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Abstract
This thesis investigates the economics of mental health focusing on three dimensions: financ-
ing and services organisation, medication adherence, and socio-economic determinants. Part
I provides a detailed analysis on the financial incentives to deliver mental healthcare services.
It also proposes innovative payment mechanisms to incentivise integrated community-based
care, to detect and prevent mental disorders early in life, and to implement a collaborative
stepped care model for depression. Part II assesses the socio-economic factors that influ-
ence non-adherence rates and investigates how one can use a payment mechanism to induce
adherence. Finally, Part III explores the relationship between unemployment and mental
health by age group and education level.
Keywords: mental health, financing & organisation, psychotropic drugs & adherence,
socio-economic determinants.
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Introduction
The World Health Organisation (WHO) defines mental health as “a state of well-being in
which the individual realises his or her own abilities, can cope with the normal stresses of
life, can work productively and fruitfully, and is able to make a contribution to his or her
community” (WHO, 2007a, p.1). This definition moves away from the simple concept that
mental health is a state of absence of mental illness.
According to WHO, around 450 million people suffer from any mental illness (WHO,
2001). In the United States (US) the 12-month prevalence of any mental disorder among
US adults amounts to 18.9% in 2017 (NIMH, 2019). Regarding serious mental illnesses
(SMI) among US adults, this rate is 4.5% (NIMH, 2019). The WHO Mental Health Surveys
Initiative assessed the prevalence of mental disorders in 10 European Union (EU)-countries
(Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Northern Ireland, Portugal,
Romania, and Spain) using data collected between 2001 and 2015 (except Portugal, 2008)
(Alonso, Chatterji and He, 2013). It was found a 12-month prevalence of any mental disorder
among adults of 13.2%. For SMI this rate amounts to 3.3%.
Mental disorders affect not only the patients but also have an impact on society (Traut-
mann, Rehm and Wittchen, 2016). Specifically, EUWMH (2013) found that 3.1% of indi-
viduals with any mental disorder are absent from work 3.1 days per month compared to 1
day per month for individuals without disorder. Also, presenteeism is much higher for in-
dividuals suffering from any mental disorder compared to individuals without disorder (2.4
and 0.5 days per month, respectively).
In the top 20 causes of global burden of disease, five are mental disorders: major depres-
sion, anxiety disorders, schizophrenia, dysthymia, and bipolar disorder (Vos et al., 2015). In
2013, mental illnesses accounted for 21.2% of years lived with disability (YLD), the highest
percentage among other groups of diseases. Using the composite measure, disability ad-
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justed life-years (DALYs), the burden of mental illness accounted for 7.1%, the fifth higher
percentage in terms of global burden of disease. However, and by reallocating neurological
disorders, self-harm, and chronic pain syndrome, Vigo, Thornicroft and Atun (2016) claim
mental illnesses account for 32.4% of YLD and 13% of DALYs. This means that assessments
of the global burden of diseases are underestimate the burden of mental illnesses. These
estimates rank mental illnesses in the first place in global burden of disease considering YLD
and DALYs.
According to Kohn et al. (2004), part of this burden results from the fact that only some
individuals receive treatment or/and treatment is delayed for many years (treatment gap).
In the US, the treatment gap for moderate to severe mental disorders amounts to 53.2%
(Kohn et al., 2018). Using data of WHO Mental Health Surveys, Wang et al. (2011) found
a treatment gap between 34% and 69% for SMI, 63% and 83% for moderate disorders, and
between 79% and 86% for mild disorders.
The cost of mental disorders does not solely comprise the diagnostic and treatment costs
(direct costs). It also includes other costs, such as productivity losses due to work absence
and/or early retirement and income losses due to mortality, disability, and care seeking.
Therefore, these should be accounted when computing the economic cost of mental disorders
(Trautmann, Rehm and Wittchen, 2016). According to Trautmann, Rehm and Wittchen
(2016), in 2010, the global direct and indirect economic costs of mental disorders amounted
to 2.5 trillion US dollars of which 1.7 refers to indirect costs. For the EU, in 2010, Gustavsson
et al. (2011) estimated the cost of brain disorders of 798 billion euros. Approximately, 37%
of this cost concerns to direct healthcare costs, 23% to direct non-medical costs, and 40%
to indirect costs related to patients’ productivity losses. Trautmann, Rehm and Wittchen
(2016) believe that these economic costs will double by 2030.
Overall, mental health imposes challenges to local Governments. Improve mental health
and reduce the burden of mental disorders should be a priority. Mental health policy “is a
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government statement specifying values, principles and objectives for mental health” (Zhou
et al., 2018, p.2) and, if correctly formulated and implemented, it can reduce its burden and
improve mental health (Zhou et al., 2018). The main areas of mental health polices have
been: service organisation, service provision, service quality, human resources, legislation
and human rights, advocacy, administration, surveillance and research, and financing and
budgeting (Zhou et al., 2018).
Economics is “concerned with the use and distribution of resources among the individuals
making up a society, and how different ways of allocating resources impacts on their well-
being” (WHO, 2006, p.5), and its application to the healthcare sector is important. Given the
impact mental disorders have not only on individuals with the disease but also on society,
“too much is at stake to ignore this economic dimension of mental health care, whether
measured in terms of lost health gains, misallocated monies or unfair financing mechanisms”
(WHO, 2006, p.11).
This thesis provides with additional evidence to the literature on economics of mental
health. It focuses on three domains: financing and service organisation, adherence to psy-
chotropic medication, and socio-economic determinants. The empirical analyses performed
in this thesis use data from Portugal because mental health in Portugal has some specificities
which make it a case study.
First, the Portuguese mental health system is essentially centred around inpatient stays
and emergency consultations, which consume more than 80% of the resources, coupled with
an insufficient provision of community-based services (Almeida et al., 2015). The way mental
health services are organised does not comply with the optimal mix of services suggested
by WHO (2007b). Specifically, it is suggested that most of mental healthcare can be self-
managed or managed by informal community-care. However, when additional support and
expertise is needed, primary care services should be able to address mental health issues and
inpatient stays should be consider as a last resort.
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Second, Portugal is one of the European’s countries with the highest prevalence of mental
health disorders (22.9% compared to 18.4% and 14.9% in France and the Netherlands, re-
spectively) (Almeida et al., 2013). Due to the financial crisis of 2008, these prevalence rates,
namely for SMI, increased (Almeida, Antunes and Silva, 2016). Additionally, and according
to the last epidemiological study, 33.6% of patients with SMI in Portugal do not receive
treatment (Almeida et al., 2013).
Finally, Portugal was strongly affected by the economic crisis, meaning that some socio-
economic determinants of mental health (e.g. unemployment and income) were largely af-
fected. Therefore, Portugal provides additional conditions to address the relationship be-
tween mental health and socio-economic determinants.
This thesis is divided in three parts: part I focuses on the financing and service organ-
isation; part II on adherence to psychotropic medication; and part III on socio-economic
determinants.
Part I includes three chapters. Chapter 1 assesses the incentives of a case-mix based
funding system in delivering mental healthcare services. The first step involves using read-
missions information as a proxy for quality of care. If readmissions are increasing over time
this can indicate a scarcity of community services or early discharges due to lack of beds or
shortage staff. On the other hand, if readmissions are decreasing we can state that inpatient
settings are providing high-quality care and responses of community services are effective.
A second relevant issue is understanding how specific determinants of the current financing
system influence delivery of inpatient mental health services. A third element is the magni-
tude of scale effects. Organisation of inpatient mental health services can be done through
concentration of services in a few units or several hospitals proving them. The trade-off to
be made is between being closer to patients having several units of low volume activity each
or benefiting from economies of scale to obtain better outcomes. Lastly, it is assessed the
importance of integrated continuous care services as a complement to inpatient care. We
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use a diagnosis related group (DRG) dataset between 1994 and 2013 considering all mental
health inpatient discharges to perform these analyses.
Using a heteroskedastic fractional probit model, evidence of a negative relationship be-
tween readmissions rate and treating more complex cases was found. The quality of care is
not affected by the number of treated patients. For hospitals that treat less complex cases,
and using a probit model, we find that the current financing system incentivises an increase
in the number of equivalent patients through rehospitalisations. Despite this effect might be
related to other DRGs, it exacerbates the problem of recurrent readmissions on psychiatric
wards. The results provide evidence of a scale effect for each DRG using a conditional risk
set model. However, its magnitude does not justify the centralisation of psychiatric services
in high-volume hospitals. In terms of long-term care, we find potential savings of 26% of
the initial cost for the National Health Service (NHS) if integrated continuous care was in
place. Based on these results, we conclude that the focus of mental health system redesign
should be on reducing readmissions by introducing a quality measure associated with DRG
prices, implementing multidisciplinary teams to provide community services and promoting
integrated mental healthcare, with concentration of hospital services not being particularly
relevant.
In Chapter 2 it is performed a comprehensive review of healthcare providers payment
schemes and their related incentives, and best practices in mental health prevention and
care. Then, it is elaborated innovative payment mechanisms, which were further discussed
with a large panel of experts. We design a four-dimension model that focused on (i) the
prevention of mental disorders early in life; (ii) the detection of mental disorders in child-
hood and adolescence; (iii) the implementation of a collaborative stepped care model for
depression; and (iv) the integrated community-based care for patients with SMI. First, it is
recommended a bundled payment to primary care practices for the follow-up of children with
special needs or at risk under two years of age. Second, it is proposed a pay-for-performance
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(P4P) scheme for all primary care practices, based on the number of users under 18 years
old who are provided with check-up consultations. Third, it is proposed a P4P scheme for
all primary care practices, based on the implementation of collaborative stepped care for
depression. Finally, a value-based risk-adjusted bundled payment for patients with SMI is
proposed. By implementing this new mental health payment scheme, it is expected that the
Portuguese mental health system will encourage and compensate early prevention and detec-
tion of mental health disorders; will create a more efficient and accessible care for depression;
and will create a more integrated, community-based care for SMI. The implementation of
evidence-based best practices in mental health requires careful attention to payment mecha-
nisms. Other countries facing similar issues can apply the suggested financing model for the
Portuguese mental health system.
Chapter 3 estimates the direct treatment costs of SMI in the Portuguese NHS and its cost
determinants. Data was collected from two Portuguese general hospitals and one Psychiatric
hospital during one year (1st of September 2014 to 31st of August 2015). Schizophrenic
and delusional disorders had the highest average cost per patient, of e1,577 and e1,493,
respectively. The cost per diagnosis decreased with age and male patients were more costly
when diagnosed with schizophrenia and affective disorders. We found some heterogeneity
among SMI and patients’ characteristics. The treatment cost of SMI in its acute phase is
relatively low in comparison with other chronic diseases. As Portugal is a country with
tight public health budgets, especially for mental health, an effective resource allocation is
crucial and can be done through economic evaluations, which requires evidence on mental
health costs. Cost determinants’ analysis provides the rationale to introduce risk adjustment
measures linked to per patient disease-related payment.
Part II includes two chapters. Chapter 4 analysis the association between primary non-
adherence and its main drivers. Using data on prescription in primary care and dispensing
of psychotropic drugs between 2009 and 2015, we compute non-adherence rates for coun-
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ties belonging to the Center region of Portugal. We merge socio-economic characteristics at
municipality-level such as unemployment rate and percentage of welfare recipients to build a
more complete set of information on patients’ context. Using a fractional probit model, it is
estimated the association between non-adherence rate and socio-economic determinants, us-
ing the pair municipality-year as unit of observation. Between 2015 and 2009, non-adherence
rates were about 8.5% and 23.7%, respectively. These results show that an increase of 1 per-
centage point in the percentage of beneficiaries of social benefits and unemployment rate
has a positive impact on non-adherence rate of 1.5 and 1.1 percentage points, respectively.
Younger individuals are less adherent to treatment. The number of physicians and average
wage in the municipality are negatively associated with non-adherence rate. These results
are capturing the effect of adverse economic conditions on non-adherence to psychotropic
medication. Specifically, there are two particular groups within the population which are
more vulnerable: the unemployed and welfare recipients. Policies focusing on unemployment
benefits should not be discarded since they can improve mental health status and may allow
individuals to afford medication. Integrating mental health in the benefit system is also of
great importance. We suggest the implementation of an additional co-payment for welfare
recipients and unemployed, given special attention to the youth. These measures should
be coordinated with strategies to enhance mental health. Hence, effective policies ought
combine the three key-areas: health, labour market, and social security.
Chapter 5 analysis the physician’s payment if treatment non-adherence is a possibility.
We design a model with a patient diagnosed with a mental health disease being followed
by one semi-altruistic physician. The Government has to decide how to pay the physician
so that she provides the proper treatment to the patient, knowing its resources come from
taxpayers. The physician receives a bonus if the patient adheres to the treatment and an
additional improvement bonus if the patient’s health status improves. The patient, who faces
an adherence cost, has to decide whether to adhere to the treatment or not. Our results show
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that when the patient and the physician need to be convinced to turn to the adherence side,
the Government decision is based on the level of tax distortion. Specifically, when the tax
distortion is low the optimal adherence bonus is zero and the improvement bonus decreases
with the level of altruism and with the benefit the patient gets if his health status improves.
On the other hand, if the tax distortion is moderate, it does not matter how the optimal
adherence and improvement bonuses are distributed as long as the expected payment to the
physician does not change. When the tax distortion is too high, it is not optimal to induce
adherence. This concludes payment mechanisms can induce adherence. However, and in
periods of tight budgets where adherence is not guarantee, the way bonuses are paid to the
physician is not relevant as long as the expected payment remains the same. Other reasons
like administrative simplicity can dictate which payment system prevails.
Part III provides additional evidence on the unemployment-mental health relationship
by allowing the impact of unemployment on perceived mental health to differ by age group
and, within each age group, to vary according to the education level of the individual.
We use Portuguese data for the period 2014 and 2015. We found evidence of a negative
relationship between unemployment and perceived mental health for individuals under 35.
The magnitude of this relationship increases with the level of education of the individual. We
conjecture that our results may be reflecting the unmet expectations of young individuals
who completed more years of schooling as far as labour market outcomes are concerned.
That is, well-educated young unemployed appear as a particular vulnerable group of mental
health exposed to unemployment in times of economic crises. Our results point to the need
of coordinating policies targeting both mental health and unemployment at this age group.
The table below provides a summary description of this thesis.
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Part I
Financing and Services Organisation
11

Chapter 1
Delivering mental healthcare
inpatient services: incentives of a
case-mix funded system
1.1 Introduction
Mental or psychological well-being makes up a valuable part of an individuals’ capacity to
lead a fulfilling life (Chisholm, Saxena and Van Ommeren, 2006). The latest epidemiological
research shows that psychiatric disorders and mental health problems have become one of
the main causes of disability in societies nowadays (Almeida, 2009).
According to Knapp et al. (2007a), economic costs of mental health disorders are very
high. For the former 15 European countries, a conservative estimation of these costs was
performed and points to an average cost of 3 to 4% of Gross National Product (Gabriel and
Liimatainen, 2000). More recently, and for 30 European countries, Wittchen et al. (2011)
estimate the economic cost of mental disorders in about 497 billion euros. This cost not only
includes both direct and indirect health costs (e.g. diagnosis and treatment of a disorder,
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social and informal services) but also indirect costs related to productivity loss.
One of the main challenges European countries are facing is to ensure mental health ser-
vices receive a fair share of the available health funding (MHE, 2002). Mental health system
financing has become a priority for almost all European countries and the US (McDaid,
Knapp and Curran, 2005; Garfield, 2011).
The way mental health is financed can create incentives or barriers to system’s reform and
have long-term consequences on planning and delivery of services (Salvador-Carulla et al.,
2006). Hence, assessing the impact of the current financing system on mental healthcare
services is crucial.
In this paper we analyse the mental health inpatient and long-term care using data of
the Portuguese NHS, a case-mix based funding system, which is currently discussing a new
financing model. More specifically, we investigate if the current financing system is creating
barriers in delivering mental health services. The first element involves using readmissions
as a proxy for quality of care. If readmissions are increasing over time this can indicate
ineffective community services’ responses or early discharges due to lack of beds or shortage
staff. On the other hand, if readmissions are decreasing we claim that inpatient services are
providing high-quality care and community services are being effective. Second, we analyse
how mental healthcare should be organised since this is the first step in the discussion
of a payment design. Suppose unit costs and outcomes of mental healthcare are largely
independent of the amount of work performed in each setting. Then, a single payment value,
applicable to all units, small and large, would be feasible. Moreover, the size of each unit
could be left totally to patients’ preferences or patients’ geographic concentration. At the
other extreme, in the presence of strong size (scale) effects, healthcare facilities of different
size may need different unit payments and location of activities of hospitals providing mental
healthcare services must be actively planned.
Additionally, and according to the literature, mental health services should be balanced
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between hospital and community-based services (Almeida and Killaspy, 2011).1 Thus, the
Portuguese government has been approving several decree-laws on integrated continuous care
for patients with SMI.2 These continuous care facilities aim to provide recovery and deinstitu-
tionalisation programmes for patients with SMI and serve as a complement to inpatient care.
The rationale is to transfer patients with SMI to these facilities once they are clinically stable
which allows, on average, shorter inpatient stays. As the implementation of these services
has constantly been postponed, we analyse the potential savings that integrated continuous
care can bring to the Portuguese NHS. Identifying these potential savings, along with their
clinical benefits, allows to discuss how mental healthcare organisation should be balanced
between hospital and integrated care. This topic is relevant also for the payment design as
it should reduce incentives for (re)institutionalisation and promote community-based care.3
Our results reveal that quality of care, measured by readmissions rate, is not affected by
the number of inpatient discharges. Using a probit model, we find that the current financing
mechanism is creating incentives for hospitals to increase the number of readmissions.
As far as services organisation is concerned, since we want to model the length of time
spent by each patient in a hospital before discharge, we use a duration model, specifically a
conditional risk set model. We opt to use this model because it accounts for several speci-
ficities of our dataset, such as recurrent readmissions within 30 days of discharge (meaning
that patients did not improve their health status) and repeated events for the same patient
(he can improve his health status but after a period of time, more than 30 days, he gets sick
again). Our results show there is no advantage in centralisation of activities in high volume
hospitals. We also identify potential savings for the NHS that range between e4.5M and
e13.4M if integrated continuous care facilities were part of the Portuguese mental health
1Community mental health services include, among others, supported housing with full or partial super-
vision, primary care medical services, daycare centers and community mental health centers.
2Patients whose diagnosis is one of the following: schizophrenia, bipolar or severe depressive disorders.
3One example is England’s “Care Pathways and Packages Approaches”.
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system as a support to inpatient care (about 26% of the initial cost). Transferring patients
with SMI to these facilities will reduce, on average, the hospitals’ length of stay (LOS).
This implies an increase in hospitals’ bed capacity allowing hospitals to treat more patients.
Based on our results, hospitals would have capacity to treat, on average, 10% to 27% more
patients with severe mental disorders per year.
Based on our results, we suggest that the new mental health financing plan should improve
quality of care by introducing adjusted payments which reward hospitals for the additional
cost/effort towards quality. Also, implementing multidisciplinary teams to provide commu-
nity care services is crucial. The new financing plan does not need to induce concentration
nor to accommodate the fact that high volume hospitals could receive proportionally less
because they benefit from economies fo scale. Hence, it would be feasible to have a single
payment to all units providing mental health inpatient care. Additionally, and given that
the treatment gap in Portugal for severe mental disorders is about 33.6% (Almeida et al.,
2013), the new mechanism should consider integrated continuous care as part of the Por-
tuguese mental health system since hospitals will have greater capacity to treat more patients
besides all the clinical benefits of these facilities.
We believe that our results and methodology might be extended to other NHS where
mental health services are being financed using a case-mix based funding system.
The remainder of this chapter is as follows. The next section briefly describes the Por-
tuguese health financing system and reviews the literature on the topic. Section 1.3 presents
the dataset used throughout our analysis and the descriptive statistics, while the method-
ological approach is described in Section 1.4. Section 1.5 presents the main results from our
analysis, which are then discussed in Section 1.6. Sections 1.7 and 1.8 provide the robustness
checks and limitations of our analysis, respectively. Finally, Section 1.9 concludes.
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1.2 Literature Review
1.2.1 The Portuguese National Health Service
The Portuguese health system is organised around a NHS, which is managed by the Ministry
of Health. The Portuguese NHS was set to comply with the Constitution disposition that
establishes the right of all citizens to health protection, regardless of their economic and
social background (Barros and Simo˜es, 2007; Simo˜es et al., 2017).
Hospitals belonging to the NHS are not paid episode by episode. There is a global
contract, contratos-progama, between each hospital and Administrac¸a˜o Central do Sistema
de Sau´de, I.P. (ACSS) that bundles together all prospective episodes.4 The total amount a
hospital h receives is equal to
Fh = Ih +Oh +Hah (1.1)
where Ih, Oh and Hah stand for inpatient care, outpatient care and other hospital activities,
5
respectively.
Concerning inpatient care, a hospital h is paid according to the following formula:
Ih = price× eph × cmih (1.2)
where eph stands for the number of equivalent patients and cmih is the case-mix index.
The price is computed using the price and weight of each DRG for a hospital h.6 The
number of equivalent patients not only considers the normal acute inpatient episodes which
have a LOS between an inferior and a superior limits defined for each DRG, but also the
4The NHS’ financial and human resources, facilities and equipment, systems and information technology
is managed by ACSS.
5E.g.: Scientific Research.
6The prices and weights of the DRG are stipulated by decree-laws.
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episodes with a LOS below or above the above mentioned limits,7 respectively. The equiv-
alent patients formula converts these last two types of episodes in equivalent normal acute
inpatient episodes. Also, the number of days in-hospital of transferred patients are converted
in equivalent episodes. A normal acute episode corresponds to one equivalent patient.
The case-mix index (cmi) is a measure of relative cost or resources needed to treat the
mix of patients. It reflects the diversity and complexity of all patients treated in a hospital.
To compute the cmi we need to weight the number of equivalent patients by the relative
weight for each DRG. The relative weights reflect the national “average hospital resource
consumption” by patient for that DRG relative to the national “average hospital resource
consumption” of all patients. Until 2014, the cmi was computed separately for medical
and surgical DRGs but from 2014 onwards, there is a unique cmi, comprising medical and
surgical activities. It should be highlighted that the price and weights set for DRGs are not
based on analytical cost. They have an historical origin with subsequent adjustments being
made mostly ad-hoc to the external researcher.8
Regarding hospital rehospitalisations, there is no additional payment if they occurred 72
hours after the last discharge.9 There are exceptions namely for psychiatric patients. In this
case, mental health patients that are readmitted within 60 days after last discharge are paid
using a daily price.10
As far as organisation is concerned, the public infrastructures for healthcare provision
have been restructured in the recent past. Most of the Portuguese hospitals are now ad-
ministratively part of health units called hospital centers (Centros Hospitalares). In some
regions, the government has been grouping together the local primary care health centers
7These boundaries are stipulated by decree-laws.
8No information has been publicly disclosed on the reason for these price changes.
9It is defined as multiple inpatient stays within a specified time period by the same patient.
10This price is defined by decree-law and it is the price paid to “other health care centers with inpatient
care”. In 2013 this price refers to the daily price paid to midterm rehabilitation care unit of the Portuguese
National Network for Integrated Care. In 1994 and 1995 the decree-law does not provide any price for
rehospitalisations.
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and the hospitals located in the same region into a single administrative unit known as local
health units (Unidade Local de Sau´de). The main idea behind this restructure was to pro-
mote efficiency gains from integrated care. This reorganisation did not imply the closure of
a hospital but instead the reconfiguration of acute services. This means that only in a few
number of cases, duplicated services within different hospitals of the same hospital center
were closed.
As far as mental health is concerned, Portugal is currently shifting from psychiatric hos-
pitals to a network of services based on the community. The rationale is to keep patients in
their respective residential communities instead of staying in psychiatric hospitals (Almeida,
2009). Thornicroft and Tansella (2003) argue that when deinstitutionalisation is carefully
planned, patients who are discharged to community care present better outcomes. Since
2007, Portugal closed two psychiatric hospitals which were replaced by community-based
services and mental health units in general hospitals. Due to this service reorganisation,
the mental health referral network was modified and new psychiatric services within general
hospitals were developed (DGS, 2004). The aim of this reorganisation is to provide services
closer to the population by developing community-based services (Almeida, 2009). Empirical
evidence shows that community care services not only promote better continuity of care but
also increase treatment compliance (Almeida and Killaspy, 2011).
However, Portugal still relies on inpatient care since it lacks of community care services,
domiciliary services and primary care services oriented towards mental healthcare. One pos-
sible reason for this fact is the way mental healthcare is funded (Almeida, 2009).11 Budget
rigidity, absence of financial incentives and lack of explicit funding for community services
are some factors that have been restraining the progress of mental health services (WHO,
2003b).
11In A.1.1 we present some of the arguments that have been put forward for a new mental health financing
plan.
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Still, no empirical study was performed on the organisation of inpatient mental health ser-
vices nor on community-based services, highlighting the need for evidence that can guide
policy making.
In 2010, and in order to solve a long-existing gap in social support and healthcare in
Portugal, the government established, by the decree-law 8/2010,12 the integrated continuous
care for patients with SMI (Portuguese National Network for Integrated Care for mental
health patients, RNCCISM). These services are a set of sequential interventions in mental
health and/or social support, focusing on rehabilitation and recovery of patients with SMI.
In the light of family and social integration, integrated continuous care conducts an active
and continuous process of rehabilitation and social support by promoting self-sufficiency and
improving patients’ outcomes. The rationale is to transfer patients from inpatient care to
these healthcare facilities, after they are clinically stable. The provision of these services
includes three types of residential units (maximum support, intermediate support and mini-
mum support), social integration facilities (day centers) and home support teams. In 2011,13
the government defined the prices that should be paid to these integrated continuous care
units.
The implementation of these services has been postponed. Despite several studies stating
the clinical benefits of these facilities on patients’ outcomes (Almeida and Killaspy, 2011),
there is no study providing empirical evidence on savings for the NHS if integrated care was
in place.
1.2.2 Mental Health Financing
Mental healthcare is characterised by diversity in provision, which covers long-term and
acute care, and medical, mental, rehabilitative and social services (Mason and Goddard,
12Updated version is given by the decree-law 22/2011.
13Decree-law 183/2011.
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2009). For a successful mental health system it is essential for patients to have access to
good physical and human capital resources. Many countries found limitation on resources
which restrict access and constraint health improvements. Policy-makers not only have to
decide on the distribution of funding within mental health system but also on the allocation
of resources between regions, services and programs (WHO, 2003b). The concepts of equity,14
effectiveness,15 and efficiency can help policy-makers to make such decisions.16 One way to
affect these elements is to use the financing and payment system.
When designing a mental health payment system, governments should take into consid-
eration the issues related to supply- and demand-side. On the supply side, financing and
reimbursement mechanisms affect the provision and availability of mental health services.
On the demand side, utilisation rates by people with mental disorders is low.17 Consider-
ing the purchaser side, such as governments, they may “disinvest” in mental health when
budgetary pressures arise. Hence, depending on how a payment system is design, it can
“exacerbate or ameliorate imbalances between supply and demand” (Mason and Goddard,
2009, p.1).
For most European countries, mental healthcare is financed in the same way as other
healthcare services, using either national, regional or local budgets (MHE, 2002). Therefore,
general decisions about such financing may not be in line with mental health policy-maker
or planner (WHO, 2003b).
The WHO proposes four ways to purchase mental health services: global budget, cap-
itation, the case rate and fee-for-service (FFS). The global budget allows the purchaser to
predict with certainty the level of expenditures on mental health in a given year. Capitation
14No particular segment of the population is favoured. Equity can be measured in terms of healthcare
status, utilisation of services, resources and access.
15Achieve the expected outcome which is measured by “how well results are produced” (WHO, 2003b,
p.12).
16Related to the resources required for effectiveness.
17This fact namely reflects the stigma and financial barriers (Mason and Goddard, 2009).
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is based on a fixed fee for each enrolled person. In this case, a specific level of healthcare
is covered, regardless of the amount of services provided. In the case rate (or bundled pay-
ment), purchasers pay a fixed amount to cover the average costs of all services needed to
achieve a successful outcome for a pre-defined episode of care. Finally, the FFS pays a fixed
fee each time a patient accesses the system, that is, the payment is based on the number of
procedures or the number of services provided. This mechanism gives economic incentives
to physicians to provide more units of care to increase reimbursement (WHO, 2003b).
Most of the empirical work regarding the innovative mental health system financing is
based on evidence from the US. Some of the studies found that FFS provides incentives for
over utilisation (Menon, 2014). The most relevant studies about this topic found that moving
from a FFS reimbursement to a capitation payment system lower inpatient and outpatient
costs without patients becoming sicker (Dwyer et al., 1995; Bloom et al., 1998; Chou et al.,
2005; Bloom et al., 2011). However, capitation per se may not increase prevention (Catalano
et al., 2000).
In the Netherlands it was introduced a new reimbursement schedule in mental healthcare
based on discontinuous discrete step function. That is, providers receive a fee according to the
treatment duration but this fee is flat and only increases after the next threshold is reached.
The authors found that this system increased the total costs since the unintended effects
offset efficiency gains (Douven, Remmerswaal and Mosca, 2015). Specifically, treatments
were shifted to a next threshold resulting in an increase of costs. The table in appendix
A.1.2 summarises the most relevant works on this topic.
Less research has been performed on the case-mix based funding in mental health (Mason
and Goddard, 2009). Based on evidence from the US, Jennison and Ellis (1986) found that
the rate of visits per mental health provider per month increased when they shift from a
salaried basis to a FFS reimbursement mechanism. Rosenthal (2000) examined the effects of
risk sharing with mental health providers. The introduction of a case-rate payment system
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resulted in a reduction of outpatient visits compared to a FFS system.
The DRG system can be effective to ensure that sufficient resources are transferred to
mental health services. Nevertheless, and for some countries such as Italy and Austria, this
system under-funds mental healthcare (Mason and Goddard, 2009). A possible explanation
relies on the reimbursement rates which “have not always fully taken into account all the costs
associated with chronic mental health problems” (Knapp et al., 2007a, p.86). In Austria,
the DRG system was reformed to take into account the additional problems associated with
mental healthcare and to allow adjustments in the LOS for different levels of clinical need.
This reform has been allowing psychiatric wards to cover their costs (Knapp et al., 2007a).
In the United Kingdom (UK), payment by results (PbR) is the mechanism used to pay
for NHS’s hospital service. PbR does not “reward results, in the sense of paying for health
outcomes, but remunerates “activity” using Healthcare Resource Groups (HRGs) as the pay-
ment units” (Mason and Goddard, 2009, p.3). The classification system created for mental
health is based on a model of care cluster. Care clusters are reference groups used to link
service users with similar needs and problem severities. The focus of this new classification
system relies on patient need and severity. This model “moves away from purely diagnostic
descriptions of people (though not wholly) to one of broadly described needs” (Clark, 2011,
p.72).
In Australia, the National Casemix & Classification Centre found that mental health ma-
jor diagnostic category (MDC) had the worst performance when compared to other DRGs
in terms of differences in resource consumption between patients. Specifically, the perfor-
mance is assessed using the Reduction in Deviation (RID) statistic. The higher the RID,
the better. This statistic is applied to several performance outcomes such as the LOS. For
mental health MDC, the LOS RID is about 16% while for the best performing MDC is 76%,
and considering all MDCs is approximately 61% (UOW, 2012). It was recommended a new
classification of mental health disorders to be used in the specialist mental health sector.
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One of the weaknesses in this vast literature is that the main empirical studies focus on
the analysis of the impact of changing the payment system from a FFS to capitation using
data from the US. Since the US has a “decentralised, multi-payer system with mixture of
private and public finance” (Mason and Goddard, 2009, p.14), the results cannot be fully
extended to a NHS.
Overall, mental health financing needs to be carefully analysed, the first step being the
assessment of incentives provided by the current financing system. Therefore, our paper adds
evidence to the literature on the incentives a case-mix funded system creates in delivering
mental health inpatient services.
1.2.3 Services Organisation
A mental healthcare system assumes a multidisciplinary approach to psychiatric disorders
(Knapp et al., 2007a). Evidence points to a balanced care between community-based and
modern hospital-based care (Thornicroft and Tansella, 2003). Frontline services are based in
the community but hospitals play an important role as specialist providers. When inpatient
care is required, LOS should be as brief as possible whilst supported by a good community
mental health services (WHO, 2003b). Empirical studies found that, after a discharge, the
risk of readmission decreases when a good clinical practice within the community is offered
(Zhang, Harvey and Andrew, 2011). Hence, organisation of inpatient care reveals to be
an important issue for the system’s efficiency and readmissions can be used as a proxy for
quality of care.
In the US, managed care is a system that integrates financing and delivery of appropriate
healthcare using a comprehensive set of services. Its major role is to control spending levels
using specific financial parameters. Managed care comprises many types of organisations and
insurance options. Also, “it includes systems of financing service delivery such as capitation
and putting providers at risk for the cost of delivery” (WHO, 2003b, p.47). Empirically,
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Bernstein and Fox (2000) found that implementing managed care to patients with SMI is an
effective way to achieve cost efficiency.
In the UK, assertive outreach teams (AOTs) and crisis resolution teams (CRTs) have
been introduced as part of the community mental healthcare system. They aim to assess
all patients being considered for acute hospital admission, to offer intensive home treatment
rather than hospital admission (if feasible), and to facilitate early discharge from hospital
(Chisholm and Ford, 2004). Several empirical studies have been performed to understand
the impact of these service models on inpatient admissions (Wane et al., 2007; Barker et al.,
2011; Jacobs and Barrenho, 2011; Hamilton et al., 2015), LOS (Barker et al., 2011), and
service cost (McCrone et al., 2009). Except in the study of Jacobs and Barrenho (2011), all
these studies found a reduction on inpatient admissions, LOS, and in service cost. Jacobs
and Barrenho (2011) did not find a statistically significant difference between admissions
before and after the implementation of CRTs. However, this study was carried at primary
care trusts which might have underestimated the impact of CRTs that operate in a smaller
geographic area. Also, and as pointed out by Werbeloff et al. (2017), there are several risk
factors that may explain admissions in acute mental health facilities after contact with AOTs
and CRTs, such as older age and being diagnosed with non-affective psychosis.
In appendix A.1.3 it is presented a table that briefly describes some of the empirical
studies on managed care, AOTs, and CRTs.
Since a large debate about financing mental health is taking place in the literature, it is
important to understand if there is any gain in terms of efficiency from centralising activities
in higher volume hospitals. The rationale for this analysis relies on the fact that hospitals,
which treat more patients, are able to “spread their fixed costs across a wider activity base,
thereby reducing the average cost per patient” (Freeman, Savva and Scholtes, 2016, p.7). So,
larger hospitals may be more cost-effective than smaller ones. This catchy argument requires
a clear empirical background which is currently absent. Policy makers need to account for
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the possibility of concentrating activities in some hospitals or at least accommodate the fact
that some hospitals may receive proportionally less as they benefit from economies of scale.
The literature is vast in what concerns hospital efficiency since hospitals consume a
significant share of health resources in most countries (OECD, 2012a). Specifically, analysis
on the economies of scale, stating whether larger hospitals are more or less efficient than
smaller ones, has gained importance (Posnett, 1999; Weaver and Deolalikar, 2004; Morikawa,
2010). The empirical work performed on this topic focuses on the analysis at a hospital-level
(Morikawa, 2010) and on specific medical treatments (Gaynor, Seider and Vogt, 2005).
As far as hospital-level is concerned, the results are consistent among studies on this
topic.18 Evidence points to a scale effect for small hospitals (less than 200 beds), a constant
scale effect for the average hospital with about 200-300 beds and an average cost increase for
hospitals with more than 400-600 beds (Aletras, Jones and Sheldon, 1997; Kristensen et al.,
2008).
The work performed on specific medical treatments reports a relationship between hos-
pital volume and outcomes such as mortality rates or other proxies (LOS, physician volume)
(Hamilton and Hamilton, 1997; Gaynor, Seider and Vogt, 2005). Logistic and probit regres-
sion models, accounting for fixed effects at hospital level, are the most common methodologies
applied in these volume-outcome studies.
Regarding studies on services organisation at a medical speciality level, Peltokorpi et al.
(2011) found potential savings of 35.3% when applying the economy of scope and scale in
vascular surgery operations. However, these concepts applied to services organisation at a
medical speciality level have not received much attention in the literature. Hence, we add to
the literature an analysis of economies of scale in mental health departments within general
hospitals. We also provide evidence on potential savings that integrated continuous care
18Most of the studies focus their analyses on a specific country and use different methodologies such as the
estimation of the total factor productivity (Morikawa, 2010) or the estimation of the short-run cost function
to determine the long-run scale economies (Kristensen et al., 2008).
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may bring to the mental health system (besides all clinical benefits), which so far has not
been done.
1.3 Data
We use the DRG dataset of hospital discharges, which is organised by ACSS. It includes all
inpatient discharges at the NHS and the diseases are classified according to the International
Classification of Diseases, 9th Revision, Clinical Modification (ICD-9-CM).19 We only con-
sider mental health diseases (i.e. DRGs 424 to 432) using observations from 1994 to 2013,
excluding Psychiatric Hospitals.20 We exclude these hospitals from the analysis because not
only they have more long-term care beds than general hospitals but because they have spe-
ciality units which cannot be fully compared with the services provided by general hospitals.
Moreover, psychiatric hospitals are planned to be excluded from the mental health system
as the Portuguese government aims to develop a mental health system balanced between
inpatient care, provided by general hospitals and community-based services.
This dataset comprises information about patients characteristics such as age and gender.
We merge hospital level information data (annual data) — case-mix index (cmi),21 beds,
average yearly LOS (lstay), discharged patients (dp), and total cost (totalcost),22 — from
ACSS and hospital reports, available at ACSS.23 This information is only available from 2001
onwards. 74 hospitals do not have complete information over these variables. To overcome
this problem, we use information of the following year whenever a gap exists. In addition,
we do not have information regarding the year 2013 on the hospital-level variables and,
19For the cost analysis we use All Patient DRG (AP-DRG) grouper, version 21.
20In appendix A.2.1 we provide the description of each DRG code.
21Through our analysis, the computation of cmi slightly change. However, these changes are not significant
enough to undermine its use since the key element that we aim to capture is the cross-section differences.
22This cost comprises operational, financial and extraordinary costs gathered from the financial state-
ments.
23In appendix A.2.2 we present the sources of information used.
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therefore, we use 2012 information as a proxy.
We found eleven cases of rehospitalisation, in the same DRGs, that had an admission
date previous to the last discharge. These cases were removed from our dataset as they were
a registration error. We also dropped 7,685 observations of patients aged 15 and younger
since they are treated in Child and Adolescent Psychiatric inpatient units.24 The dataset,
including all discharges from 1994 to 2013, has 209,415 observations.
Observations of some hospitals were combined due to the creation of hospital centers and
local health units. Given to this merge, in 2011, the data of Centro Hospitalar e Universita´rio
de Coimbra includes the discharges of the psychiatric hospital Sobral Cid. We are not able
to disentangle the information of this psychiatric hospital. In appendix A.2.3 we present a
summary of the hospital mergers occurred in the NHS.
1.3.1 Descriptive Statistics
The number of mental health inpatient discharges increased by approximately 4% between
1994 and 2013 which is slightly higher compared to the overall discharges in the NHS (3%).
DRGs 426 (Depressive neuroses), 429 (Organic disturbances and mental retardation), and
430 (Psychosis) are the codes with more cases registered, representing together approximately
82% of all mental health discharges. The histogram is presented in appendix A.2.4. DRG
430 is the most heterogeneous group within mental health DRGs since it comprises different
diseases such as schizophrenia, schizo-affective, and bipolar disorders. 98% of all inpatient
discharges whose diagnoses are severe mental disorders were registered in DRG 430. These
disorders account for 43% of all mental health inpatient discharges.
Almost all hospitals registered cases in all DRGs — DRGs 424 and 427 were recorded in
83.3% of all hospitals, DRGs 425, 426, and 429 in 98.3%, DRG 428 in 79.2%, DRG 430 in
95.8%, DRG 431 in 77.5% and DRG 432 in 89.2%.
24Patients aged 16 and older may be treated in adult mental health inpatient units.
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Given the number of cases treated per year, we consider that a small capacity hospital
treats less than 302 cases per year, whereas a high capacity hospital treats more than 542
cases per year.25 In our dataset, 72% of the hospitals treated less than 302 cases per year
and 9.2% treated more than 542 cases per year. To what concerns the overall dimension of
the hospital (measured by the number of beds), 52% of all inpatient discharges were treated
in hospitals with less than 650 beds. However, more than half of these observations were
treated in hospitals with a number of beds that range between 400 and 650.
To analyse a possible correlation between hospital capacity and the treatment of complex
cases (considering complex cases the ones that are more costly), we analyse the average
total cost per hospital associated with mental health DRGs and year. This “cost” range
between eight hundred euros and four thousand euros, approximately.26 We excluded from
this analysis the surgical DRG (DRG 424) since not only has a higher price when compared
to the other DRGs but also the number of cases recorded in this DRG is small. In Figure
A.2, appendix A.2.5, we present the average “cost” by hospital capacity. The “outlier” in
the small capacity hospitals group concerns to a hospital that treated only one case in 2011.
Regarding the medium and high capacity hospitals, we consider there are three distinct
groups in terms of costs. This is explained by the DRG prices update. Overall, this figure
allows one to say that both small and medium capacity hospitals treat complex cases.
In mental health inpatient care, the key important variables are the LOS and rehos-
pitalisations (Gaynes et al., 2015). Since these variables will be used in our analyses, we
provide a detail descriptive statistics in subsections 1.3.1.1 and 1.3.1.2, respectively. Addi-
tionally, special attention should be given to DRG 430 as it comprises approximately 51%
of all mental health inpatient discharges. Subsection 1.3.1.3 discriminates a detail analysis
25These values correspond to the 25th and 75th percentiles, respectively.
26As mentioned before, price and weight of DRGs are not based on analytical cost. Therefore, the best
we can do is to use the DRG prices as a proxy of the cost. The price can be obtained using the decree-laws
that were in force in the period under analysis.
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on the diagnoses recorded in DRG 430. In appendix A.2.6 we provide a description of all
the variables included in our analysis, their respective designations and summary statistics
for DRG 430 — Psychosis. For the remaining DRGs, this information is presented in a web
appendix.27 In subsections 1.3.1.4 and 1.3.1.5 we perform a patient analysis and determine
the level of complexity in mental health, respectively.
1.3.1.1 Length of Stay
In the period under analysis, approximately 98.7% of all discharges have a LOS less than
90 days (mean and standard deviation amount to 22.2 and 135.4 days, respectively) and,
within 90 days, we have approximately 67.3% of cases with a LOS between 1 and 20 days
(Figure A.3, in appendix A.2.7).
The total LOS increased by approximately 2.9% between 1994 and 2013 due to an increase
in the number of discharges with LOS of less than 40 days. During this period, the percentage
of cases with a LOS above 120 days decreased, with exception of 2013. In addition, 0.14%
of all discharges have a LOS of more than 360 days registered in all DRGs. More than 80%
of these cases were registered in DRGs 430 and 429. In our data there are 146 cases with a
LOS higher than 1,000 days.
The LOS can in part explain hospital costs, as there is a strong, although not perfect,
correlation between LOS and hospital costs (Polverejan et al., 2003). Therefore, it is impor-
tant to understand the outliers in our sample. We use the method applied by Freitas et al.
(2012) where LOS outliers are defined as episodes with a LOS that exceeds the geometric
mean plus two standard deviations of all inpatient stays registered in the same DRG per year.
This method seems reasonable as LOS distribution is approximately log-normal and “it could
lead to a high level of agreement between costs and LOS, identifying the majority of extreme
costs” (Freitas et al., 2012, p.3). Outliers account for 2% of total discharges distributed as
27https://meocloud.pt/link/28843095-7089-400d-b320-5a26a6a528b7/Web_Appendix/
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follows: DRG 426 (33.9%), DRG 430 (20.4%), and DRG 425 (13.5%). Approximately 54%
of all outliers were registered in eight hospitals.
Considering the average length of stay (ALOS), DRG 430 has the highest ALOS (26.3
days) among the others DRGs (not considering DRG 424 as it is a surgical one — its ALOS
amounts to 38.6 days).
Figure A.4, presented in appendix A.2.8, conveys a considerable increase in the ALOS
from 1999 to 2000 which is explained not only by a decrease in the number of discharges in
2000 but also due to an increase in the LOS of most DRGs, with exception of DRGs 425,
426, and 428.
The ALOS per hospital range between 4.5 and 70.2 days from 1994 to 2013, respectively.
Comparing the ALOS between hospital centers and hospitals per se, we can state that around
73.5% of hospital centers have a higher ALOS.
1.3.1.2 Rehospitalisations
Hospital readmissions are defined as multiple inpatient stays within a specified time pe-
riod by the same patient. They are an important indicator of patient health outcome and
healthcare system performance. They are also regarded as an indicator of poor care or lack
of coordination of care services. In the US, data from Medicare hospitalisations collected
in 2005 shows that 37% of Medicare expenditures concern to inpatient care. Readmissions
account for a significant share of this cost: 18% of Medicare patients are readmitted within
30-days of discharge, accounting for $15 billion (Minott, 2008).
Despite shorter stays tend to be more service intensive and more costly per day, too
short LOS could also cause adverse effects on health outcomes, or reduce the comfort and
recovery of the patient. If these outcomes lead to a greater readmission rate, costs per
episode of illness may fall only slightly, or even rise (OECD, 2011). Recent research shows
that hospital ALOS is positively associated with lower readmission rates (Mark et al., 2013).
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In our data we have 27,622 cases of rehospitalisation from 1994 to 2013 and about 64.2%
and 12.6% of these rehospitalisations occur in DRGs 430 and 426, respectively. All these
cases happen within a year.28 Nearly 42.8% of all rehospitalisations (corresponding to 11,821
cases) occur within 30 days and 1.3% (347 cases) happen within the same day.
Rehospitalisations registered within the same DRG amount to 21,345 (corresponding to
approximately 77.3% of all rehospitalisations). About 74.1% and 10% of these cases are coded
as DRGs 430 and 426, respectively. The average time to rehospitalisation amounts to 68.1
days in DRG 430 and 74.8 days in DRG 426. Approximately 21.5% of these rehospitalisations
were registered in the last three years — from 2012 to 2013, it increased 6.5%. The ALOS
of the first inpatient admission has been decreasing in the last three years, namely between
2011 and 2012 (approximately 16.5%). The same trend is identified for the ALOS of the
rehospitalisations, with exception of 2012.
Analysing readmissions,29 they amount to 9,434 (corresponding to 44.2% of all rehos-
pitalisations within the same DRG). Approximately 51% of these readmissions occur in 10
hospitals.
We identify a pattern in readmissions, which consists in a seven-day peak. This pattern
is characterised by having a large number of readmissions in every seven-days.
These peaks are in part explained by the readmissions registered in one hospital, which we
call Hospital X (Figure 1.1).30 According to psychiatrists, both the third and fourth peaks
are explained by the fact that some patients who receive maintenance electro-convulsive
therapy (ECT) need to stay in the hospital for at least one day. However, and excluding
from our analysis the readmissions occurred in this hospital, in weeks 3 and 4, we still
28The number that identifies each patient is different every year which means that it is possible to have
rehospitalisations occurred between years but we are not able to identify them. Only from 2012 onwards we
are able to follow the patient between years.
29Individuals being rehospitalised within 30 days of last discharge from hospital and registered in the
same DRG.
30We are not authorised to specify the hospitals’ name in our analysis.
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Figure 1.1: Histogram – Readmissions
have three peaks — 6, 13, and 21 days.31 In our dataset, we have a variable that allows
us to distinguish between both emergency and non-emergency readmissions. Based on this
variable, in Figure 1.2 we present the histogram of emergency readmissions which allows to
conclude that the peaks we identified earlier concerns to non-emergency readmissions. The
Figure 1.2: Histogram – Emergency Readmissions
unplanned readmissions amount to 68% of the total readmissions within the same DRG.
This means that non-emergency readmissions account for a significant share of the total
31We have another peak corresponding to 3 days after the last discharge which cannot be explained by
the fact that some patients left the hospital on Friday and were readmitted on next Monday, as the number
of these cases is not significant.
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readmissions (32%). Regarding the readmissions occurred in days 3, 6, 13, and 21 after last
discharge, 50% concerns to planned readmissions.
Comparing the number of readmissions before and after the merge, approximately 77.8%
of the hospital centers have a lower number of readmissions when compared to hospitals
per se. Nevertheless, in the cases in which the hospital centers have a higher number of
readmissions, this number is significantly high.
Another important aspect is that nearly 68.1% of the readmissions are registered as
episodic mood disorders (39.6%) and schizophrenic psychoses (28.5%). Bode´n et al. (2011)
identified two potential risk factors for rehospitalisation of people with schizophrenic and
schizoaffective disorders: short duration of initial hospitalisation (less than two weeks) and
early non-adherence to medication. According to our data, the ALOS of these diagnoses
amounts to 27.3 days.
Since readmissions per se may not be very informative as we are not taking into con-
sideration the total number of discharges, it is important to analyse the readmission rate.
Namely, the 30-day readmission rates after an admission for SMI is considered in the liter-
ature as one of the key indicators of mental health quality (OECD and WHO, 2012). This
measure is cited as a main undesirable outcome of healthcare systems. Therefore reducing
readmission rates should be one of the top strategic priorities (WHO, 2005a).
The 30-day readmission rate ranges between 0 and 40% between 1994 and 2013. The
DRG 430 has the highest readmission rate among others DRGs with an average of 11%. For
all DRGs, we find a negative correlation between the ALOS of 30-day readmission and the
readmission rate. Meaning, for longer ALOS we have lower readmission rates. The same
evidence was found when considering the first inpatient stays, except for DRGs 425, 429,
and 432.32
32We also considered as first inpatient stays the readmissions occurred in 30-days but registered in a
different DRG, and all the readmissions registered in the same DRG above 90 days.
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This analysis show that readmissions are main issue in mental health. Thus, it is impor-
tant to determine the cost of emergency readmissions and determine the potential incentives
the current financing mechanism provides.
1.3.1.3 DRG 430 — Psychosis
DRG 430 is the most heterogeneous group within mental health DRGs since it includes
different diseases such as schizophrenic disorders, schizoaffective psychoses, and bipolar dis-
orders.
Performing an analysis on the main diagnoses, we can state that approximately 56.5% of
these cases, from 1994 to 2013, are registered as episodic mood disorders (25.5%), schizophrenic
disorders (18.1%), and anxiety, dissociative and somatoform disorders (12.9%). For this anal-
ysis we have comprised the diagnoses into main categories.
Chronic schizophrenia is a severe and disabling disorder. According to the study about
Global Costs of Schizophrenia conducted by Knapp, Mangalore and Simon (2004), the impact
of schizophrenia on healthcare budgets is considerable, ranging between 1.5% and 3% of total
national healthcare expenditures. Because it is a chronic disease its cost tends to persist.
The study further reveals that approximately one third to two thirds of the total healthcare
cost of schizophrenia is for hospitalisation, even in countries that have already substantially
reduced their inpatient care. The authors also bring to attention the costs this disease has
in other care organisations and public sector bodies, mainly social service agencies, housing
departments, and the criminal justice system. In our dataset, the weight of cases registered
as schizophrenic disorders has not been changing over time and its ALOS is 34.6 days.
1.3.1.4 Patient Analysis
The mean age of the patients is forty-nine years and about 58.3% of all patients are women.
Costs are not available at a patient level. As mentioned in subsection 1.2.1, price and weight
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of DRGs are not based on analytical accounting cost. Hence, we use the DRG prices as a
proxy of the cost.
To estimate the “cost” per patient, we use all the decree-laws that were in force during
the years under analysis. In these decree-laws we have the price of each DRG, which can
be assumed as the “cost” of an inpatient stay when the LOS is between an inferior and a
superior limit. If the LOS is below the inferior limit, the “cost” is computed by multiplying
the LOS by a daily price. When the LOS is above the superior limit, the “cost” is then
computed by adding to the DRG price a daily price (which is multiplied by the difference
between the superior limit and the LOS). This daily price decreased approximately 34.4%
between 2012 and 2013. This was an administrative decision with no explanation.
The “cost” of rehospitalisation is computed by multiplying the LOS by a daily price.33
The total “cost” amounts to 496,061,211e from 1994 to 2013. Around 56% of this total
“cost” was incurred in the last 7 years (Table 1.1):
Table 1.1: Treatment “cost” per year
Year “Cost”
2006 31,602,388e
2007 34,240,380e
2008 32,939,646e
2009 35,535,352e
2010 33,659,596e
2011 36,778,748e
2012 37,588,428e
2013 35,340,496e
Analysing the “cost” per patient of the outliers, the mean and standard deviation amount
to 13,626.5e and 63,075.7e, respectively. The sum of this “cost” over all patients is about
56,999,668e and represents approximately 11.5% of the total cost.34
33For psychiatric departments, patients who are readmitted within 60 days after discharge are consider a
rehospitalisation.
34In the appendix A.2.8, Figure A.5 depicts the “cost” per patient split between outliers and non-outliers.
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The average “cost” per patient sums up to 2,368.8e and DRG 430 has the greatest
average “cost” (2,769.5e), excluding DRG 424.
1.3.1.5 Mental Health Complexity
In order to estimate the level of complexity in mental health, Ij, we take the average weights
of all discharged patients, multiply the relative weight of each DRG (wi) by the number of
cases in each DRG (ni,j) and then divide by the total number of discharges, as follows:
Ij =
∑
i
wi ∗ ni,j∑
i
ni,j
(1.3)
The higher this index is, the more complex cases we have, and more resources are needed.
In our case this index amounts to 1.24. According to Freitas et al. (2012), the increasing
complexity “may be the single most important determinant of high LOS outliers” (p.8).
1.4 Methodology
Descriptive statistics give a general overview of the key variables one should take into con-
sideration when designing a new financing model. This analysis per se is not sufficient to
pursue our aim in analysing the mental health system. A more sophisticated investigation is
needed concerning rehospitalisations and services organisation since they are the main issues
in a mental health system.
Regarding rehospitalisations, we first analyse treatment outcomes (subsection 1.4.1.1).
We describe the method to determine the effect of treating a high number of patients on
the quality of medical care. We also investigate if the current financing system is creating
unintended consequences on readmissions and estimate the cost of emergency readmissions
(subsections 1.4.1.2 and 1.4.1.3, respectively).
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As far as services organisation is concerned, and given the recent developments in the
Portuguese system,35 we focus on hospital services organisation and integrated continuous
care. Specifically, we discuss if organisation of mental health services should be done with
concentration of services in a few hospitals or with several units providing them (subsection
1.4.2.1). We describe the method used to estimate the potential savings that integrated
continuous care can bring to NHS (subsection 1.4.2.2).
All the analyses were performed using Stata®12.
1.4.1 Rehospitalisations
1.4.1.1 Treatment Outcomes
Our first variable of interest is the 30-day readmission rate as it can be considered a proxy of
the quality of medical care (Fischer et al., 2014). This rate is computed as the ratio between
the number of patients admitted to the hospital within 30 days after an inpatient stay and
the total number of discharges. It includes all the unplanned readmissions within the same
DRG. We exclude from this analysis the planned readmissions since they are usually part of
clinically proper care (Horwitz et al., 2011).
Considering we want to assess the volume effect on quality of care, our independent
variable of interest is the current total number of discharges by DRG, hospital, and year
(volume). As covariates we include the hospital characteristics (cmi, beds, dp, lstay and
totalcost).36
The relevant equation is:
rehosp rateh,j,t = α0 + α1 ∗ volumeh,j,t + α2 ∗ χh,t + α3 ∗ ζh,t + h,j,t (1.4)
35Please see subsection 1.2.3.
36In appendix A.2.6 we provide a detail description of each variable.
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where h, j and t indexes the hospital, the DRG, and the year, respectively. χ is a vector
of hospital characteristics: cmi, beds, dp, lstay, and cost. ζ is a vector of dummy variables
(dumcmi, dumtotcost, dumlstay, dumdp, and dumbeds) that were created to control the
procedure of using 2012’ information for the year of 2013 (when no information was available)
and for using information of the following year when there was no available information for
the remaining years. We estimate the above equation separately for each DRG using time
fixed effects.
Because the readmission rate ranges between [0, 1) we decide to use a fractional response
model. Particularly, we use a fractional response generalised linear model (fractional probit
model), which accommodates the zero values of the dependent variable and also allows for
heteroskedasticity (Wooldridge, 2011; Williams, 2016).37
To interpret the results we compute the marginal effects. We also estimate equation (1.4)
using a non-heteroskedastic model, since Wooldridge (2011) recommends the comparison of
the results of average marginal effects between ordinary fractional probit and heteroskedas-
tic fractional probit. If there are some modest differences in the average marginal effects
estimated by the two models, we can be almost sure the heteroskedastic model is the appro-
priate one (Williams, 2016). The comparison per se is not sufficient to claim one model is
better than the other. We perform a Wald test to determine whether the coefficients in the
heteroskedasticity equation are significantly different from zero (Williams, 2016). In cases
where we fail to reject the null hypothesis (coefficients are equal to zero), the preferable
model is the non-heteroskedastic.
We did not use the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method because it predicts impossible
values (i.e. values below 0 or above 1), produces non-normal errors, and only provides linear
effects (the effect of the explanatory variables tends to be non-linear) (Buis, 2010). We did
37We decide to use the probit function since it “leads to computationally simple estimators in the presence
of unobserved heterogeneity or endogenous explanatory variables”(Papke and Wooldridge, 2008, p.123).
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not consider models such as logit, probit, or heteroskedasticity probit because they do not
allow for fractional response variables. Additionally, despite the generalised linear models per
se can estimate some fractional dependent variables, they do not allow for heteroskedasticity
(Williams, 2016). Hence, we opt to use a more flexible model.
1.4.1.2 Financing determinants
Considering how hospitals are being financed in terms of inpatient care,38 the case-mix index
(cmi) and the equivalent patients days are the relevant determinants. In order to determine
the variables that may influence rehospitalisations, we use a probit regression model to
estimate the following equation:
dum rehospn,h,j,t = α0 + α1 ∗ volumeh,t + α2 ∗ agen + α3 ∗ gendern
+ α4 ∗ χh,t + α5 ∗ ζh,t + α6 ∗ weightj,t + n,h,j,t
(1.5)
where n, h, j and t indexes the patient, the hospital, the DRG and the year, respectively.
The dum rehosp is a binary variable such that:
dum rehospn,h,j,t =
 1 if the patient was readmitted in the same DRG within 60 days (unplanned)0 otherwise
Volume is the current total number of discharges by hospital and year. χ and ζ have the
same meaning as before. weight stands for the relative weight of each DRG code.39 In this
analysis we consider both short-term (less than 30 days) and medium-term rehospitalisations
(between 31 and 60 days) as the latter rehospitalisations may reflect the influence of factors
beyond inpatient care such as availability of community and family supports (CIHI, 2008).
38For further detail see subsection 1.2.1.
39This variable can be consider as a proxy of the average relative amount of hospital resources required
to treat patients within each DRG category.
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In this analysis, we did not consider patients who were discharged in November or December
(except if it was a readmission) as we are not able to follow these patients between years.
Another important aspect of the financing system is how it pays mental health rehos-
pitalisations occurred within 60 days after last discharge.40 Between 1996 and 2013,41 the
daily prices have been changing, and therefore it is important to estimate the impact of these
changes on rehospitalisations.42 Applying the same reasoning as before, but now being the
price of rehospitalisation the variable of interest, we perform a probit regression model:
dum rehospn,h,j,t = α0 + α1 ∗ volumeh,t + α2 ∗ agen + α3 ∗ gendern
+ α4 ∗ χh,t + α5 ∗ ζh,t + α6 ∗ price rehospt + n,h,j,t
(1.6)
where the indexes are the same as before. The variable price rehosp is the daily price
that is defined by decree-laws.
1.4.1.3 Cost of emergency readmissions
According to physicians, it is common to schedule a consultation between weeks one and two
after a patient is discharged (clinical practice guidelines). Rehospitalisations may be due to
medication adherence or treatment adjustment patients. Hence, identifying a large number
of readmissions between weeks one and two after a patient has been discharged does not
mean that we are dealing with unplanned readmissions. To estimate the cost of emergency
readmissions, we need to eliminate from the analysis the non-emergency readmissions. In
our dataset, and as reported in subsection 1.3.1.2, we are able to disentangle the planned
readmissions from the unplanned ones. Assuming that we did not have such variable (which is
the case in most datasets), we use an econometric model to estimate planned readmissions.
40Please see subsection 1.2.1
41In 1994 and 1995 the decree-law does not provide any price for rehospitalisations.
42This daily price increased about 3.8% in the last 18 years. The price decreased approximately 13.3%
between 2012 and 2013.
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We perform such analysis in order to add additional evidence on how one can estimate
unplanned readmissions when it is not possible to disentangle both readmissions. Also, we
are able to check if our approach estimated well the planned readmissions as we are able to
compare the estimated results with the true values of these readmissions.
Since we need to estimate the “excesses” given by the peaks identified in subsection
1.3.1.2, we use a negative binomial regression model. The dependent variable is a discrete
variable defined as the number of days between the date of admission and the last discharge
(readmission).
readmissionn,h,j,t = α0 + α1 ∗ agen + α2 ∗ gendern
+ α3 ∗ χh,t + α4 ∗ ζh,t + α5 ∗ dumread3 + α6 ∗ dumread6
+ α7 ∗ dumread13 + α8 ∗ dumread21 + n,h,j,t
(1.7)
where n, h, j and t indexes the patient, the hospital, the DRG and year, respectively. χ
and ζ have the same meaning as before. dumread3, dumread6, dumread13, and dumread20
are dummy variables to control for the four peaks (3, 6, 13 and 21) that remain after excluding
readmissions occurred in Hospital X in weeks 3 and 4.
After estimating the model, we generate predicted probabilities. We use those predictions
to estimate the non-emergency readmissions. To determine the cost of emergency readmis-
sions we drop the observations corresponding to non-emergency cases and use the “cost” per
patient computed in subsection 1.3.1.4.
1.4.2 Services Organisation
1.4.2.1 Economies of scale
Our dependent variable is the LOS per episode, hospital, year, and DRG. Volume and
volume2 are the independent variables of interest. As covariates we include patient char-
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acteristics (age, gender) and hospital characteristics (cmi, beds, dp, lstay, totalcost).43 We
perform the regression analysis separately for each DRG since it classifies a patient under a
particular group where those assigned are likely to need a similar level of hospital resources
for their care.
To compute the scale effect we use a duration model to model the length of time patients
spend in the hospital. The model adopted is the conditional risk set model (Box-Steffensmeier
and Jones, 2004; Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). We did not use OLS method because it does
not account for several specificities of our dataset which influence the results.
Since our dataset consists of discharged patients, the model needs to be an univariate
duration model (transition from “sick” to “stable”)44 but with multiple spells (patients may
be readmitted). We have recurrent/repeated events, which arises when several events of the
same type are registered for each individual. Our dataset only has completed spells since
we do not have individuals that stay “sick” (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn, 2002).45 Spells for
the same individual cannot be considered independent and therefore we need to account for
correlated unobservables.
We assume entry into the state being modelled is exogenous, meaning there are no initial
conditions problems. Otherwise, the model of survival times in the current state would also
have to take into account the differential chances of being found in the current state in the
first place (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn, 2002).
The survival time data is an outflow dataset in which data collection is based on those
leaving the state of interest. We also have information on when the spell began. If one has
information about the day, month, and year in which a spell began, and also the day, month,
and year, at which subjects were last observed — so survival times are measured in days
43We also introduce dummy variables to control for the procedure of using 2012 information for the year
of 2013 and use information of the following year whenever a gap exists.
44We only have a single state.
45Our dataset consists on inpatient discharges. This means that the likelihood function is simply the
multiplication of the density function from period 1 to N.
43
— and the typical spell length is months or years, then it is reasonable to treat survival
times as observations on a continuous random variable (not grouped). But if spells length is
typically only a few days long, then recording it in units of days implies substantial grouping.
It would then make sense to use a specification that accounts for the interval censoring. In
our data around 18% of all observations regarding DRG 430 (Psychosis) have a duration
spell between 1 and 30 days. Therefore, we can use days as unit of the LOS. We assume a
continuous model since {T = t} is interpreted as an observation from a continuous process,
contributing a density function term to the likelihood.
An important issue that we should take care of concerns “tied” survival times — more
than one individual in the data set with the same recorded survival time. A relatively high
prevalence of ties may indicate that the banding of survival times should be taken into
account when choosing the model specification (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn, 2002; Cleves
and StataCorp, 2009).
Overall, the duration model that we have to consider must take into account the fol-
lowing items: continuous time; outflow sample; no time-varying characteristics (explanatory
variables are fixed over time and have only cross-section variation); completed spells; re-
current events (multiple spells); correlated unobservables (state dependence); unobserved
heterogeneity; and “tied” survival times.
We do not have time-varying characteristics since our control variables are: gender, age,
volume and hospital characteristics (which change between years but not within the same
year and because we cannot follow a patient between years — due to id changes — this is
not a concern. These variables are time-invariant within each spell.).
First, we need to understand which model accounts for multiple spells and correlated un-
observables. There are two different approaches to deal with recurrent events: the Counting
Process (CP) and the Stratified Cox (SC) model (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn, 2002; Cleves
and StataCorp, 2009). In the CP model, different lines of data are treated as independent
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even though several outcomes are from the same subject. This model uses the standard Cox
proportional hazard (PH) method to analyse the data. In the SC model, recurrent events
are treated as not identical and the strata are the time interval numbers. Within this model
we have three different approaches: Conditional 1, Conditional 2 and Marginal models.
Conditional means that a subject is assumed not to be at risk for a subsequent event
until a prior event has occurred. The difference between these two conditional models is the
time scale. Specifically, the Conditional 1 approach uses the same data layout as the CP
approach, but a SC model is used instead of a standard Cox PH model. In this model, the
time until the first event influences the risk of the set for later events. The Conditional 2
model uses a different data layout: the start value is always 0 and the stop value is the time
interval length. The time until the first event does not influence the following events since
the clock determining who is at risk gets reset to zero after each event.
The Marginal approach uses the standard data layout. It considers each event as a
separate process. Time for each event starts at the beginning of follow-up for each subject.
There is no start time column but only a stop time column. All subjects are considered to
be at risk for all events, regardless of how many events they actually had.
If the order of the events is not important, then we should choose the CP model. Other-
wise, we need to decide between the three approaches of the SC model. If the time interval
of interest is the time from the study entry then Conditional 1 approach is the correct choice.
We should choose the Conditional 2 model if the time interval of interest is the time between
two events. If there are different types of events, then we should use the Marginal model.
In our case, the more suitable approach is the Conditional 2 model, as the time a patient
stays in the first episode influences the time he stays in the second time, and so on (order
matters). What we have seen from the descriptive analysis is that the LOS of the first
episode has been decreasing and the number of readmissions within the same DRG has been
increasing with a LOS higher when compared to the first episode.
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Thus, the appropriate model is the conditional risk set model (variance-correction models)
considering elapsed time, where estimates are provided for the effect of covariates on the
hazard of the kth event since the beginning of the observation period.
The Cox model is a proportional hazard model, its specification can be written as:
hq(t) = h0q(t)× eXβ (1.8)
where X is the vector of time-independent covariates (volume, volume2, age, gender,
cmi, beds, dp, lstay, totalcost, and the dummy variables) and h0q(t) is the baseline hazard
function at time t for a subject in group q. The baseline hazard function describes the risk
for individuals with xi = 0, who serve as a reference cell and exp(Xβ) is the relative risk,
a proportionate increase or decrease in risk, associated with the set of characteristics xi. In
this model, the coefficients are assumed to be the same, regardless of the group, but the
baseline hazard can be group specific. The baseline hazard function can take any shape as
a function of t. The only requirement is that h0q(t) > 0.
The characterisation of the distribution of time can also be provided by the survival function.
This function gives the probability that the event has occurred by duration t. Both hazard
and survival functions provide alternative but equivalent characterisation of the distribution
of time. There is a mathematical relationship between these two functions. The survival
function is the baseline survival function, raised to the power of the exponent of the linear
prediction (Clayton, 2012).46 Thus, the effect of the covariate values on the survivor function
is to raise it to a power given by the relative risk exp(Xβ).
Maximum likelihood estimates of β for the above model is obtained by maximizing the
partial log-likelihood function:
46The exponent of the linear prediction is the hazard ratio for that combination of covariates.
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logL =
D∑
j=1
[∑
i∈Dj
xiβ − djlog
{∑
k∈Rj
exp(xkβ)
}]
(1.9)
where xi is the row vector of covariates mentioned before for the time interval (t0i, ti]
for the ith observation in the dataset i = 1, ..., N . j indexes the ordered failure times t(j),
j = 1, ..., D; Dj is the set of dj observations that fail at t(j); dj is the number of failures at
t(j); and Rj is the set of observations k that are at risk at time t(j), that is, all k such that
t0k < t(j) ≤ tk. The estimator βˆ has been shown to be a consistent estimator for β (Lin,
1994).
To estimate this model we consider the exit rate (event) as a variable that is 1 if the
patient leaves the state, and 0 if not. In addition, and in order to build a timeline, we create
two variables: one for entry time and other for exit time. To adjust for repetitions and for
dependence of spells, we generate a variable that stratifies our data and is based on episode
sequences for each patient. Hence, the estimation of the partial log-likelihood function (1.9)
is obtained by forming the ordered failure times t(j), the failure sets Dj, and the risk sets
Rj, using only those observations within that stratum.
Finally, and in order to account for “tied” events, this model uses the Efron method which
takes consideration on how the risk set changes depending on the sequence of tied events
(Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004).
There are economies of scale if exp(Xβ)high volume > exp(Xβ)low volume as the baseline
survivor function ranges between 0 and 1. Specifically, to determine if there is a scale effect,
we convert the estimation results in number of days by obtaining the adjusted survival curve
for low and high volume hospitals for each DRG.47 This is done by combining the baseline
survivor function with the linear prediction of the covariates. It is worth recalling that the
adjusted survival at time t is the baseline survival at time t, raised to the power of the
47The mean difference between these two curves gives the scale effect measured in number of days.
47
exponent of the linear prediction.
The difference between these two curves is the predicted value of the variable volume.
We consider high/low volume hospitals are the ones with a volume greater/less than the
median value. To obtain the adjusted survival curve for the high/low volume hospitals we
then use the mean volume for each volume group.48 For the remaining control variables (age,
gender and hospital characteristics) we use their mean value for each DRG.
We estimate the scale effect for each DRG but, because DRG 430 comprises 51% of the
total observations, we pay special attention to the results of this DRG.
1.4.2.2 Potential savings for NHS from integrated continuous care
Our approach is to use the DRG dataset to analyse which inpatient stays of patients with
SMI are eligible to be transferred to these institutions and compute the potential savings
(difference between the current “cost” and the potential “cost” if integrated continuous care
units were in place).49
First, we analyse the LOS. According to psychiatrists,50 and based on their clinical ex-
pertise, the LOS that on average a patient with SMI needs to stay in the hospital to be
stabilised is approximately 24 days (Scenario 1).51 We claim all inpatient discharges which
had a LOS higher than this ALOS could have been transferred to these facilities.
The integrated continuous care cost is computed by multiplying the time that a patient
needs to stay in those facilities (the difference between the total LOS and ALOS) by the daily
price defined in the decree-law, which amounts to 26.62e.52 Since we have no information
48For robustness purposes we perform this analysis considering different predicted values for volume using
the percentile 75.
49As mentioned before only patients with SMI are eligible for integrated continuous care facilities.
50The auhtors would like to thank Ricardo Gusma˜o from Instituto Nacional de Sau´de Pu´blica do Porto
and Teresa Reis from Nova Medical School.
51This ALOS is very similar to the one we find if we compute the ALOS for SMI patients using our
dataset (23.6 days).
52This price can be considered as the “cost” of treating a patient in continuous care housing: “Resideˆncia
de apoio moderado com complemento de unidade so´cio-ocupacional”. So far, no changes have been made to
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on the LOS a patient, on average, needs to stay in integrated care, we assume equal quality
of treatment which is reflected in the same LOS, independently where the patient is treated.
As psychiatrists claim that the ALOS for patients with SMI can range between 15 and 30
days we create two additional scenarios based on the lower and upper bound of this interval
(Scenarios 2 and 3, respectively).
We perform this analysis for the period between 2011 and 2013. The daily price paid per
patient to these units was defined in 2011.
It is worth recalling that these facilities not only aim to support inpatient care but also
to provide social integration of individuals with psychosocial disability. In our analysis, we
are not considering the benefits from social integration, due to lack of information.
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Rehospitalisations
1.5.1.1 Treatment Outcomes
Table A.4 in appendix A.3.1 presents the estimation results for the model specification
(1.4) for each DRG. The results were estimated using the heteroskedastic fractional probit
regression, except for DRGs 425 and 432 in which we use the ordinary fractional probit model.
According to the Wald tests, we reject the null hypothesis for all DRGs. For DRGs 425 and
432, it was not possible to estimate equation (1.4) using the heteroskedastic fractional probit
model since convergence is not achieved.
The variable of interest, volume, is statistically significant for all DRGs, except for DRG
432 in which the coefficient is not statistically significant (first column of Table 1.2). Volume
increases readmission rate suggesting that quality of medical care is affected by the number
the prices stipulated in 2011.
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of inpatient discharges. However, the average marginal effects are approximately zero for all
DRGs. For DRGs 425, 426, and 430, if we increase the number of inpatient discharges by
100, it will lead to a 2 percentage points increase in the readmission rate. Regarding DRGs
427 and 429, if we increase the number of inpatient discharges by 100, the readmission rate
increase by 3 percentage points. For the remaining DRGs, 428 and 431, an increase in the
number of inpatient discharges by 100 will lead to a 6 and 14 percentage points increase in
the readmission rate, respectively.
Table 1.2: Treatment Outcomes — Average Marginal Effects
volume cmi
DRG425 0.0002 NS
DRG426 0.0002 -0.0286
DRG427 0.0003 NS
DRG428 0.0006 NS
DRG429 0.0003 -0.0244
DRG430 0.0002 -0.0206∗
DRG431 0.0014 0.0424
DRG432 NS NS
NS: Not statistically significant
*statistically significant at 0.1
On the impact of the remaining covariates, namely complexity of cases (cmi), Table 1.2,
second column, presents the average marginal coefficients of this variable. For all DRGs, with
the exemption of DRGs 427 and 431, treating more complex cases decrease the readmission
rate. For DRG 431, cmi was found to be positively associated with readmission rate. The
average marginal effects linked to beds are approximately zero and not statistically significant.
1.5.1.2 Financing determinants
Tables A.5 and A.6, in appendix A.3.2, present the results for the regression equations (1.5)
and (1.6). The first column presents the results for the full model, whereas the second
column presents the results of a restricted model, in which the variables that were found
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not to be statistically significant were recursively eliminated. The results in Table A.5 show
patients are more likely to be rehospitalised in DRGs with higher weight and in hospitals
with a lower cmi. Higher average length of hospital stays increase the probability of patients
being readmitted by 0.0054. The remaining control variables bear the expected signs. In
particular, patients discharged from small hospitals (small number of beds) or from hospitals
with a high number of discharged patients are more likely to be readmitted. However, the
magnitude of the marginal effect of beds and volume is approximately zero.
According to the model specification (1.6), the price of readmissions does not have an
impact on the probability of readmissions. The marginal effect is almost zero and it is not
statistically significant. As for the remaining variables, the results are similar to the ones
obtained in the previous model specification, in terms of both statistical significance and
marginal effects.
1.5.1.3 Cost of emergency readmissions
In appendix A.3.3 we present the estimation results of equation (1.7). This regression model
is used as a means to determine the planned readmissions.
Plotting the observed proportion of each count and the mean probability for the negative
binomial model (Figure A.6 in appendix A.3.3), we can state the negative binomial regression
model as reasonable predictions. Using these predictions, we estimate the non-emergency
readmissions as follows:
Table 1.3: Non-emergency readmissions
Readmission Predicted Probability Frequency Number of cases Non-emergency readmissions
3 0.0537896 406 546 140
6 0.057382 433 697 264
13 0.0383559 289 771 482
21 0.0170736 129 253 124
According to our results, the non-emergency readmissions corresponds to approximately
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11% of the total readmissions (excluding the readmissions registered in Hospital X in weeks 3
and 4). Also, of the readmissions occurred 3, 6, 13, and 20 days after the last discharge, 43%
correspond/concern to planned readmissions.. Comparing these results with the planned
readmissions that actually occurred, which represents approximately 50% of the readmis-
sions occurred in the seven-day peaks, we can state that our methodology provides good
predictions for the peaks.
Using the estimation results, the total cost of the emergency readmissions is 10,464,023e.
If we consider the unplanned readmissions that effectively occurred, this cost is slightly
smaller and amounts to 9,247,645e.
1.5.2 Services Organisation
1.5.2.1 Economies of Scale
Tables A.9 and A.10 present the estimation results of the conditional risk set model for each
DRG (appendix A.3.4.2).
Since we have a quadratic term in our regression model, it is not straightforward to
determine if we have a scale effect or not, only by looking at the volume’s marginal effects
presented in tables A.9 and A.10. Hence, we convert the estimation results in potential
days saved using the methodology described in subsection 1.4.2.1.53 The scale effect ranges
between 0 and 6 days (Table 1.4).
For DRGs 427, 430 and 432 we identify a scale effect. DRGs 428 and 429 present zero
potential days saved. For the remaining DRGs, we find diseconomies of scale.54 The results
are very similar if we consider the top 25% as the high volume hospitals.
It is worth highlighting the impact of the remaining covariates, namely beds and com-
plexity of cases (cmi). Table 1.5 presents the marginal effects of both variables. Specifically,
53In appendix A.3.4.1 we present the median and pctl75 of the variable volume for each DRG.
54The results are very similar if we drop the variable volume2.
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Table 1.4: Economies of scale — Volume
# days saved (pctl 50) # days saved (pctl 75)
DRG425 -0.01 0
DRG426 -0.02 -0.02
DRG427 1.05 1.06
DRG428 0 0
DRG429 0 0.01
DRG430 0.08 0.08
DRG431 -1.1 -1.1
DRG432 6.33 6.33
we present the unexponentiated coefficients (i.e. hazard rates).
Table 1.5: Marginal effects — beds and cmi
Marginal effect (beds) Marginal effect (cmi)
DRG425 -0.0013 0.426
DRG426 -0.0010 0.392
DRG427 -0.0011 NS
DRG428 -0.0016 -0.319
DRG429 -0.0003 0.361
DRG430 -0.0004 0.528
DRG431 -0.0004 NS
DRG432 NS NS
NS: Not statistically significant
The coefficient of beds is statistically significant for almost all DRGs (except DRG 432).
The negative sign indicates that those treated in hospitals with a high number of beds have
a lower hazard rate ceteris paribus (i.e. lower conditional “stable” rates and hence longer
LOS). Regarding cmi, the associated coefficients are positive and statistically different from
zero for all DRGs, except for 427, 431 and 432. The positive coefficient estimates indicate
that patients who are treated in high cmi hospitals have a smaller LOS. Only for DRG 428
we find a negative relationship between cmi and LOS, suggesting diseconomies of scale.
Based on these results, we can say there is no justification to centralise psychiatric services
in high volume hospitals.
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1.5.2.2 Inpatient Care and Integrated Continuous Care
The table below (Table 1.6) presents, for the three scenarios, the current “cost” (before
transferring) of treating patients eligible to be transferred to integrated continuous care and
the potential “cost” if these facilities were in place (after transferring). We also report
the number of patients eligible and the ALOS in these healthcare facilities under the three
scenarios.
Table 1.6: Potential Savings for NHS of Integrated Continuous Care
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
# patients 6,149 11,382 3,978
ALOS CC 23.03 19.50 27.79
Before transferring
Cost hospital 24,215,920e 41,109,184e 17,085,424e
After transferring
Cost hospital 14,002,497e 21,783,754e 9,645,127e
Cost CC 3,770,430.3e 5,907,430.5e 2,942,628e
Total cost 17,772,927.3e 27,691,184.5e 12,587,755e
Potential savings 6,442,992.7e 13,417,999.5e 4,497,669e
% of initial cost 26.6% 32.6% 26.3%
Under these scenarios it is expected potential savings that range between 4,497,669e
and 13,418,000e (about 26% and 33% of the initial cost, respectively). If continuous care
facilities were in place, hospitals would have capacity to treat, on average, 10% to 27% more
patients with severe mental disorders per year.
1.6 Discussion
Our results show the number of readmissions has increased in the last three years. This trend
can be explained by the fact that the ALOS of both readmissions and first inpatient discharge
have been decreasing. According to recent literature on management strategies to reduce
psychiatric readmissions (Gaynes et al., 2015), psychiatric hospital stays have become too
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brief with a negative consequence on the number of readmissions. We conjecture that patients
are leaving the hospital not fully recovered. There are several reasons that might explain
this result. First, hospitals may be under pressure to discharge patients specially because of
lack of beds or shortages of staff (RCPsych, 2009). Second, and according to Gaynes et al.
(2015), in order to avoid readmissions, hospitals should render sufficient inpatient care to
stabilise the patient’s psychiatric status. It should also ensure an adequate discharge plan
and the mental health system should provide support services to allow a successful transition
from inpatient to outpatient care. In addition, the mental health system ought to deliver an
effective outpatient services so that patients remain in the community. Our result might be
due to lack of adequate discharge plans and effective community mental health services. To
test this conjecture we need information on the number of community mental health units
and the geographical area where they provide such services. Having this information we
could compare readmissions pattern between hospitals where these units exist and hospitals
where they do not.
On the other hand, the current financing mechanism provides incentives for hospitals
with a lower cmi to increase the number of equivalent patients using rehospitalisations.
Although this effect might be related to other DRGs, it exacerbates the problem of recurrent
readmissions on psychiatric units. As far as the daily price of rehospitalisations (price rehosp)
is concerned, we did not find evidence to sustain the fact that this variable increases the
likelihood of subsequent psychiatric admission.
When analysing the readmission rate, we find the number of inpatient discharges increases
the readmission rate for all DRGs, except for DRG 432 in which the variable volume is
not statistically significant. The magnitude of the marginal effect is approximately zero
suggesting quality of medical care is not affected by the number of inpatient discharges.
As for the slightly negative effect of treating more complex cases, on average, cmi, we
put forward the hypothesis this variable is capturing best practices since larger hospitals get
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sicker and more expensive patients (Morikawa, 2010). According to information provided by
psychiatrists about hospitals providing community mental health services (we do not know
the extension of these services), we believe this result may also be explained by the fact that
hospitals with higher cmi provide more community care services than their counterparts.
Since in our dataset hospitals that treat, on average, more complex cases are the ones
providing mental health home care and have day centers, this fact can be one possible
explanation for our finding. According to ACSS (2015), a governmental report on mental
healthcare delivery, Portugal still lacks of community care services. The literature has been
reporting a positive relationship between readmissions and hospital case-mix index (Frost
et al., 2009; Ammar et al., 2013). The rationale is that hospitals with a higher cmi are
probably dealing with more complex cases, which may result in a higher readmissions rate
due its complexity .
Regarding DRG 431, where we find a positive relationship between readmission rate and
cmi (0.0424), it comprises childhood mental disorders. Two possible reasons can explain
this result. First, despite patients ageing 16 and older can be treated in adult psychiatric
departments, the paediatric hospitals with childhood and adolescent wards are specialised
in treating those disorders, particularly the complex ones. In Portugal there are few units
specialised in treating those patients and are inserted in hospitals with higher cmi. This
result is in line with previous literature. That is, more complex cases are treated in hospitals
with higher cmi which result in higher readmissions rate. Second, and given that only few
units are specialised in treating childhood and adolescent disorders, our result may reflect
the weakness of general hospitals with only adult psychiatric wards to effectively treat these
disorders, which can possibly increase readmission rate. To validate these two conjectures,
we would need to know which hospitals have a specific unit to treat children with psychiatric
disorders or have protocols with child psychiatrists to provide care on a regular basis.
As for the remaining control variables, the average marginal effects are very small. Specif-
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ically, the number of hospital beds (beds) has a negative relationship with readmission rates
for almost all DRGs. Despite this result not being statistically significant, it is in line with
recent literature. Brown et al. (2014) claim larger hospitals may be able to address strategic
issues such as readmissions since they are likely to have more resources.
Overall, treating complex cases plays an important role not only on the likelihood of being
readmitted but also on the readmission rate. Combining this fact with our conjecture that
patients are leaving the hospital not fully recovered, policy makers should implement mea-
sures to reduce unplanned readmissions. To do so, the mental health system should provide
enough outpatient resources to allow a successful transition from inpatient to outpatient fa-
cilities. In 2012, the US established the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP),
which reduced the payment to hospitals with excessive readmissions. These readmissions are
determined by a risk-adjusted computation of a hospital’s actual readmissions compare to a
national benchmark. This program only includes patients with acute myocardial infarction,
heart failure, pneumonia, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and elective primary total
hip and/or total knee replacement. However, and according to McGarry, Blankley and Li
(2016), despite readmissions have been decreasing, this decline may not be attributable to
HRRP. One of the biggest concerns regard the overall financial impact of this program on
hospitals’ bottom lines. Reducing readmissions implies hospitals to invest in services that
may help prevent readmissions, such as follow-ups and discharge plans. Since these services
are not reimbursed and hospitals have less revenues from reduced readmissions, it is not clear
if it is cost-effective for hospitals to try and avoid penalties (James, 2013). To overcome this
problem, the Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services provide additional funding for
strategies that aim to reduce readmissions such as the Community-based Care Transitions
and the Partnership for Patients.
We consider a new mental health financing plan should provide incentives to reduce read-
missions. This plan should implement a quality measure, which should be associated with
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the reduction of DRG prices. Specifically, hospitals should be rewarded for the additional
cost/effort involved in raising quality (Busse, Geissler and Quentin, 2011). Specific financial
incentives should be provided to hospitals reporting a set of quality information. These
financial incentives can be related to DRG prices. Also, the mental health system should
promote effective services to improve care transitions from hospital to other settings. Mean-
ing, the financing mechanism should incentivise community care rather than inpatient stays.
Community based multidisciplinary teams should also be created and able to provide in-
tensive and highly integrated community mental health services for people with SMI. These
multidisciplinary teams should include nurses, psychiatrist, psychologists, occupational ther-
apists, and social workers. According to Gaynes et al. (2015), a long-term approach to reduce
readmissions for people with SMI is the Assertive Community Treatment (ACT). This ap-
proach was developed in the US and provides treatment, rehabilitation, and support services
to patients who are diagnosed with SMI. Most ACT contacts are provided in community
settings (Bond et al., 2001). It worth highlighting that community-based services also have
impact on patient’s outcomes. As Almeida and Killaspy (2011) state, these services pro-
vide significant better outcomes on treatment compliance, clinical symptoms, quality of life,
housing stability, and vocational rehabilitation.
As far as service organisation is concerned, our results show there is a scale effect for
DRGs 427 (Neuroses except depressive), 430 (Psychosis) and 432 (Other mental disorder
diagnosis). For DRG 430 the economic magnitude of the scale effect in number of days
amounts to 0.08 per year (our temporal unit of reference). This value is rather small to
justify the centralisation of psychiatric services in high volume hospitals. For DRGs 427 and
432, we find potential gains of 1 and 6 days if patients were treated in high volume hospitals,
respectively. The ALOS of both DRGs 427 and 432 is 14.85 and 7.87 days, respectively.
Transferring treatments to high volume hospitals can only bring potential savings of 2.8%
for the NHS as these two DRGs account for 5% of total hospital mental health discharges.
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For the remaining DRGs, the scale effect is negative suggesting diseconomies of scale.55
One possible explanation for our findings is that DRG 427 comprises more common and
straightforward diagnoses and, consequently, high volume hospitals are more effective in
treating these diseases (e.g.: adjustment disorders and obsessive-compulsive disorders). Re-
garding DRG 432, it includes diagnoses that normally need special treatment such as sleep
disorders. These treatments are often provided by high volume hospitals. Therefore, patients
with these disorders treated in these facilities need less inpatient care than the ones treated
in hospitals with no such treatments.
When deciding on the centralisation of activities in high volume hospitals, policy-makers
should not rely only on potential savings. The literature has reported a negative relationship
between usage of services and the distance of the patient from the hospital (the so-called
distance decay effect) (Mungall, 2005). This effect is more pronounced for patients with low
incomes, poor access to transport and the elderly and disable. Balancing the potential gains
that we find against the arguments on access to care, we conjecture the former argument is
not strong enough to justify the centralisation of psychiatric services.
Since inpatient care for mental disorders is indicated specially for people with SMI our
results may be reflecting the fact that this type of diseases has on average a length of
treatment of 24 days in Portugal, regardless of hospital volume. This value was provided
by psychiatrists and is based on their clinical expertise since no formal study was performed
on the ALOS of patients with SMI in Portugal. In the literature there are several studies
focusing on SMI inpatient ALOS based on evidence from the US. Lee, Rothbard and Noll
(2012) found a confidence interval for the ALOS of 10 ± 3 days. However, we need to be
cautious when comparing these values across countries. This is due to the fact that inpatient
LOS is influenced by the availability of community health services (WHO, 2003b) and also
55The most prominent result concerns to DRG 431. As this DRG comprises childhood mental disorders,
the effect of treating more cases is potentially offset by the fact that we are not considering patients aged 15
or younger.
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by the increased pressure to discharge patients earlier (Auffarth et al., 2008). Systema,
Burgess and Tansella (2002) found evidence of a shorter LOS in a community-based system
than in a hospital-based system. As for Portugal, it has been relying on inpatient care, and
community services did not have the desirable development. Meaning, these services were
not implemented in the majority of general hospitals that belong to the NHS (Almeida,
2009).56 Therefore, and since the US is more community-based oriented than Portugal, the
results provided by empirical evidence need to be read carefully.
It is worth highlighting that we find economies of scale for hospitals that treat, on average,
more complex cases (cmi). Specifically, hospitals with higher cmi have a smaller LOS. This
result may be explained by the same reason we describe in treatment outcomes: larger
hospitals treat, on average, more difficult cases (patients are more complex) (Morikawa,
2010), we believe this might be capturing best practices.
We also find diseconomies of scale for larger hospitals (with higher number of beds),
which is in line with previous literature (Posnett, 1999). Our results may be reflecting the
reorganisation of public infrastructure for healthcare provision which inserted the Portuguese
hospitals into common management health units. This reorganisation did not imply a hos-
pital merge but instead only administrative services were merged. In addition, combining
this result with the finding that larger hospitals have lower readmission rates, enhances the
importance of the LOS. According to Gaynes et al. (2015), one advantage of longer stays
is that patients are provided with additional monitoring which increases the likelihood of a
patient being stabilised via treatment, reducing the readmissions. On the other hand, and as
the authors pointed out, longer stays have disadvantages such as unintended consequences of
hospitalisations (infections, job loss). Also, and as mentioned before, longer LOS can imply
lack of community health services. Policy-makers aim to “move away from a mental health
56One reason is the low funding of general hospitals with community focus (WHO, 2003b; Almeida et al.,
2015).
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system dominated by institutional care alone towards one whereby the main emphasis is on
providing care and support within the community” (McDaid and Thornicroft, 2005, p.12).
Hence, the LOS should be brief and supported by multidisciplinary teams in the community.
Our results on integrated continuous care show these facilities should be considered as
part of the Portuguese mental health system. They serve as a complement to inpatient
care as many mental disorders are “better managed by services that adopt a continuing
care model” (WHO, 2003c, p.48). The ability of inpatient care to help patients with SMI
may depend on the availability of comprehensive continuous care services (WHO, 2003c).
Additionally, and according to the literature, once these services are available, they may help
reduce hospital readmissions (Systema, Burgess and Tansella, 2002), and also provide social
integration for these patients (Wait and Harding, 2006) which can bring long-term gains.57
If these facilities were available, hospitals would have the capacity to treat, on average, 10%
to 27% more patients with SMI per year. In Portugal, Almeida et al. (2013) estimated a
treatment gap (difference between population in need of services and the proportion that
actually receives such services) of 33.6% for SMI. This result provides additional grounds to
implement such facilities for SMI patients.
According to Porter and Lee (2013), the healthcare delivery system design can improve
patient value. Organising care into Integrated Practice Units (IPUs) around patient medical
conditions can efficiently maximise the patient’s overall outcomes (Porter, 2012). As inte-
grated continuous care facilities are patient-centered and bring together providers and staff
who address severe mental disorders, they can improve patient outcomes at both medical
care and social integration.
It should be highlighted that the recent governmental report on mental healthcare delivery
(ACSS, 2015) identifies as an urgent need the creation of continuous care facilities. It is the
57This social integration promotes greater personal autonomy and independence and also employment
integration for patients with SMI.
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social sector that has been the main provider of psychiatric rehabilitation but it cannot be
considered as a substitute for these facilities.58 Moreover the social sector has been at almost
full capacity (ACSS, 2015).
Given the current economic and financial situation, Portugal has launched several reforms
in its healthcare sector not only to “introduce more efficiency into the health system” (Barros,
2012a, p.10) but also to reduce the costs regarding the NHS. Implementing continuous care
facilities could bring potential savings to NHS and should, therefore, be considered by policy-
makers.
In terms of the methodology used to determine the unplanned readmissions and its cost,
we consider that our approach, the negative binomial regression, is appropriate since it
fits quite well the 30-day readmissions distribution. Comparing these results with the real
unplanned readmissions,59 we believe this methodology can be used as a guide to deter-
mine unplanned readmissions when it is not possible to distinguish between planned and
unplanned.
Comparing the methodology used in determining the scale effects with the main com-
mon methods used in the volume-outcome empirical works, mainly the logistic and probit
regression models, we believe our approach is the most appropriate because it accommodates
the fact that patients may leave the hospital not fully recovered, a very important aspect in
mental health (Zhang, Harvey and Andrew, 2011), particularly in our dataset. We must refer
that data on hospital characteristics about mental health departments were not available.
Regarding the computation of potential savings, we assume a benchmark with an ALOS
for all patients with SMI. As mentioned before, this ALOS is the number of days that a
patient with SMI needs to stay at the hospital in order to be stable (which approximately
coincides with the ALOS of these patients in our dataset — 23.6 days). The cases in which
58The social sector is financed by the Ministry of Labour and Social Security.
59As mentioned before, in our dataset we have a variable that distinguish both the planned and unplanned
readmissions.
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patients may need to stay longer in the hospital are the ones in which patients have co-
morbidities. The patients considered in the analysis are diagnosed with a SMI. Thus, we
believe these patients could have been transferred to an integrated continuous care facility.
It is worth noting that transferring patients to these units will allow the ALOS to de-
crease mainly in DRG 430 (it comprises 98% of all mental health inpatient discharges whose
diagnosis is severe mental disorders). As these cases are treated mostly in high volume
hospitals we conjecture that potential scale effects could emerge from integrated continuous
care, ceteris paribus. After the implementation of integrated continuous care, we suggest
scale effects should be reassessed. If the magnitude of the scale effect is sufficiently high, the
government should promote the centralisation of inpatient services in high volume hospitals.
In this scenario, decentralisation is not affected, as integrated continuous care is provided
closer to patients’ geographic concentration.
Another important issue is to understand if the current DRG financing mechanism for
mental health inpatient care is the right one. This mechanism encourages hospital activity
such as more inpatient stays and emergency visits, and also discourages the implementation
of a more balanced care (Almeida et al., 2015; CTARSM, 2017; Perelman et al., 2018). In
2009, the WHO compared the optimal mix of services for mental health (WHO pyramid
framework (WHO, 2007b)) with the Portuguese mental health services structure (WHO,
2009b). That comparison clearly showed the Portuguese mental health system relies heav-
ily on hospital settings, community services are underdeveloped, and fragmentation of care
occurs. We identify DRG 430 as an heterogeneous code which comprises diagnosis with
different ALOS. Like in the UK, an alternative financing mechanism based on clusters can
be considered. Each care cluster group people with similar mental health needs and dif-
ficulties and also take into consideration the period of care. An algorithm was created to
support physicians in accurately allocating patients to clusters. Patients are re-assessed
and re-clustered periodically (NHS, 2016). These clusters are then used to pursue the PbR
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mechanism for commissioning mental healthcare. Hence, we suggest policy-makers should
rethink the payment mechanism in order to reflect the different resources needed to treat
similar diseases. We should highlight that since 2015, ACSS implemented a new classifica-
tion system (All Patients Refined DRG) which classifies patients according to their reason
of admission, severity of illness and risk of mortality. In this classification, the DRG 430 was
disaggregated and some diagnoses such as schizophrenia and bipolar disorders were assigned
to a specific DRG. Therefore, despite the mechanism by which the Portuguese hospitals are
financed remains the same, this new classification might bring different incentives to mental
health inpatient than the ones we found when AP-DRG, version 21, was in place. As future
research, we will determine if this new classification system had impact on some of the main
key issues of mental health (length of stay and readmissions).
Overall, the Portuguese mental health financing system should create incentives for hos-
pitals to reduce their readmissions rates by introducing a quality measure associated with the
reduction of DRG prices. Also, the mental health financing plan should be designed in order
to account for the implementation of integrated continuous care and to establish specific
multidisciplinary teams. Specifically, the financing mechanism should allocate a significant
part of the budget to community care rather than to inpatient care. Providing such facilities
and multidisciplinary teams not only will reduce readmissions but also will improve patient
outcomes (Almeida, 2009; Almeida and Killaspy, 2011). In terms of organisation, we do not
find any advantage in centralise inpatient services and, therefore, the financing system does
not need to induce concentration. Also it does not need to accommodate the fact that high
volume hospitals could receive proportionally less because they benefit from economies of
scale. A single payment value, applicable to all units is adequate.
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1.7 Robustness Checks
We estimated the regression model described in subsection 1.4.2.1 using a multiple OLS.
In this analysis we create an unique observation for patients who were readmitted within
30 days by adding the LOS of the different admission episodes. The results are different
from the ones we obtain using a duration model, as in this case volume is not statistically
significant, specifically for DRG 430 (Tables A.11 and A.12 in appendix A.4). Hence, to have
a correct view of economies of scale, it is crucial the way data specificities are accommodated
by each estimation method.
In terms of efficiency measures, some authors state that one should use the ALOS instead
of LOS. The argument is the LOS is influenced by patients’ characteristics, but even after
controlling for those covariates, there is still unexplained variations in the LOS between
hospitals (Cooper et al., 2010). For robustness purposes, we estimated the regression model
described in subsection 1.4.2.1, using ALOS as the dependent variable instead of LOS. We
opt to use the OLS regression model since in this case the observation unit is the hospital and
not the patient. Tables A.13 and A.14 in appendix A.4 present the results of this analysis.
We find a scale effect for most DRGs, exception being DRGs 425, 426, and 431. The sign
and magnitude of the coefficients are similar to the ones we obtain considering as efficiency
measure the LOS.
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1.8 Limitations
It is worth highlighting some limitations of our analysis. The first one is related to the fact
that we are not able to follow the patients between years in the DRG dataset. Second, we did
not analyse the social sector which constitutes an important part of the Portuguese mental
health system (financed by the Ministry of Social Security), specially in terms of long term
care for patients with SMI. A governmental report on mental healthcare delivery (ACSS,
2015), identified the social sector as the main provider of psychiatric rehabilitation.
Additionally, we were limited to conducting an analysis on outpatient care. The ACSS
provided this information, namely the monthly accumulated number of mental health consul-
tations between 2008 and 2013 for all hospital centers (Centros Hospitalares) and local health
units (Unidades Locais de Sau´de) belonging to the NHS. However, this information is not
very informative as we were not able to disentangle the services provided in the community
from outpatient consultations. We consider that policy-makers should gather all information
on community mental health services provided by hospitals in order to be possible to analyse
the impact of these services on inpatient care and also understand the current state of the
art.
1.9 Conclusion
Our paper assesses the incentives of a case-mix based funding system in delivering mental
healthcare services. Since organisation of services is relevant for the mental health system
financing, we determine the existence of a scale effect from concentrating activities in high
volume hospitals. This study is performed for Portugal between 1994 and 2013 and uses a
DRG dataset. Also, potential savings for NHS from continuous care were computed since
these facilities can work as a complement to inpatient care.
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The current financing mechanism provides incentives for hospitals treating, on average,
less complex cases to increase the number of equivalent patients using rehospitalisations.
Despite this result might be related to other DRGs, we believe it exacerbates the problem
of recurrent readmissions on psychiatric wards.
We find evidence of a negative relationship between readmission rates and treating more
complex cases. Our results also show quality of care, measured by readmissions rate, is not
affected by the number of patients treated.
As far as organisation of services is concerned, we find a scale effect for some DRGs,
specially DRG 430 which comprises about 51% of total mental health inpatient discharges.
Despite this result, the economic magnitude of the scale effects found is rather small and does
not justify the centralisation of psychiatric services in high volume hospitals. The potential
savings that this centralisation could bring is about 2.8% of the total cost of mental health
inpatient care (likely to be smaller than costs of transport and convenience to patients).
We also find potential savings for inpatient care if integrated continuous care was in
place that range between 4.5eM and 13.4eM (about 26% and 33% of the initial cost,
respectively). Transferring patients to these facilities could allow inpatient care to treat, on
average, 10% to 27% more patient with SMI per year. This is an important issue given that
33.6% of the Portuguese population with SMI do not receive treatment (treatment gap).
Our results provide information to the Portuguese policy-makers designing a new mental
health financing plan. The focus should be on reduction of readmission by introducing qual-
ity measure, on implementation of multidisciplinary teams and on promotion of integrated
mental healthcare with concentration of services not being relevant.
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Chapter 2
Reforming the Portuguese mental
health system: an incentive-based
approach1
2.1 Introduction
To promote an effective mental health system, the WHO has made several recommendations,
namely, a larger involvement of primary healthcare (PHC) in prevention and treatment of
mild diseases, community-based care for SMI, more integrated care, better access to care,
and less discrimination (WHO, 2009a). An evaluation of the Portuguese Mental Health
Plan carried out in 2017 stated that Portugal is failing to achieve such recommendations
(CTARSM, 2017).
The Portuguese mental health system is essentially centred around inpatient stays and
emergency consultations, which consume more than 80% of the resources, coupled with an
insufficient provision of community-based services (Almeida et al., 2015). A cross-country
1The co-authors of this paper are Pedro Chaves, Jose´ Caldas de Almeida and Julian Perelman.
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comparison has shown that Portugal is below other European countries in terms of develop-
ment of community-based mental health centres and mental health teams (Almeida et al.,
2015).
These weaknesses are especially worrisome when considering that the prevalence of life-
time mental disorders is above 30% (Almeida et al., 2013), that mental health disorders
represent 11.7% of disease-adjusted life years lost, and that Portugal experiences a high
prevalence of depression (7.9%), anxiety (16.5%), impulse disorders (3.5%), and substance
abuse (1.6%) in comparison with other European countries (Almeida et al., 2013). Several
ambitious and evidence-based plans have been proposed over the last decades, but none
of them has been able to convincingly tackle these issues. We documented, in a previous
contribution (Perelman et al., 2017b), that this failure was partly due to the inadequate
payment mechanisms of Portuguese mental health care providers, which did not encourage
best practices. Among these mechanisms we highlighted the volume-based hospital financing
system, which does not encourage the continuity of care or community-based interventions;
and the capitation-based model for PHC, which favours long lists and short consultations,
completed by a P4P scheme that does not include a single mental health indicator.
Based on this perspective this study designs a new payment model for mental health care
providers in Portugal, focusing on the prevention and detection of mental health disorders
early in life, on the treatment of moderate depression in PHC, and on the community-based
follow-up of SMI. The prevention and detection dimensions were selected as major issues
because of the large burden of mental disease in Portugal, in comparison with neighbour
countries: for example, the 2017 Global Burden of Disease study indicates that major de-
pressive disorders represented the third cause of years lived with disability in Portugal, 40%
than predicted according to the country’s socio-demographic context, while it is the fifth
cause in Western Europe, 10% higher than predicted (Vos et al., 2017). The second reason
for selection was the extreme weakness of mental public health in the country. As mentioned
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in the 2017 evaluation of the National Mental Health Plan, “so far, Portugal has no inte-
grated strategy for promotion and prevention in mental health” (CTARSM, 2017, p.57). In
regard to treatment of moderate depression in PHC, WHO (2011b) mentioned that “unless
primary care services can treat the large minority of people with anxiety and depression, spe-
cialist services will be paralysed due to the demand, unable to focus on people with severe
and ongoing needs” (p.9). The same mission observed that “the financing system has cre-
ated unintentional disincentives to establish community based services, rewarding hospital
admissions and medical interventions” (WHO, 2011b, p.9). We further detail the rationale
for selecting these dimensions as priorities for reforming the payment system.
The remainder of this chapter is as follows. The next section provides the conceptual
background of our analysis, which briefly reviews the literature. Section 2.3 presents the
methodological approach. Section 2.4 presents the main results from our analysis, which
are then discussed in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 provides the limitations of our study. Finally,
Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
In the health economics literature, the physician (the agent) is viewed as making decisions on
behalf of the patient (the principal), because he has more knowledge and information about
diagnoses and treatments. However, the physician is rarely a perfect agent for the patient
because he also cares about his own interests (income, leisure time, reputation, etc.). The
physician’s objectives of patient well-being and own interest may conflict, which may result
in the physician not always making the best decisions for the patient. This agency problem
exists because of the impossibility for the patient to adequately monitor the physician’s effort
and competence due to lack of knowledge and information, and the uncertainty surrounding
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treatments’ outcomes. The fact that patients lack information about their mental health
disease and possible treatments is especially acute because of the stigma surrounding these
diseases, which inhibits open discussions and information search, while the uncertainty about
treatments’ effectiveness is greater than in other clinical domains. These difficulties are
amplified by the physicians’ own lack of information and knowledge for mental health. For
example, a focus group with general practitioners (GPs), conducted in the UK, observed
that SMI is “too specialised for routine primary care and felt they lacked sufficient skills and
knowledge” (Lester, Tritter and Sorohan, 2005, p.2). Payment mechanisms are of particular
importance to align physicians’ objectives of patient health and own well-being.
All traditional payment mechanisms have advantages and drawbacks. The fixed salary
avoids incentives to discriminate against patients but limits the physicians’ motivation, in-
troducing a risk of lower quality. FFS motivates physicians to increase the volume of care,
but may encourage an excess provision, leading to higher expenditures. Capitation, which
reimburses practices on the basis of a list of potential users, promotes efficient use of re-
sources but may lead to selecting the healthiest users, and to under-provision. The bundled
payment, which reimburses providers for treating diagnosed patients for a given period re-
gardless of services provided, creates incentives similar to those in capitation, except that
it does not encourage the selection of healthy patients because it finances patients with a
given disease. Finally, P4P rewards high quality care but may cultivate a practice centred
exclusively on indicators, and the selection of patients who are more likely to help attain
the targets. Let us mention also that FFS is more trusted by patients than other payment
models, because they feel that under FFS physicians put the patients’ health and well-being
above cost considerations (Kao et al., 1998).
Internationally, alternative reimbursement models have been tested in mental health,
with limited success, as shown in Chapter 1. Recalling, in the US, the “Colorado Medicaid
Capitation” replaced the traditional FFS system in 1995, which led to a reduction in the use
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of more complex resource-consuming services and lower expenditures (Bloom et al., 1998),
a greater integration of services (Chou et al., 2005), consultations replacing inpatient stays
among youths, but no change in prevention (Catalano et al., 2000).
The per case payment system, using DRG, was demonstrated to reduce institutionalisa-
tion of SMI (Zechmeister et al., 2002) but increased hospital debts, possibly because of the
inadequacy of DRG as a classification system for mental health, which are more oriented
to short acute stays than long-term uncertain ones (Knapp et al., 2007b). In Austria the
creation of specific categories for mental health allowed hospitals to cover their costs while
increasing community-based care (Zechmeister et al., 2002).
Finally, in the UK, characterized by an NHS with strong similarities to the Portuguese
one, a payment per activity was implemented based on HRG. However, it was observed that
this payment model offered few incentives to mental health providers to respond efficiently to
mental health needs (Jacobs et al., 2016), so that episode-based payments were introduced,
based on Mental Health Clusters. These clusters group patients into 21 categories, according
to their needs, and providers are paid a fixed amount for each treatment period according
to the patient’s cluster. Jacobs et al. (2016) analysed this payment model, showing a high
variation between providers in terms of costs, treatments, and lengths of stay within clusters,
making the adequate pricing and services of each cluster difficult. These authors concluded
that the payment should not be abandoned, as it was the most adequate for mental health
treatment, but that clusters should be revised in order to make them more homogeneous.
To summarise, theory suggests using payment systems that combine various reimburse-
ment schemes in order to attenuate their weaknesses, while the evidence is poorly conclusive
about which system functions best in mental health. Hence, our proposal is more grounded
on theoretical considerations, adopting the following options:
1. When there was evidence that a specific service was a good practice, we opted to
encourage it specifically through FFS.
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2. Capitation and bundled payments were favoured because they encourage efficiency,
continuity of care, and prevention, but we completed these schemes with P4P in order
to limit the risk of under-provision.
2.3 Methodology
Our goal is to create payment mechanisms that encourage the evidence-based best practices
in mental health, not to define these best practices. This is why we perform a narrative
review of the literature, in the four selected domains of action, to identify the best practices
with proven effectiveness and cost-effectiveness. The option for a non-systematic review was
guided by the fact that best practices have long been identified in systematic reviews, and
reported in national and international guidelines, so that a duplication of this task was not
deemed necessary.
Thereafter, we elaborate payment mechanisms, which we further present to a large panel
of experts in the field, who comment on the proposal and make suggestions. We interview
22 experts with different backgrounds and experience, and from Southern and Northern
Portuguese regions. The list of experts includes ten psychiatrists, four hospital managers
with an economics background, two psychologists, two nurses, one hospital manager with
a health science background, one social assistant, one public health specialist, and one GP.
There were 13 men and nine women, and the average experience as professional in the area
was 22 years (ranging from 3 to 42) (Table B.1 in appendix B.1).
Our study cannot be considered as a qualitative analysis in a traditional way, which was
beyond our scope and competences. However, we proceed in a way that is close to the Delphi
technique, with two rounds, as follows. We design an alternative payment model, on the
basis of the literature, and then we present it individually, through face-to-face interviews,
to the panel of experts, asking them to comment on the model and provide suggestions.
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Then, after a first round of interviews, and a collection of highly important and numerous
comments and suggestions, we revise our model, which we present it to experts again for their
approval, and provide new suggestions and comments, if deem necessary. The consultation
rounds occurred between 29 February 2016 and 18 March 2016.
This approach is indeed close to what is generally known as the Delphi technique, al-
though it was not applied in a rigid way, and our objective is more about improving our
initial model by obtaining new ideas and measuring its feasibility in the Portuguese context,
than to make it fully consensual (contrary to the principle of the Delphi technique, which
aims at reaching consensus by way of statistical analysis (Jones and Hunter, 1995)). This is
why our paper also does not display results of the expert panel.
The results of the final model, which derive from our literature review and the inputs
from experts, are reported.
2.4 Results
We detail here the four dimensions of the proposal, describing the rationale for choosing
one as a priority; the type of intervention that we choose to encourage, and why; and the
proposed payment mechanism. The final proposals for each dimension are summarised in
Table B.2 in appendixB.2.
2.4.1 Prevention early in life
• Rationale
There is vast evidence that early life adversities affect health in the long run (Case, Fertig and
Paxson, 2005). This is particularly true for mental health. Kessler et al. (2010) estimate that
parental mental health disorders, parental criminality, family violence, and physical or sexual
abuse, are all related to a higher likelihood of mental health disorders during childhood,
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adolescence, and adulthood. Interventions early in life in socially deprived contexts have
also been demonstrated to be highly effective in preventing physical and mental illnesses
(Muennig et al., 2011).
• Intervention
The Portuguese National Plan for Child and Youth Health (PNSIJ) acknowledges this point,
suggesting that it is crucial to evaluate the adaptation to pregnancy, the emotional sta-
tus of the mother, and psychosocial factors (DGS, 2013). The text mentions, “the assess-
ment of family dynamics should be a concern for the PHC team at each contact with the
child/youth/family. During the first year of life, special attention should be devoted to the
emotional status of the mother (due to the risk of post-partum depression), referring to the
identified cases that may interfere in the child’s development” (DGS, 2013, p.12). The plan
suggests personalised care for children at risk or special needs, with a higher frequency of
consultations, and the possibility of at-home visits. These visits have been proven to be
effective in avoiding mental health disorders later in life (Olds et al., 2004; Peacock et al.,
2013).
These proposed guidelines seem to represent an adequate response, but their implemen-
tation has been limited by the insufficient human resources and by the absence of a clear
signal and compensation to PHC teams for whom early prevention of mental health disorders
should be a priority.
• Payment model
We propose the creation of a bundled payment to the PHC team for the follow-up of children
at risk or with special needs during the two first years of life, with the registration of these
children on a central platform, including information/justification for these children being
considered at risk or with special needs, on the basis of a diagnosis evaluation grid (CNSM,
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2009). The presence of a psychologist available for consultation in PHC practices is also
recommended (he/she does not need to be physically present full time, being preferably part
of a specialized mental health team).
2.4.2 Early detection of mental health disorders
• Rationale
Kessler et al. (2005) observe, on the basis of a cohort, that half of mental health disorders
(Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th Edition (DSM-IV)) have their
onset before 14 years old, and 75% before 24 years old. This study also observe that the
median age of onset of anxiety and impulse disorders was 11 years old. However, Burnett-
Zeigler et al. (2012) conclude that only a third of adolescents attending a PHC consultation
receive a psychological evaluation.
• Intervention
PHC practices are the best setting to tackle this issue. In Portugal, since individuals have
easy access to PHC, due to universal coverage, very low co-payments, and wide geographical
distribution, the GPs can easily reach children and youth.
Also, the PNSIJ includes guidelines for the evaluation of children and youths, indicating
at which ages they must be evaluated and how. Eleven consultations are recommended
between the first week and the third year of life, and eight consultations between three and
18 years old. The contents of the mental health evaluation are clearly stated, mentioning
affective relationships, behaviours and disorders, life at home, at childcare, and at school,
substance abuse, violence, and physical abuse. Guidelines are widely available, but are
poorly followed because of GPs’ lack of time, and also because the implementation of these
guidelines is not clearly signalled and compensated. In practice, the evaluation of children
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is essentially centred on physical health, while adolescents often do not appear at these
vigilance consultations.
• Payment model
We suggest adding an indicator in the P4P scheme for PHC practices, namely the “per-
centage of users in the key-ages of the PNSIJ who have effectively attended the vigilance
consultations, according to the diagnosis evaluation grid”.
Given that vigilance consultations are specific services that need to be encouraged, and
that mental health evaluation is more time consuming, we suggest the payment of an addi-
tional fee to GPs for each follow-up consultation including mental health evaluation, using
the diagnosis evaluation grid.
2.4.3 Stepped collaborative model for depression
• Rationale
According to WHO (2011b), PHC is the main pillar supporting high-quality mental health
care. PHC has the capacity to identify and treat mental health disorders, refer more severe
cases to specialists, and carry out prevention and promotion activities. In particular, the
treatment of common mental disorders by PHC services has several advantages over the
treatment provided by specialized teams in Portugal. Specifically, easier access related to
the wide geographical distribution of PHC practices and the very low co-payments, holistic
view of the patient, allowing the treatment of co-morbidities, and a more efficient treatment,
avoiding the use of more expensive specialized care.
78
• Intervention
According to Gilbody et al. (2006), there is strong evidence that the intervention of PHC
in the treatment of depression is effective and cost-effective. We therefore opt to focus on
this disease as a priority, which may be extended later to other mental health diseases.
The collaborative stepped care model has been demonstrated to be an effective response
for the treatment of depression. Thirty-seven studies measured this effectiveness, showing
improvements in terms of patient adherence to treatment, quality of life, and depression
outcomes (Mitchell et al., 2013). The model has been implemented differently in various
places, namely in the UK (NICE, 2009), the Netherlands (Franx et al., 2012), the US (Bartels,
Gill and Naslund, 2015), and Chile (Araya et al., 2003).
Based on the international experience, we suggest the implementation of a model in four
stages:
• 1st stage: Depression diagnosis in PHC, using a pre-defined symptoms grid (e.g., Pa-
tient Health Questionnaire, PHQ-9), by a GP or a nurse.
• 2nd stage: Treatment of mild depression in PHC, on the basis of self-help, cognitive-
behavioural therapy, and physical exercise, by a specialised mental health worker.
• 3rd stage: Treatment of moderate depression in PHC, on the basis of medication,
psychological interventions, and social support, by a GP or psychologist.
• 4th stage: Treatment of severe, atypical, or psychotic depression, or with suicide risk, on
the basis of medication, complex psychological interventions, and combined treatments,
by a specialised mental health team including a psychiatrist.
The current payment scheme for PHC does not, however, provide incentives for their
involvement in mental health care. The capitation payment favours long patient lists, and
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thus leads to excess referral and overloading, and short consultations, which are not appro-
priate for mental health therapies; finally, the P4P scheme does not include a single indicator
related to mental health.
• Payment model
Following Miller et al. (2017), we propose the inclusion of the following indicator in the P4P
scheme for PHC: “proportion of users with depression whose condition has been diagnosed
with PHQ-9 and treatment has been initiated in the adequate phase of the collaborative
stepped care model”.
We also suggest nominating a reference GP in the PHC team and a reference psychia-
trist in the specialised mental health team of catchment area, to enhance the collaboration
between primary and specialised care. We suggest the payment of a fixed monthly fee to
compensate these physicians for the extra work. The availability of psychologists in PHC
practices should also be considered.
2.4.4 Integrated community-based care for SMI patients
• Rationale
There is substantial evidence suggesting better outcomes for SMI when treated in the com-
munity, while inpatient stays are associated with poorer health outcomes and risk of read-
missions (Knapp et al., 1995). Despite this evidence, there are few community-based mental
health teams in Portugal, while the current hospital financing model is volume-based, favour-
ing more frequent consultations and inpatient stays.
• Intervention
The model to be favoured is that of community-based mental health teams, which are ex-
pected to improve access to care because of their proximity to patients’ homes and lower
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stigma; to improve reinsertion because the community-based setting allows better contacts
with social care, families, and employers; to improve follow-up, which leads to better health
outcomes and efficiency through reducing inpatient stays and emergency visits.
• Payment model
We suggest the implementation of a per period payment, according to which the hospital
receives an annual payment for each patient registered with SMI, covering all healthcare
services.
The rules for the payment attribution are the following:
• Diagnosed with SMI according to the ICD-9-CM: 292 (drug-induced mental disorders),
295 (schizophrenic psychosis), 296 (affective psychosis), 297 (delusional disorders), or
298 (non-organic psychosis).
• The number and type of patients are contracted at the beginning of the year, with the
payment being attributed according to this estimated volume.
• The payment covers all SMI-related services, namely inpatient stays, day care, medi-
cations, consultations, lab tests, and exams.
• The payment does not cover the non-acute treatment phase, i.e., long-term care ser-
vices.
Also, the participation in the new payment scheme is conditional on the following:
• The payment is attributed to the mental health department, which has full autonomy
and responsibility in managing funds, being the residual claimant.
• The mental health department disposes of community-based mental health teams, with
protocols with PHC practices, residential units, patients and families associations,
rehabilitation units, nursing homes, social services, and local authorities.
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Also, the payment includes a P4P component:
• A bonus (resp. penalty) for the hospitals in the lowest (resp. highest) decile of the
distribution in terms of inpatient stays.
• A bonus (resp. penalty) for the hospitals in the lowest (resp. highest) decile of the
distribution in terms of post-discharge consultations up to 30 days after discharge.
• A budget penalty in case the hospital does not contribute and update a national registry
of SMI, specifically created within this new payment model.
Finally, we suggest an implementation phase of this new payment scheme, in order to smooth
the adaptation, collect new data, and evaluate its impact.
The implementation should be limited to three hospitals in year 1, six hospitals in year
2, and nine hospitals in year 3. The selection of hospitals for this pilot phase should be
made using a random sampling method, from the universe of Portuguese NHS hospitals
with a mental health department from the Lisbon, Coimbra, and Porto regions, where most
patients are treated. We suggest selecting three hospitals used as “treatment group”, and
three others as “control group”. Then, the same process will be replicated for the three
following in year 2, and for the three last in year 3.
In their first implementation year, we suggest a 25% higher bundled payment, in order to
favour the necessary changes in structures and teams. During the first three years, data will
be collected on resource use, pathologies, and functionality, in order to refine the payment
value and their risk-adjustment for functionality. Afterwards, the new payment model and
its values will be designed, and the implementation will be extended to all the hospitals
belonging to the Portuguese NHS.
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2.5 Discussion
This paper proposes an innovative payment model for the Portuguese public mental health
system. This system departs from the hypothesis that failures of previous plans, which
have been largely highlighted in recent national and international evaluations (WHO, 2011b;
CTARSM, 2017), are the result of the neglecting of implementation processes, especially in
ensuring that suggested guidelines are properly financed and motivated. This is why in this
project we focus on a payment model, as a means to implement best practices in mental
health.
Much has been written about the influence of payment models on healthcare providers’
practices (Rice, 2006; Ettner, Schoenbaum and Williams, 2012). Surprisingly, only few
studies have addressed the impact of reimbursement schemes in mental health. This is why
the proposal was mainly based on theoretical and empirical studies not specifically oriented
towards mental health, validated by mental health experts. This resulted in the view that
all payments have serious limitations, so that “payment innovations that blend elements
of fee-for-service, capitation, and case rates can preserve the advantages and attenuate the
disadvantages of each” (Robinson, 2001, p.150). In other terms, it appears clearly that
blended payments are the most promising option, combining several advantages of various
payment schemes, in order to diminish their adverse effects. In the meantime, we selected
the areas and types of interventions that best correspond to the current weaknesses of the
Portuguese mental health system, and for which there was more evidence.
This proposal needs to be tested in practice, to confirm whether the expected benefits will
materialize in practice, and not be compromised by unexpected adverse effects. It should
be highlighted that preliminary meetings have taken place at the ACSS, the Portuguese
institution that defines and implements the financing of NHS healthcare providers, in order
to implement pilot projects following our recommendations. This is a promising step because
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these pilot projects include a close evaluation of their effectiveness and cost-effectiveness.
Thus, we will be able, in the following months, to produce outcomes that we expect to be
useful for Portugal and for other mental health systems facing similar difficulties.
As our proposal is largely centred around implementing new financing mechanisms for
mental health providers, a major issue is its sustainability, in a country marked by a relatively
low GDP per capita compared to other European countries, and tight public health budgets.
Some of our suggestions are neutral from a budget viewpoint, as they merely redistribute
money from low performers to high performers, in the case of P4P (dimensions 1, 2, and 3),
or redistribute the money paid on the basis of volume into per-patient payments (dimension
4).
However, in dimension 1 we propose a bundled payment to the PHC team for the follow-
up of children at risk or with special needs during the first two years of life; in dimension 2,
we suggest the payment of an additional fee to GPs for each follow-up consultation; and in
dimension 3 the payment of a fixed monthly fee to compensate these physicians for the extra
work, respectively. Considering an estimated number of 4,722 children at risk and prices
of each type of consultations, the annual budget impact of dimension 1 may vary between
1.3 and 2.4 million euros. Considering 1,964,862 children in the ages for the follow-up
consultations, and a fee of 15 euros per consultation, the annual budget impact of dimension
2 would be of 29.5 million euros. Finally, considering the 857 primary care centres and 110
hospitals, and a monthly fee of 124 euros to GPs and specialists, the annual budget impact
of dimension 3 would be of 1.2 million euros. In other terms, the budget impact of the
proposal would be of 33.1 million euros per year, that is, 0.36% of the total public health
expenditures (9,130 million euros in 2017).
Note, however, that providers’ payment mechanisms are only one among other possible
instruments to promote best practices in mental health, so that it should be accompanied
by investments in community-based care facilities, continuous training and support for GPs,
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a greater autonomy for primary care and mental health department managers, and the
reinforcement of primary care teams with psychologists. These investments also require an
increasing awareness on the part of the population and decision-makers about the burden of
mental health disease, which financing models cannot achieve.
2.6 Limitations
Our proposal suffers from some limitations that should be mentioned. First, the proposal was
presented to and validated by only a limited group of experts, selected by convenience. If,
as expected, the project creates interest in policy-makers for its implementation in practice,
we suggest diffusing the proposal through formal channels, and opening a period for public
discussion.
Second, there is a vast literature on the effects of payment schemes on physicians’ prac-
tices, which inspired our model, but the literature is scarce on the empirical testing of their
impact, and even much scarcer in the field of mental health. This is why we also suggest im-
plementing the model progressively, in order to measure its effects carefully, before expanding
it to the whole country.
Finally, we must repeat that all payment schemes have their weaknesses, and even com-
bining various models through blended formulas may not succeed in mitigating them. In
particular, we propose to use in some way the P4P in all dimensions, which might be as-
sociated with excessive focus on incentivised indicators, crowding-out intrinsic motivation,
or cheating on performance reporting (Doran, Maurer and Ryan, 2017). Although the evi-
dence is ambiguous for these adverse effects, they may be considered in the implementation
process, through limiting the weight of the P4P in the physician remuneration.
85
2.7 Conclusion
The Portuguese mental health system suffers from various weaknesses, and has failed to
implement WHO recommendations on best practices. This failure is largely related to in-
adequate payment and incentives to providers. To overcome this problem, we design an
alternative payment model for primary care and hospitals on the basis of the literature and
experts’ consultation.
The model focuses on prevention and detection of diseases early in life, stepped care
collaborative model for depression, and community-based care for SMI. This alternative
financing model for mental healthcare providers, aimed at incentivising best practices, is
expected to contribute to a better quality of all mental health financing systems that are
facing the same challenges as the Portuguese one.
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Chapter 3
Direct treatment costs of Serious
Mental Illnesses among adults and
their determinants: the Portuguese
National Health Service1
3.1 Introduction
For people with SMI, defined according to their duration and impact on the disability
(Bachrach, 1988), evidence suggests that community-based care (e.g.: community-based
rehabilitation and mobile crisis teams) should be available and inpatient stays should be
consider as a last resort since evidence points to better outcomes when patients are treated
by community services instead of inpatient treatment (Thornicroft and Tansella, 2003; WHO,
2007b). Also, treating patients with SMI implies a strong coordination between services and
continuity care. It is important for patients with SMI that mental health services guarantee
1The co-author of this paper is Julian Perelman.
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the coordination of different services such as social, psychological, and medical, as patients
with mental health disorders find it difficult to access several essential services (Thornicroft
and Tansella, 2003). Therefore, mental health services should avoid fragmentation of care
(Funk and Pathare, 2003). Several countries such as the UK, the US, and Canada have
been shifting their mental health services to a more community-based system in which in-
patient care, based in general hospitals, is the last resort (Drake and Latimer, 2012; MHT,
2016). This transition should be carefully planned, however, since the lack of community
services may increase problems of marginalization and homelessness, which occurred in the
US (Raphael and Stoll, 2013).
Recently, and as already mentioned, Portugal has been discussing how mental health ser-
vices should be organised and how the financing mechanism can help achieve good practices.
Currently, the Portuguese health system relies heavily on a NHS, and mental health disorders
are mostly treated at NHS hospitals (Almeida, 2018). Hospitals receive an annual budget
calculated on the basis of expected complexity adjusted activity, using DRGs (for a detailed
description of the financing system please see Chapter 1, subsection 1.2.1). However, the
current financing mechanism encourages hospital activity such as more inpatient stays and
emergency visits, and also discourages the implementation of a more balanced care (Almeida
et al., 2015; CTARSM, 2017; Perelman et al., 2018). In 2009, the WHO compared the op-
timal mix of services for mental health (WHO pyramid framework (WHO, 2007b)) with the
Portuguese mental health services structure (WHO, 2009b). That comparison clearly showed
that the Portuguese mental health system relies heavily on hospital settings, that community
services are underdeveloped, and that the fragmentation of care occurs.
In order to favour greater continuity and coordination of care, to promote prevention,
and make inpatient care less profitable in favour of more efficient care (e.g. community),
a new mechanism based on a per patient disease-related payment has been proposed to
finance the treatment of patients with SMI (Perelman et al., 2018). To implement the pay-
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ment scheme, cost measurement is needed in order to define a fair payment to compensate
costs and reduce the risk of patient selection and under provision. Measuring direct treat-
ment costs for the Portuguese NHS is important because Portugal is a country with a low
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita within the European context, and tight public
health budgets, especially for mental health, which imperatively calls for careful attention
to resource allocation. Decision-making about resource allocation (e.g., through economic
evaluations) requires sound evidence about mental health costs. Our paper seeks to fill in
the lack of evidence in this field. The main goal is to assess the direct cost of treating SMI
in psychiatric wards and determine its main drivers in the Portuguese NHS.
The remainder of the chapter is as follows. The next section 3.2 presents the dataset
used throughout our analysis and a descriptive statistics, while the methodological approach
is described in section 3.3. Section 3.4 presents the main results from our analysis, which
are then discussed in section 3.5. Sections 3.6 and 3.7 present the limitations of our work
and suggestions for future research, respectively. Finally, section 3.8 concludes.
3.2 Data
Our data was collected between 1st of September 2014 and 31st of August 2015 from a
convenience sample of three public hospitals: one psychiatric hospital located in Lisbon
(Centro Hospitalar Psiquia´trico de Lisboa (CHPL)) and two general hospitals located in
Lisbon and Porto (Centro Hospitalar de Lisboa Ocidental (CHLO) and Centro Hospital de
Sa˜o Joa˜o (CHSJ), respectively). In 2015, these hospitals accounted for 13% of all inpatient
discharges in the NHS.
The data was collected through revision of paper registries at CHLO, by psychiatrists,
and using electronic databases at CHSJ and CHPL, by psychiatrists and administrative staff.
At CHLO, despite the diagnoses were already codified, psychiatrists had to review the paper
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registries since the electronic databases did not contain all the interventions performed per
patient. The data collection was approved by the hospital boards and Ethical Committees,
and the data collection process was designed in close collaboration with hospital and mental
health department boards.
The data comprises all patients diagnosed with an SMI, during the acute phase of disease,
aged 18 or older and who received any treatment during the period under analysis. We used
the ICD-9-CM to select the patients with an SMI: 291, alcohol-induced mental disorders;
292, drug-induced mental disorders; 295, schizophrenic disorders; 296, affective disorders;
297, delusional disorders; and 298, non-organic psychosis. In appendix C.1 we provide a list
of the 3-digit codes considered in our analysis. We follow the definition of Bachrach (1988),
who suggests that people with chronic mental disorders can be defined according to their
diagnosis, disability, and duration of their diseases. If a patient was diagnosed with more
than one SMI diagnostic procedure, we considered the most recent one.
Note that some diagnoses were not included, on the basis of the Bachrach (1988) defini-
tion, which might be considered as SMI by some authors. This is the case, for example, of
ICD 294, which includes organic psychosis such as dementias and amnestic disorders that
were not classified in other ICD-9 codes. Regarding people suffering from dementia, they
have specific programs and are followed by other medical specialities (neurology, internal
medicine, geropsychiatry, etc). Only a minority of these cases are followed in Psychiatry’s
outpatient settings. This is also the case of patients coded with ICD 299 (pervasive devel-
opmental disorders), who are followed in specific centres that treat such disorders.
Our dataset included six patients who died during the period under analysis. We dropped
those observations since the cause of death could not be directly related to mental health.
The total number of patients amounted to 2,928. The total number of resources provided
by the three hospitals during the year under analysis was 30,532.
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3.2.1 Cost measurement
The dataset contains information on all resources provided by the hospitals on outpatient
and community settings, day care and emergency ward. We also have information on inpa-
tient stays such as the length of stay and the DRG. Information on the year in which patients
started to be followed by the hospital is also available. The dataset comprises information
on patients’ characteristics such as age and gender. Data on level of education, employ-
ment status, and degree of disability were provided only by one hospital and, therefore, we
disregarded this information.
Unit costs are not available at a patient level. The best proxy to evaluate the unit cost of
resources provided to patients with SMI is the official tariffs that are stipulated by decree-
law. It should be highlighted that these tariffs are not based on analytical costs. They
have an historical origin with subsequent adjustments being made ad-hoc to the external
researcher, and are used as prices in hospital financing.
More specifically, and regarding inpatient care, we use the DRG prices, which are stip-
ulated by decree-law. Between 2014 and 2015 those prices changed and, therefore, we use
the decree-laws number 20/2014 and 234/2015 for discharges occurred in 2014 and 2015,
respectively. For the remaining types of care, that is, community and emergency services,
outpatient care and all the resources provided on those settings, the official tariffs did not
change during the year under analysis. It should be highlighted that there is no official tariff
for day care. The only thing that is paid is all the services and resources provided in this
setting.
Finally, the medication administered in the hospital setting is fully supported by the
hospital. Hence, the medications cost was provided by hospitals.
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3.2.2 Descriptive Statistics
About 74% of the patients in our dataset were diagnosed with schizophrenic psychosis (ICD
295) or affective disorders (ICD 296) as presented in Table C.2 in appendix C.1.1. Given
the residual number of patients recorded with alcohol-induced disorder (ICD 291), we did
not consider those observations in our analysis.
Outpatient care and emergency services represented about 42.5% and 32% of the total
services provided. Inpatient care accounted for 3.4% of the total services (Figure C.1 in
appendix C.1.1).
The average length of stay amounted to 21.7 days and 15% of total inpatient stays
regarded readmissions. The average number of consultations per patient was 4.4. Concerning
individual information, 59% of the patients are male and the mean age is 49 years old.
3.3 Methodology
To analyse the main drivers of the costs we estimate the following equation for each ICD-9-
CM:
costi,j = β0 + β1agei + β2genderi + β3treat phasei + αh + j,i (3.1)
where i, j, and h stand for patient level, ICD-9-CM code, and hospital level, respectively.
Gender is a dummy variable that is 1 if male and 0 if female. The treatment phase is also
a dummy variable that assumes the value 1 if patients have been followed for more than 3
years by the hospital, and 0 otherwise. We included this variable as a potential cost driver
since evidence suggests that treatment costs can vary according to phase of care and stage
of disease (Jo, 2014).
Equation (3.1) was estimated using a generalised linear model (GLM), with gamma
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distribution and log link function. We have controlled for hospital fixed effects (αh). We
chose the gamma distribution because our dependent variable is strongly skewed to the left.
Having said that, we did not use the OLS because it will lead to less precise estimates
of the means and marginal effects. This method does not produce robust results to tail
problems unless for large samples (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005), which is not our case. Since
GLM allows to specify a distribution that reflects the mean-variance relationship and a link
function that can handle linearity in the sense of no systematic misfit, we opted to use such
regression model (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). We use the statistical software Stata®13 to
perform this analysis.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Direct treatment costs
Schizophrenic psychosis and delusional disorders are the most costly diseases, e1,577 and
e1,493, respectively. The cost of treating a patient with non-organic psychosis amounts to
e933, which is the least expensive disorder (Table C.3 in appendix C.2.1).
The average cost per patient of treating patients with SMI amounts to e1,289. The most
costly resources were the day center (services and resources provided in such setting) and
inpatient care (Table C.4 in appendix C.2.1).
The density function of the cost considering all ICD-9-CM was heavily skewed and the
extreme values concerned patients who had longer inpatient stays, several readmissions, and
were administered with second generation of antipsychotics in outpatient settings (Figure
D.5 in appendix C.2.1).
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3.4.2 Cost determinants
The cost per patient decreased with age in all ICD-9-CM, with the exception of drug-induced
mental disorders (ICD 292) (Table (C.5) in appendix C.2.2). Being male increased the cost
of schizophrenic psychosis (ICD 295) and of affective disorders (ICD 296). On the other
hand, a female patient is more costly than a male patient when the diagnosis was one of the
following: drug-induced mental disorders (ICD 292), delusional disorders (ICD 297), and
non-organic psychosis (ICD 298).
The treatment phase was not statistically significantly linked to cost for the diagnoses
ICD 295 and ICD 297. The treatment for patients diagnosed with delusional disorders or
non-organic psychosis and followed by the hospital for more than three years was more
costly compared to patients who have been followed for less than three years. Regarding
drug-induced mental disorders, the initial treatment phase was more costly.
3.5 Discussion
The average yearly cost of treating SMI in the Portuguese NHS is e1,289. Schizophrenic
psychosis (ICD 295) and delusional disorders (ICD 297) were more costly than the remaining
SMI, amounting to e1,577 and e1,493, respectively. Although inpatient care accounted for
only 3.4% of the total services, its cost per diagnosis represented more than 50% of total
cost.
Age was negatively related to cost in almost all diagnosis. Male patients were more
costly when diagnosed with schizophrenia psychosis and affective disorders. Female patients
experienced higher costs when diagnosed with drug-induced mental disorders, delusional
disorders, and non-organic disorders. Finally, the treatment phase (i.e. for patients treated
for more than 3 years) was positively related to cost for affective disorders and non-organic
94
psychosis.
The cost could not be directly compared to earlier evidence as most studies considered
both direct and indirect costs, and presented results only for the burden of disease, which
combines costs with prevalence (Insel, 2008; Gustavsson et al., 2011; Neil et al., 2014).
However, and for schizophrenia, a recent study determined the direct treatment cost of
disease for various European countries. The authors reported an annual cost per patient
that ranged between e3,211 in Poland and e13,704 in the Netherlands (Kova´cs et al., 2018).
Compared to this international evidence, the values for Portugal are quite low (e1,577).
This may be explained by two factors. On the one hand, we used the prices that are paid
by the NHS, and not the real costs supported by hospitals; in a context of recognized under-
financing (EC, 2019), these prices may be very low, compared to those practices elsewhere.
On the other hand, also due to under-financing, NHS hospitals have suffered severe financial
difficulties, with high levels of debts and arrears (EC, 2019). This may have prompted
hospitals to cut in resource use, which our study likely reflects. This reduction might have
consequences on the quality of care, which we did not assess and was beyond the scope of
the study.
Regarding other diseases, as studies generally report mental health disorders aggregated
into broader categories, this imposes an additional challenge for comparison (Gustavsson
et al., 2011). However, and based on international evidence, there are other chronic condi-
tions with higher direct treatment costs when compared to SMI. For example, in the US,
Williams et al. (2011) compared the direct treatment cost of bipolar disease with other
chronic conditions, and found that diabetes and coronary artery disease were more costly.
Regarding cost drivers, individual characteristics play an important role. Given that
many adult mental health disorders begin in adolescence (Jones, 2013) and preventive in-
terventions have the capacity to generate economic benefits when compared to interventions
later in life (Australia, 2016), we conjecture that treatment costs are higher early in life
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because they have an additional component regarding prevention. In contrast, for drug-
induced mental disorders, the treatment cost varies positively with age. On one hand, the
use of cannabis, which may induce SMI such as bipolar disorders with psychotic features,
occurs at young ages (Bally, Zullino and Aubry, 2014; Carra` et al., 2014; Gibbs et al., 2015);
on the other hand, however, some mental health consequences of substance abuse, such as
severe depression, usually occur later in life, explaining the higher needs (Ganzini, Walsh
and Millar, 1993).
Treating male patients with schizophrenic psychosis or affective disorders (bipolar disor-
der and depression) is more costly when compared to female patients with the same diagnosis.
Evidence from the literature points out that incidence of schizophrenia is higher in men, and
that they usually suffer more negative symptoms (Ochoa et al., 2012). Evidence suggests in
this sense that “until menopause illness onset is delayed and severity of illness is reduced by
oestrogen on the level of gene expression and transmitter functioning” (Ha¨fner, 2003, p.1).
Regarding bipolar disorder, the literature shows that men with bipolar disorder present more
obsessions/compulsions and suicidality than women, while women present more weight gain
and insomnia (Goel, Terman and Terman, 2002). Hence, the cost of treating affective dis-
orders may be higher for men given the more severe symptoms when compared to women.
Another hypothesis is that men tend to recognise their mental health condition with greater
difficulty, or face a greater perceived stigma, with a subsequent delay in searching for care.
There is evidence, for example, that men have a significantly lower use of any mental health
treatment (Wang et al., 2005; Roy-Byrne et al., 2009), so that they access treatment at a
more severe stage of disease.
Regarding drug-induced mental disorders, despite these diseases being more prevalent
in men (Almeida et al., 2013), women experience greater risk of depression and histories
of abuse when compared to men (Caton et al., 2014). This fact may explain the higher
cost of treating female patients diagnosed with drug-induced mental disorders. Delusional
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disorders are more prevalent among women (Soyka, Zingg and Baumga¨rtner, 2011), and no
gender differences were found in the prevalence of non-organic psychoses (Petkari, Mayoral
and Moreno-Ku¨stner, 2017); however, we did not find any evidence that severity, needs, or
healthcare use are higher among women, probably related to the very scarce literature on
these issues.
Our results also show that patients who are being treated for affective disorders or non-
organic psychosis for more than three years are more costly compared to patients in the
initial treatment phase. There are two main treatments for affective disorders: medication
and psychotherapy. The former plays an important role in the prescribed treatment. How-
ever, the high rate of non-adherence to psychotropic medication (Bulloch and Patten, 2010)
may lead to treatment adjustments, which possibly translate into a more costly treatment
over time. We must highlight that patients can recover from these disorders with the appro-
priate long-term treatment (Muneer, 2013). Non-organic psychosis is a very comprehensive
category, which allows physicians to avoid making specific diagnoses straight away. Also, di-
agnoses are likely to change according to the changes in symptoms and relapses (Chaturvedi
and Sahu, 1986). Therefore, the specific diagnosis may likely be identified later, which can
explain the higher cost for patients followed for a longer period.
Additionally, and from a more general perspective, that the way services are organised
plays an important role on the treatment cost (Funk and Pathare, 2003). Since Portugal
strongly relies on inpatient care, and community services are underdeveloped and continuity
of care is weakly promoted (Almeida, 2009), costs may be higher than those that would be
observed if balanced care model was implemented and continuity of care promoted. This
is particularly likely to hold in the Portuguese case because of the high number of mental
health readmissions (Chapter 1).
Note finally that we did not consider the role of social and private sectors because the
scope of our work is to determine the direct treatment costs of SMI in its acute phase, under
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the NHS perspective. However, it is worth highlighting the important role of the social sector
for providing rehabilitation and continuing care (WHO, 2009b).
3.6 Limitations
First and foremost, we only considered a convenience sample of three hospitals, which were
not totally representative of all NHS practices, using a limited number of variables for a
limited period of time. This was problematic especially because the sample was too small
to evaluate alcohol-induced mental disorders, which were less prevalent. Also, and being
located in urban areas and being quite similar in terms of dimension, our analysis may not
reflect the practices of smaller and rural settings. It was beyond our material possibilities to
perform a data collection in a larger sample of settings that would be more representative
of the NHS mental health practices. Further research, which would require more means
and greater support from public and/or private institutions, should replicate the study on
a larger scale, for a longer time period, and with a broader data collection scope. Note,
however that despite not being representative of all NHS hospitals, these three hospitals
accounted for 13% of all inpatient discharges in 2015.
Second, the resource valuation was based on official tariffs rather than on analytical
costs. As mentioned above, unit costs are not available and official tariffs were the best
proxy. Stated differently, we based our estimates on NHS prices paid to hospitals, which
may under- or over-estimate true costs. A close monitoring of hospital activities should
be performed in order to check which services are incentivized or de-incentivized when a
per-patient payment is implemented, in order to verify which of these services are over- or
under-paid.
Third, we followed patients over one year, which is a relatively short time frame. However,
we were able to collect information on new patients and patients followed by the hospital
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over many years. We were therefore able to collect heterogeneous types of treatment. We
must also highlight that, in this analysis, we considered patients with SMI in their acute
phase only.
Finally, more research should be performed on the disability and socio-economic cost
drivers. The data collection protocol included data on socio-demographic (level of education
and employment status) and clinical (degree of disability) characteristics. Unfortunately,
only one hospital was able to provide this information on a useful scale, so we could not
use this information in multivariate analysis, due to the high proportion of missing data.
Consequently, and as further research, we aim to collect additional information to refine our
analysis.
3.7 Further Research
In 2018, and following our financing proposal (Perelman et al., 2018), ACSS implemented a
pilot study in which a per period payment was introduced, according to which the hospital
receives an annual payment for each patient registered with SMI, covering all healthcare
services. Only five hospitals entered in this study: CHLO, Hospital Magalha˜es Lemos,
Centro Hospitalar Universita´rio de Coimbra, CHSJ, and Hospital Esp´ırito Santo de E´vora.
The selection criteria was the availability of community services. The price paid per patient
was computed using our data but without controlling for possible risk factors. Specifically,
the prices that were used to pay for schizophrenic psychosis, affective disorders and non-
organic psychosis amounted to e1,519, e1,035, and e799, respectively.
So far, no study has evaluated this pilot study. Therefore, we proposed to ACSS to
evaluate this study in order to assess if the prices correctly cover the treatment cost of those
diagnoses and also if this new financing mechanism improved community-based mental health
teams, “which are expected to improve access to care because of their proximity to patients’
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homes and lower stigma; to improve reinsertion because the community-based setting allows
better contacts with social care, families, and employers; to improve follow-up, which leads
to better health outcomes and efficiency through reducing inpatient stays and emergency
visits” (Perelman et al., 2018, p.7).
3.8 Conclusion
Our paper assesses the direct treatment costs of SMI and its determinants in the Portuguese
NHS. We found that schizophrenic disorders are the most costly disease. Age, gender, and
treatment phase play important roles as cost determinants.
As Portugal is a country with a low GDP per capita among other European countries and
with tight public health budgets, especially for mental health, effective resource allocation
is crucial. Decisions on this allocation, which can be done through economic evaluations or
cost-effectiveness programmes, require clear evidence about mental health costs.
Since Portugal is currently discussing a new mental health financing plan based on a
per patient disease-related payment to finance the treatment of patients with SMI, our cost
determinants’ analysis provides a rationale to introduce risk adjustment measures when
defining a new payment scheme. Finally, direct treatment costs were substantially lower
that those observed in other European countries, possibly related to under-financing and
cuts in resource use, with possible consequences on the quality of care, which remains to be
evaluated.
100
Part II
Adherence to Psychotropic
Medication
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Chapter 4
Non-adherence to psychotropic
medication in Primary Care: the role
of socio-economic determinants
4.1 Introduction
Psychotropic drugs are medications that aim to improve an individual’s mood, emotions
and behavior. They play a central role in the treatment of mental health disorders along
with psychotherapies (Kovess et al., 2004). Over the past years, an increase in utilisation
of psychotropic drugs has been reported. In the US, Moore and Mattison (2017) found
one in six American adults filled one or more prescriptions for psychiatric drugs, namely,
antidepressants, antipsychotics, anxiolytics, hypnotics and sedatives (AHS). In Australia, the
antipsychotic and sedative dispensing increased by 85.2% and 26.4% between 2010 and 2011,
respectively (Stephenson, Karanges and McGregor, 2013). Regarding European countries,
Kovess et al. (2004) reported a mild-increase in consumption of antidepressants from 2000
to 2002. More recent studies found an increase of 6.8% per year between 1998 and 2010 in
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psychotropic prescriptions in England (Ilyas and Moncrieff, 2012). In Portugal, Matias et al.
(2015) reported an increasing trend in utilisation of psychotropic medication from 2003 to
2009 and a downward trend from 2010 onwards. The most prominent result of this study
is the extremely high utilisation of AHS. The authors found that, in 2012, approximately
12.5% of the population, on average, receives daily treatment with these drugs.
Patients with mental health disorders can improve their health status by adhering to
the prescribed treatment. Treatment non-adherence can be defined as “failure to enter in
a treatment programme, premature termination of therapy and incomplete implementation
of instructions (including prescriptions)”(Nose´ et al., 2003, p.197). Despite treatment non-
adherence being a challenge in all fields of medicine, it is a matter of particular importance
in mental health. Psychiatric disorders have the highest percentage of patients who do
not comply with the treatment (20-50% of any patient population is at least partially non-
adherent compared to 70-80% of patients with schizophrenia and related psychotic disorders).
Several reasons can explain this difference such as lack of insight of the disease, namely for
SMI patients, and frequency of treatment-related side-effects (Nose´ et al., 2003). Also, socio-
economic factors have been pointed out as important determinants of non-adherence (Lese´n,
2011; Sundell et al., 2013).
Non-adherence to psychotropic drugs has been reported as a public health issue (Fa-
rooq and Naeem, 2014) but it also has important implications in economic terms. Not
adhering to the prescribed treatment may result on decompensation of patients with mental
illnesses. In fact, patients with SMI who do not adhere to the treatment are more likely to
be (re)hospitalised with more severe symptoms and, normally, with longer inpatient stays
(Dilla, Ciudad and Alvarez, 2013). A systematic review on economic costs of medication
non-adherence by disease groups, reports an annual adjusted total cost per mental health
patient between $3,252 and $19,363 (Cutler et al., 2018).
Mental health patients are not treated only by psychiatrists and other mental health pro-
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fessionals but also by primary care physicians. Primary health services play an important
role in delivering mental health care (Clatney, MacDonald and Shah, 2008). According to
WHO (2007a), providing mental health services in primary care involves not only diagnos-
ing and treating people with mental illnesses but also providing follow-up consultations and
strategies to prevent mental health disorders. In addition, primary care is a crucial compo-
nent in most of the collaborative care models (CCMs) for mental health (Goodrich et al.,
2013). These models provide integrated mental health and general medical care in primary
care units. Jacob et al. (2012) and Woltmann et al. (2012) found evidence on cost-efficiency
of CCMs to improve health outcomes for several mental health disorders considering different
primary care settings and population study.
Most of mild-to- moderate mental disorders are treated in primary care. Only when
patient’s problem is too complex, the GP should refer to a primary care mental health
provider, or directly to secondary care (Kravitz et al., 2006). Consequently, patient’s non-
adherence to psychotropic treatment is an issue that is faced not only by psychiatrists and
other mental health professionals but also by GPs.
Portugal is one of the European’s countries with the highest prevalence of mental health
disorders (22.9% compared to 18.4% and 14.9% in France and the Netherlands, respec-
tively) (Almeida et al., 2013). Due to the financial crisis of 2008, prevalence of mental
health disorders, namely the severe ones, increased (Almeida, Antunes and Silva, 2016) and
socio-economic conditions deteriorated (Pedroso, 2014). Primary care settings have been
recognised by the government as a cornerstone of the Portuguese mental health system.
However, there are important features on primary care services that make treatment non-
adherence even a more serious problem. First, and according to the National Health Plan
for 2011-2016, the treatment of mental health disorders in primary care has mainly been re-
lying on prescription of psychotropic medication (Miguel and Sa´, 2010). This characteristic
is itself a problem since the literature has been reporting the importance of psychotherapies
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provided in primary care to treat patients with mental health illnesses, particularly, depres-
sion (Cuijpers et al., 2009). Second, there are no incentives for GPs to provide continuous
care for people with mental disorders (Perelman et al., 2017a). If patients are not monitored
in a continuous basis, they might not fulfil with the prescribed treatment (Mert et al., 2015).
This chapter assesses the link between treatment non-adherence to psychotropic medi-
cation in primary care and socio-economic factors in central region of Portugal, which com-
prises approximately 17% of all the Portuguese population (ARS Alentejo et al., 2016). This
region is very heterogeneous as it comprises urban and rural municipalities with distinct
socio-economic characteristics.
We have data on electronic prescriptions and dispensing of psychotropic medication be-
tween 2009 and first semester of 2015. We define non-adherence when patients do not fill the
prescriptions. We perform this analysis at a municipality level as we do not have individual
information on socio-economic characteristics. We add to our dataset socio-economic vari-
ables such as the number of physicians per 10,000 inhabitants, percentage of beneficiaries
of social benefits and unemployment rate. Since our dependent variable is a proportion,
meaning it is bounded between zero and one, we use a fractional probit model (Papke and
Wooldridge, 2008) to estimate the impact of socio-economic variables on the percentage of
patients who did not adhere to the prescribed treatment. We perform the same analysis for
specific pharmacological subgroups such as AHS and antidepressants since Portugal has the
highest prevalence of depression among European countries.
We find that between the first six months of 2015 and 2009 the non-adherence rates were
about 8.5% and 23.7%, respectively. AHS and antidepressants were the pharmacological
subgroups with higher average non-adherence rate, amounting to 19.9% and 22.5%, respec-
tively. Our results show an increase of 1 percentage point in the percentage of beneficiaries
of social benefits and unemployment rate has a positive impact on non-adherence rate of 1.5
and 1.1 percentage points, respectively. Younger individuals are less adherent. The number
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of physicians and average wage are negatively associated with non-adherence rate.
Our results are capturing the effect of adverse economic conditions on non-adherence rate
to psychotropic medication. There are two particular groups within the population which are
more vulnerable: the unemployed and welfare recipients. These findings call for policies to
promote employment and to support welfare recipients combined with integration of mental
health. Within those groups, the youth are the most vulnerable. We believe policies focus-
ing on unemployment benefits should not be discarded since they can improve mental health
status and may allow individuals to afford medication. Integrating mental health in the
benefit system is also of great importance. We suggest the implementation of an additional
co-payment for welfare recipients and unemployed, given special attention to the youth.
Also, and given the high non-adherence rate, these findings call for coordinated strategies
to enhance adherence and promote mental health. Strategies to tackle non-adherence can
range from psychosocial and cognitive interventions to electronic reminders or family inter-
ventions. Based on the literature, the success of these strategies will depend on the degree of
involvement of GPs in the treatment process (Thompson and McCabe, 2012). Hence, GPs
should be incentivised to treat mental health disorders and monitor mental health patients
on a regular basis.
The remainder of the chapter is as follows. The next section reviews the literature
on treatment non-adherence. Section 4.3 briefly provides an overview on the Portuguese
prescription drug system. Section 4.4 presents the dataset used throughout our analysis
and a descriptive statistics, while the methodological approach is described in section 4.5.
Section 4.6 presents the main results from our analysis, which are then discussed in section
4.7. Section 4.8 and 4.9 provide the robustness checks and suggestions for future research,
respectively. Finally, section 4.10 concludes.
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4.2 Literature Review
4.2.1 Definition of adherence
Non-adherence with medication is a complex problem affecting most of health care systems.
However, it is important to clarify the concept of adherence. “Adherence” and “compli-
ance” are terms related to the extent in which patients follow the prescribed treatment. As
Hugtenburg et al. (2013) reported, these terms are used interchangeably but their meaning
is slightly different. The difference relies on the relationship between the patient and the
health care provider. Compliance was defined by Blackwell (1992) as “the extent to which
a person’s behaviour in terms of taking medications, following diets or executing lifestyle
changes coincides with medical or health advice”. In other words, compliance is used when
patients follow the recommendations of the practitioner. On the other hand, adherence
implies a more proactive role of the health care provider in the “compliance with recom-
mendations made in a therapeutic relationship” (Breen and Thornhill, 1998, p.459). The
literature has been using patient compliance and adherence as synonyms (Hugtenburg et al.,
2013). However, in recent years, authors prefer to use “treatment adherence” rather than
“treatment compliance” since the latter term has been linked to the idea that patients are
subservient to health providers (Hugtenburg et al., 2013). In this study we use adherence to
refer to patients’ compliance to the prescribed medication.
4.2.2 Treatment non-adherence
The body of literature on treatment non-adherence is vast and has different approaches.
Some authors focus their analysis on identifying the causes and consequences of patient’s
non-adherence to the prescribed treatment. Others analyse the prevention side.
The reasons for non-adherence are related to patient-, practitioner-, and/or medication-
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specific factors. Examples such as a complex treatment plan, lack of communication between
patient and physician, patient’s belief that treatment is not necessary, and patient’s inability
to follow the treatment due to its costs may explain non-adherence (Jimmy and Jose, 2011;
Hugtenburg et al., 2013; Farooq and Naeem, 2014).
The consequences of non-adherence go beyond patient’s poor outcomes. It is expected that
costs increase for the health care system and also for the society. According to Iuga and
McGuire (2014), poor health outcomes increase services utilisation, and consequently health
care costs. It is estimated the avoidable health care costs due to medication non-adherence
among patients with hypercholesterolemia, hypertension, diabetes type 2, osteoporosis, HIV,
and congestive heart failure in the US amounts to $105 billion (Aitken, Valkova et al., 2013)
in 2012, about 3.9% of the total health care costs. This estimation was performed by
comparing the difference between health care utilisation costs of patients with complications
due to treatment non-adherence and patients with the same disease who did not have any
complication. In addition, non-adherence’s phenomenon has important consequences on
productivity and absenteeism (Iuga and McGuire, 2014).
Several prevention guidelines have been proposed to prevent non-adherence. Among
them, we highlight patient counselling, family support, reminders, simplify medication pre-
scription and availability of team based care (Jimmy and Jose, 2011; Iuga and McGuire,
2014). But before adopting any of these measures, the practitioner should understand the
causes of non-adherence. Only by recognising such reasons, an effective strategy can be
implemented (Iuga and McGuire, 2014).
To perform studies on treatment non-adherence, it is crucial to know how to assess ad-
herence to medication. Depending on the available information, there are direct and indirect
measurements. The former comprises direct observation, and drug levels and markers (Iuga
and McGuire, 2014). To what concerns indirect measurements, there are specific measures
used in research and administrative settings such as Medication Possession Ratio (MPR)
109
which is the ratio between the total days supplied and the number of days between the first
and last refill; and the Proportion of Days Covered (PDC) which considers the number of
days in refill interval (Iuga and McGuire, 2014). Regarding inpatient settings, pill counting,
technology-assisted monitoring, self and interviewer rating measures and dose counting de-
vice are some of the indirect measurement tools (Iuga and McGuire, 2014; Sajatovic et al.,
2010).
There are some issues that we have to take into account when selecting the adherence’s
measurement (Sajatovic et al., 2010). First, the relationship between adherence and patient’s
outcome should be considered. That is, if we are studying pharmacological classes in which
the effects of missed doses can only be assessed several weeks after discontinuation, we
do not need a frequently measure of adherence. On the other hand, if we are analysing
drugs such that a missed dose have an immediately impact on patient’s outcome than a
regular measure for adherence is required. Also researchers have to balance between costs
of measure adherence and its precision. Finally, Sajatovic et al. (2010) suggest to combine
complementary adherence measurements.
It is worth mentioning that non-adherence can be classified into the following three
types: a primary type, known as non-fulfilment adherence or primary non-adherence, in
which practitioners prescribe medication but patients never fill or initiate the treatment;
a second type, named persistence, refers to event when patients discontinue the treatment
when health providers did not tell to do so; and a third type, known as non-conforming, and
happens when patients do not take the medication as prescribed (e.g. skipping doses; take
medication at incorrect times) (Jimmy and Jose, 2011).
4.2.3 Treatment non-adherence in Mental Health
Non-adherence is common in all fields of medicine but it takes special relevance in mental
health. According to Breen and Thornhill (1998), between 20% and 50% of any patient
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population is likely to be partially non-adherent. In the treatment of psychotic disorders
this percentage can be as high as 70% or 80%. In primary care, non-adherence can reach
60% for patients diagnosed with depression.
As mentioned above, and also for mental health disorders, there are three main reasons for
non-adherence: medication-, patient- and provider-specific factors. Regarding medication-
specific factors, antipsychotic and antidepressants medications induce one or more adverse
effects. Breen and Thornhill (1998) provide a detailed discussion on the possible side effects
that can occur with psychiatric medication, explaining why they might induce non-adherence.
But briefly, most of the adverse effects, such as sedation, impaired sexual functioning and
acute dystonia, have a large impact on patient’s daily routine.
In addition, the cost of psychotropic medicines and complex medication regimens have also
been pointed out as inducing non-adherence. Most of the second generation antipsychotics
are costly and patients may be unable to afford the prescribed medication. As reported by
Breen and Thornhill (1998), in South Carolina (US), low income patients have medications
that exceed 25% of the mental health disability income. Moreover, and given the fact the
US has a health care system based on insurance coverage, patients who require multiple
medications, can exceed the limits set by their health care insurance.
Mental health patients, particularly the ones suffering from a SMI, can be prescribed with
more than one medication to treat a single disorder. Regimen complexity such as higher
dosing frequency and complicated instructions can increase the probability of non-adherence
(Haddad, Brain and Scott, 2014).
Age, psychiatric symptoms, abnormal illness behavior (AIB) and family/patient attitudes
have been cited by Breen and Thornhill (1998) as patient-specific factors for non-adherence.
A qualitative review performed by Jin et al. (2008) shows, depending on the disease, el-
derly patients can be more compliant than younger ones. More specifically, the rate of
non-adherence for antidepressants and anxiolytics decrease with age (Bulloch and Patten,
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2010). On the other hand, there is a positive relationship between non-adherence and age
for patients with schizophrenia (Eticha et al., 2015).
The nature of psychiatric disorders also plays an important role on non-adherence. As
mentioned by Breen and Thornhill (1998), a patient diagnosed with psychosis may not have
the ability to understand a medication complex regimen. AIB is characterised by “the persis-
tence of an inappropriate or maladaptive mode of perceiving, evaluating or acting in relation
to one’s own state of health” (Pilowsky, 1993, p.62) despite the fact that a physician has
provided a precise explanation of the disease. In psychiatric disorders, AIB affects adherence
namely when patients are in denial of illness in maniac states or when they refuse to accept
the diagnosis, commonly in personality disorders (Pilowsky, 1993).
In psychiatric disorders, family and patient attitudes towards the disease have an important
impact on adherence. According to Breen and Thornhill (1998) some family members tend
to react to visible adverse effects of medication and may discourage patient to take it. Fur-
thermore, the degree of family support is also an important determinant. Patients with a
high family support tend to be more adherent than the ones with less or even without such
support (Perkins, 2002).
Patients may become non-adherent to the prescribed treatment if their views about the
disease are not in line with the practitioner’s own view (Breen and Thornhill, 1998). In
addition, communication between physicians and patients has also been pointed out as a
practitioner-specific factor. If physicians are not available to answer to all the questions
a patient or his family might have or/and if he does not provide all the information about
possible side-effects, patients are more likely to be non-adherent (Breen and Thornhill, 1998).
There is a vast literature on strategies to increase adherence among patients with men-
tal health disorders. For instance, Haddad, Brain and Scott (2014) suggest patients should
be aware of the side-effects when starting medication and practitioners, whenever possible,
should simplify the treatment regimen. Involving the patient on the decision of their med-
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ication can increase the likelihood of adherence. In addition, there are several psychosocial
interventions, which should be combined to increase effectiveness, such as psycho-education
(patients are provided with more information about their disease), behavioural approaches
(it comprises “skills building, practising activities, behavioural modelling, and reinforcement
strategies” (Haddad, Brain and Scott, 2014, p.53)) and cognitive interventions (it includes
neurocognitive remediation). Services interventions, in which mental health care providers
ensure patients can easily access the clinical services, and electronic reminders are also pos-
sible strategies that can improve adherence (Haddad, Brain and Scott, 2014).
The studies that assess the degree and main drivers of non-adherence to psychotropic
medication are different in terms of design and adherence measures. Using prescription data,
Sundell et al. (2013) assess the socio-economic factors that influence early discontinuation of
antidepressant treatment in Swedish patients aged 20-34 years. Early discontinuation was
defined as filling only one antidepressant prescription within a 6-month period. The authors
found that approximately 26.1% of all patients discontinued the treatment early. Using a
multiple logistic regression analysis, it was found that being an immigrant, receiving social
assistance and being a men increases the likelihood of early discontinuation. On the other
hand, having at least two years of higher education was found to have a negative relationship
with early discontinuation.
Also in Sweden, Ma˚rdby et al. (2016) describe the adherence pattern of antidepressants
among women and men using trajectory models. A prescribed drug dataset was used and
it includes patients aged between 18 and 85 years old who were followed for two years.
To estimate adherence, the authors use a continuous measure of medication acquisition
which is the ratio between the number of days’ supply and the number of days in the
observation period. The adherence pattern was determined using a group-based trajectory
models. These models use “finite mixture models to identify clusters of individuals who have
similar pattern of progression over time” (Ma˚rdby et al., 2016, p.1383). It was found five
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different patterns: a first pattern where women and men were adherent to the prescribed
treatment during two years of follow-up (women: 28.6%; men: 27%); a second in which
patients were adherent up to six months from the date of first purchase (women: 16.6%;
men: 16.3%); a third group which had an initial period of low adherence but after month
10, the adherence increased (women: 14.5%; men: 14.3%); in trajectory 4 there is a steep
decline in the adherence pattern until patients drop the treatment in month 10 (women:
29.4%; men: 31.2%); and, finally, in trajectory 5 (women: 11%; men: 11.1%) patients
were not adherent from the first month after purchasing the antidepressant. Patients with
lower education, on welfare/social assistance, and unemployed have a higher probability of
developing a non-adherent pattern. The authors claim the need to intervene during the
first few months of antidepressant treatment. Specifically, both women and men with lower
education or income should be capable to develop and maintain an adherence pattern over
time. Finally, and given the high proportion of individuals belonging to trajectories that
describe early discontinuation, the authors conclude additional support to patients in the
early stages of the treatment could enhance adherence.
Freccero et al. (2016) provides evidence on primary-adherence to prescribed antidepres-
sants in primary health care facilities in Stockholm and middle part of Sweden. Authors
linked data from prescription and dispensing of antidepressants between 2005 and 2007.
Non-adherence rate was defined as a collection of a prescription within 30 days. A total
of 11,624 patients were included in the analysis. Primary non-adherence to antidepressants
amounted to 14.9%. Using logistic regressions they found that immigrants, younger and
divorced patients had a lower primary adherence. Income, gender, education, and diagnosis
were not statistically significant.
Braunstein et al. (2017) study adherence of older patients to antidepressant medications.
Adherence was measured in several ways: proportion of days covered, discontinuation pe-
riods, persistence treatment and dose dispensed. Authors also combined those measures
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using a mixed clustering method in order to obtain clusters with similar individuals but
with different characteristics. To conduct this study, the authors use the French National
Health Insurance reimbursement database from 2010 to 2011 in which they include individ-
uals with more than 65 years old. The authors follow the individuals during 18 months,
and based on the clustering analysis, they found five distinct groups. The first group, which
represents 26.9% of all patients, were fully adherent according to the clinical guidelines. A
second group, amounting to 15.8%, was adherent but had several periods of discontinua-
tion. The remaining groups, representing 57.3%, were non-adherent to the treatment and
their differences were related to dispensing frequency and treatment discontinuation. Sev-
eral hypotheses have been put forward to explain non-adherence such as possible side-effects,
patients not consulting their physicians to renew their prescription and possible inefficacy of
antidepressants. Based on clustering analysis, it was found patients who frequently attended
to medical appointments were more likely to adhere to the prescribed treatment.
In Canada, Bulloch and Patten (2010) estimate the degree of non-adherence for the
general population. Using the Canadian Community Health Survey of 2002, which was
carried out to produce population-based estimates on non-adherence, it was found that,
among all individuals, about 34.6% were non-adherent to antipsychotics, 34.7% to sedative-
hypnotics, 38.1% to anxiolytics, 44.9% to mood stabilizers, and 45.9% to antidepressants.
Age was found to have a negative relationship with non-adherence. In addition, educational
status, rural/urban residence, employment status and income were not statistical significant.
In the US, a recent study assesses the risk of discontinuation of long-acting injectable
(LAI) antipsychotics for schizophrenia and the relationship between discontinuation rates
and socio-demographic variables (McCreath et al., 2017). The dataset refers to ambulatory
services provided by a large general hospital mental health center. It includes patients aged
between 18 and 81 years who received at least one LAI from January, 2014 to October,
2015. Patients were followed until September, 2016. The authors assume a patient is not
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adherent to treatment if he did not receive additional injections after October, 2015. To
evaluate the risk of discontinuation, it was performed a hazard analysis for single-decrement,
non-repeatable events. From this analysis, it was found that the highest proportion of
discontinuation happened within 16- and 19-month interval. To determine the relationship
between discontinuation rate and socio-demographic variables, it was used χ2 tests. The
authors did not find significant effects of patient’s age, gender and race in continuation rates.
On the other hand, prescribed frequency (twice a month, monthly, and multiple) was found
relevant in explaining continuation rates. Patients who received monthly injections have
higher adherence rates than those receiving biweekly injections. One possible explanation
may be related to the time commitment of attending to more frequent injections.
Most of the literature only presents the relationship between non-adherence rate and
socio-economic conditions for a specific disease and uses subjects sampled from clinical set-
tings. Only Canada presented estimates of non-adherence rates to psychotropic medication
but they are based on self-reported adherence and dated 2002.
Having information on prescription and dispensing of all psychotropic medication for
approximately seven years (2009 to June 2015) we are able to provide a pattern of non-
adherence rates and relate it to socio-economic characteristics. Our analysis allows to per-
form comparisons between major pharmacological subgroups. Therefore, this study provides
information that could be used for any future attempts to enhance adherence. Also, and
being Portugal one of the countries with the highest prevalence of mental health disorders
it is crucial to know the rate of non-adherence to psychotropic medication and its link to
socio-economic conditions. Moreover, and due to the financial crisis of 2008, the Portuguese
socio-economic determinants have been changing throughout the years.
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4.3 The Portuguese prescription drug system
The Portuguese prescription drug system has been changing over the last years. Until 2011,
electronic and manual prescriptions coexist in the Portuguese NHS. That is, physicians were
allowed to use both type of prescriptions. Also, during this period, electronic prescription
was not paperless. That is, in order for a patient to fill the prescribed medication, the
physician needed to print and sign the prescription.
In 2011, the financial assistance program for Portugal and the associated Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU) imposed changes to the pharmaceutical market. Regarding prescrip-
tion, the MoU required a compulsory electronic prescription system. It was also demanded
an improvement of the monitoring system of prescription of medicines. In addition, and in
order to provide clear rules for the prescription patterns, the MoU required the adoption
of international prescription guidelines (Barros, 2012b). Therefore, in 2011, the government
made electronic prescriptions mandatory. There are some exemptions such as failure of the
system, prescription in a domiciliary setting and for physicians with a volume of prescriptions
of at most 50 prescriptions per month.
In Portugal, prescriptions can be renewable (no more than three times) for long-term
treatments, in which psychotropic medication is included. Renewable and single prescriptions
are valid for six months and 30 days from the date on the prescription, respectively. It it
worth highlighting that, before 2011, a single prescription was valid only for 20 days.1
The prescription rules are determined by decree-law. In the same prescription, a physician
can only prescribe a maximum of four distinct medicines of a total of four packages. For
the same medicine only, at most, two packages can be prescribed. Regarding single-dose
drugs, physicians cannot prescribe more than four packages of the same medicine. Until
1The decree-law 242-B/2006 established the due date of 20 days for single prescriptions, as before 2006
they were valid for 10 days. The ordinance 193/2011 established the current due date of 30 days.
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2016, patients did not have the option to fractionate the dispensing, even if they buy only
one of the prescribed drugs, as the prescription become invalid.
According to an official report issued by the Ministry of Health, in the last six months
before electronic prescriptions became mandatory, about 94% and 78% of all the prescribed
drugs in primary care and hospital settings, respectively, were issued electronically (MS,
2011).
In 2015, the government established the rules to implement paperless electronic pre-
scriptions (de-materialisation). With this new system, the government aims to enhance the
monitoring system and combat fraud. These prescriptions are compulsory for the NHS since
April 2016. However, they coexist with both materialised electronic and manual prescription
(only for the exemptions mentioned before).
With paperless electronic prescription, there is no limit to the number of medicines in each
prescription. Patients can opt to buy only some medicines without the prescription become
invalid (SPMS, 2016c). Renewable and single prescriptions still have the same validity date.
In Portugal it is not possible to buy any psychotropic drug without prescription. The
government reimburses part of the psychotropic drugs expenditures. According to the re-
imbursement rate, there are four categories: category A, which includes all pharmacological
groups and subgroups with a reimbursement rate of 90%; category B, with a reimbursement
rate of 69%; category C, which includes all medicines with a reimbursement rate of 37%; and
category D, that comprises all drugs with a reimbursement rate of 15%. For pensioners and
for patients with specific diseases such as bipolar disorders there is a special reimbursement
regime in which the reimbursement rate for drugs included in category A is 95%, and for
categories B, C, and D the government add an additional amount of 15%. Antipsychotics
are included in category A and antidepressants and AHS belong to category C. It should
be highlighted that these reimbursement rates are in place since 2010. Previously, all the
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pharmacological groups and subgroups belonging to category A were reimbursed by 95%.2
4.4 Data
Our dataset comprises information on all prescription and dispensing of psychotropic drugs in
primary care for the Center region of Portugal between 2009 and June 2015. This information
was provided by Administrac¸a˜o Regional de Sau´de do Centro (ARS Centro).
To gather this information, we submitted a research protocol to the Ethic Commission
for Health of ARS Centro, in which we state the purpose of our study. We required informa-
tion on the following pharmacological classes, using the Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical
(ATC) Classification System: N03A (antiepileptics); N05A (antipsychotics); N05B (anxi-
olytics); N05C (hypnotics and sedatives); N06A (antidepressants); N06B (psycho-stimulants
and nootropics); N06C (psycholeptics in combination); N06D (anti-dementia drugs); and
N07B (drugs used in additive disorders).3
In the protocol we asked for prescription and dispensing information between 2005 and
2015. According to ARS Centro, the required information is only available since 2007, but
information for 2007 and 2008 is not reliable. Hence, ARS Centro granted information from
2009 onwards.
To perform our study, ARS Centro provided information at a patient level (id number,
age, gender, municipality and main diagnosis using the International Classification of Pri-
mary Care (ICPC) – Second Edition); and at prescription level (id prescription number;
prescription date; cost of reimbursement for NHS; price supported by the patient; number
of pills; number of packages; dosage; active ingredient; and if it is a generic drug). Using
2For the remaining categories the reimbursement rates slightly change. The reimbursement rates for
categories B, C, and D amounted to 70%, 40%, and 20%, respectively.
3We submitted the same research protocol to the remaining Administrac¸o˜es Regionais de Sau´de (ARSs) in
order to obtain information on prescription and dispensing of psychotropic medication for Portugal. Despite
our protocol have been accepted in all ARSs, we did not receive the information.
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the id prescription number we are able to identify prescriptions that are single or renewable.
All this information was collected from Sistema de Informac¸a˜o da Administrac¸a˜o Regional
de Sau´de (SIARS) and was anonymized by ARS Centro.
Since we do not have socio-economic characteristics at a patient level, our analysis is
performed at a municipality level and no merge with other databases is possible. The
Center region of Portugal comprises 77 municipalities that are very heterogeneous as it
includes rural and urban areas. This region represents about 17% of the total population in
Portugal. We merge annual socio-economic variables at municipality level — unemployment
rate (unemp rate), average wage (avg wage),4 percentage of beneficiaries of social benefits
(Rendimento Social de Inserc¸a˜o, RSI) (pct rsi), number of physicians per 10,000 inhabitants
(nr phys), pharmacy index (pharm index ) and mean age (avg age).5 The latter variable was
computed using individual information at municipality level.
ARS Centro provided information on prescription and dispensing separately. We merge
the datasets using the statistical software Stata®13. During this process we found some
inconsistencies particularly in early years. In the prescription dataset, each row corresponds
to one prescription. However, we found the same prescription several times. Considering
the dispensing data, we found cases in which the same prescription was filled multiple times.
According to ARS Centro these two inconsistencies concern to fraud schemes and were
communicated to the relevant Authorities. In our analysis we drop duplicated observations.
Based on the Portuguese prescription rules, section 4.3, we found some prescriptions with
a number of packages higher than one allowed by law. These observations are an error in
the dataset, so we have dropped them. We also drop observations related to patients who
live in municipalities which are not part of ARS Centro. It is possible that a patient might
4We only have information from 2009 to 2013. We use 2013’s information to fill the missing values for
2014 and 2015.
5In appendix D.1.1 we provide detailed information on these variables as well as on the sources of
information used.
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be prescribed in primary care settings that belong to ARS Centro (for example in cases in
which the patient lives in a parish closed to the administrative border of ARS Centro) and
fill the prescription in a pharmacy located outside the administrative region of ARS Centro.
In each year we have approximately 2.5 million observations and, for each year, we dropped
0.5% of observations.
Our final dataset considering all psychotropic drugs is a balanced panel. That is, we
have 77 municipalities with all of them having information on non-adherence rates and
socio-economic conditions.
4.4.1 Adherence measure
The information collected by ARS Centro does not provide any socio-economic determinant
at patient level. Therefore, adherence rate needs to be measured at a municipality level.
With such information, we determine the proportion of individuals, at a municipality level,
who did not buy the prescribed medicines following the prescription rules stated in section
4.3. That is, we assess the non-fulfilment adherence (primary type of adherence) between
2009 and the first six months of 2015 as follows:
pct n adherjt =
∑
non filled prescriptionsjt∑
prescriptionsjt
, where j and t indexes the municipality and year, respectively.
4.4.2 Descriptive Statistics
The total number of patients who have been prescribed with psychotropic drugs in primary
care between 2009 and the first six months of 2015 amounts to 782,316. The years in
which more patients were prescribed with psychotropic medicines were 2012 (383,759) and
2011 (382,238), as described in Figure D.1, appendix D.1.2. The total resident population
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covered by ARS Centro did not fluctuate much between 2009 and 2015. On average, ARS
Centro comprises about 1.7 million individuals. Therefore, and in 2012, approximately 22.5%
of the population was prescribed with this type of medication. The average age change
slightly through years and it ranges between 61.8 and 63.6 in 2009 and the first semester
of 2015, respectively. It should be highlighted that in all years we have patients of all ages.
Approximately 40% of the patients aged between 18 and 37 years. On average, 72.6% of
patients prescribed with psychotropic medication are women.
From individual data, the percentage of patients who, at a given year, were prescribed
with psychotropic drugs in the year before, is decreasing over time. Specifically, that per-
centage amounts to 53% and 32% in 2009 and the first semester of 2015, respectively. We
did not identify a non-adherence pattern among patients. This means, patients who did not
adhere to the prescribed treatment in a given year may not be the ones who did not adhere
in another year. It should be highlighted that non-adherence rate differs between years for
the same patient.
Between 2009 and the first half of 2015, the total number of psychotropic prescriptions
amounted to 13 million. In appendix D.1.2, Figure D.2 we present the prescription rate by
year. It should be pointed out the decrease verified between 2014 and 2015 is due to the fact
that we only have information for the first six months of 2015.
Performing the analysis by ATC codes, more than half of all prescribed medicines corre-
sponds to anxiolytics (N05B; 37.7%) and antidepressants (N06A; 27.8%). In appendix D.1.2,
Figure D.3, we present the prescription rate by ATC codes. Performing the analysis by the
three main codes (anxiolytics (N05B), antidepressants (N06A) and antiepileptics (N03A))
by year, we can see the prescription pattern did not change much over the years (Figure D.4,
appendix D.1.2), except for anxiolytics and antidepressants from 2012 onwards.
The non-adherence rates range between 5.9% and 52.3% considering all the years. In ap-
pendix D.1.2, Figure D.5, we present the kernel density for non-adherence rate by year and
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by the whole period under analysis. The latter distribution presents three peaks which con-
cerns to different non-adherence rates between years. The first peak regards to first semester
of 2015 and the last peak concerns to 2013. The average non-adherence rate amounts to
21.3% with a standard deviation of 10%.
The non-adherence rate per year was 23.7% in 2009 and 8.5% in the first six months of
2015 (Figure D.6, in appendix D.1.2). Non-adherence rates for all municipalities are much
higher in 2013 when compared to remaining years.
AHS (N05B and N05C), and antidepressants (N06A) were the prescribed medicines by
ATC code with higher non-adherence rates, on average (Figure D.7, in appendix D.1.2).
The average non-adherence rate amounts to 19.9% and 22.5% for AHS and antidepressants,
respectively. In this analysis we exclude psycholeptics in combination (N06C) and drugs
used in additive disorders (N07B) given their residual prescription volume.
In appendix D.1.2, Figure D.8, we present the top and bottom 10% of municipalities
with higher and lower average of non-adherence rates, respectively. There is not a strong
positive correlation between non-adherence rates and prescription volume. That is, munici-
palities with highest non-adherence rates are not necessarily the municipalities with highest
prescription rates (Figure D.9, in appendix D.1.2).
It is worth highlighting non-adherence rates are more dispersed between years (standard
deviation of 0.097) than between municipalities (standard deviation of 0.023). Meaning,
non-adherence rates are more variable over time than across municipalities.
A detailed description of all variables included in the model, their respective designations,
and summary statistics is presented in appendix D.1.
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4.5 Methodology
Our variable of interest is the annual non-adherence rate by municipality (pct non adherjt).
We want to estimate the impact of socio-economic characteristics on treatment non-adherence
at municipality level, as follows,
pct non adherjt = β0 + β1unemp ratejt + β2nr physjt + β3pharm indexjt
+ β4avg wagejt + β5pct rsijt + β6avg age+ jt
(4.1)
, where j and t indexes the municipality and year, respectively.
Because non-adherence rate is bounded between zero and one, standard linear models, as
the one presented in equation (4.1), may not be accurate since they can generate predictions
outside the unit interval. The appropriate model must take into consideration our dependent
variable is a proportion, 0 < pct non adherjt < 1. In addition, the regression model should
incorporate the fact that our data is a balanced panel, meaning, we have information on
non-adherence rate for 77 clusters (municipalities) over seven years.
Because our analysis is performed at municipality-level, unobserved heterogeneity and
its possible correlation with the explanatory variables should be accounted for by the re-
gression model. In other words, the regression model should allow unobserved time-constant
municipality effects, which captures differences between municipalities, to be related to mu-
nicipality’s socio-economic characteristics.
An approach suggested by Papke and Wooldridge (2008) is to use a generalised estimation
equations (GEE) model. The GEE is an extended version of the generalised linear model to
account for within-subject correlations. The GEE characterises the marginal expectation,
average response for observations sharing the same explanatory variables, as a function of
covariates (Wooldridge, 2010). The marginal regression model with unobserved effect is
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given by,
g (E [yjt|xjt, cj]) = x′jtβ + cj (4.2)
, where j and t denote the municipality and year, xjt is a 1 ×K vector of covariates, β
consists of the K regression parameters of interest, g(.) is the link function, yjt denotes the
response variable that is allowed to range between 0 and 1, and cj is the unobserved effect. In
our case, yjt is the non-adherence rate and xjt is a vector containing the following variables:
unemp rate, avg wage, pct rsi, nr phys, pharm index, and avg age. We also add a year
dummy for 2013 in order to control for the higher non-adherence rate when compared to the
remaining years.
Estimation of equation (4.2) provides the direction of the partial effects which is given
by the elements of β. As the partial effects depend on the level of covariates and unobserved
heterogeneity, and since the latter is not observed, one way to measure the importance of
the covariates is to average the partial effects across the distribution of cj. By doing so, we
obtain the average partial effects (APEs). In our model we impose the conditional normality
assumption,
cj|xjt ∼ Normal(ψ + x¯′jξ, σ2a)
, where x¯j is a 1×K vector of time averages (x¯j = 1T
∑T
t=1 xjt), and σ
2
a is the conditional
variance of cj.
Additionally, and in order to guarantee that β and APEs are identified (the former up
to a positive scale factor) (Wooldridge, 2010), we assume strict exogeneity of xjt conditional
on cj. That is,
E (yjt|xjt, cj) = E (yjt|xj, cj)
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, where xj is the vector of all covariates in all time periods. Given our model, this
assumption is likely to hold. As Papke and Wooldridge (2008) pointed out, this assumption
“is common in unobserved effects panel data, but it rules out lagged dependent variables in
xjt, as well as other explanatory variables that may react to past changes of yjt”(p.123).
Given both assumptions, we can solve equation (4.2) and get,
g (E [yjt|xjt, cj]) = ψa + x′jtβa + x¯′jξa (4.3)
, where subscript a denotes the division of the original coefficients by (1 + σ2a)
1/2. Papke
and Wooldridge (2008) and Wooldridge (2010) provide a more detailed explanation.
As mentioned before, one important feature of the GEE model is that it accounts for
correlation between subjects. Therefore, we have to choose the working correlation structure.
The literature provides seven possible structures: exchangeable, independent, unstructured,
autoregressive, stationary, non-stationary, or user-specified. According to Horton (2001),
we should use the exchangeable structure if observations have no logical order (clustered
data) and small number of time periods; if the number of clusters is small then independent
matrix is recommended; the unstructured matrix is appropriate if the number of time periods
is small and data is balanced and complete; and if observations are mistimed, the correlation
should vary with time, so stationary or autoregressive matrices are preferrable.
Since we have clustered data followed during 7 years and there is high variability within
municipalities than between them, we assume an exchangeable (compound symmetry) work-
ing correlation matrix (WCM) defined as
Rt,s =
 1 if t = sα otherwise (4.4)
where t and s are two different time points and α is the correlation parameter. This struc-
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ture assumes that within a cluster any two observations are equally correlated, Corr(yjt, yjs|xj) =
α, but no correlation between observations from different clusters. Also correlations do not
depend on xj. This structure is similar to the assumption on the correlation matrix under a
random effects linear model (Wooldridge, 2010).
One of the features of GEE is the consistency of parameter estimates even when WCM
is not correctly specified. But, and as highlighted by Agresti (2013), choosing carefully
the working correlation model will improve the efficiency of the estimates namely for small
samples. In the presence of large samples (more than 100 clusters), GEE method provides
consistent parameter estimates, regardless of the choice of working correlation structure
(Jang, 2011). Since in our case we have 77 clusters, choice of the working correlation structure
is important. In section 4.8 we provide a sensitivity analysis on the WCM structure.
To estimate equation (4.3), and as suggested by Papke and Wooldridge (2008), we assume
that non-adherence rate follows a binomial distribution and, as the link function, we use
the probit model. We estimate equation (4.3) considering all psychotropic drugs and then
separately for AHS and antidepressants. To perform the analysis we use Stata®13.
4.6 Results
In appendix D.2, Table D.2, we present the estimation results of equation (4.3). All estima-
tions contain time averages of the six explanatory variables.
Considering all psychotropic drugs, all the coefficients bear the expected sign except
pharmacy index. The percentage of beneficiaries of social benefits and unemployment rate
are positively related to non-adherence rate. More specifically, the estimated effect of a 1
percentage point increase in rate of beneficiaries of social benefits and in unemployment rate,
is 1.5 and 1.1 percentage points on the non-adherence rate, respectively.
The number of physicians per 10,000 inhabitants, the average wage and age have a
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negative impact on non-adherence rate. Our results show that increasing the number of
physicians by 1 per 10,000 inhabitants per municipality, non-adherence rate decreases by 0.6
percentage points. If the average wage of a municipality increases by e100 and the average
age by 10 years, the non-adherence rate decreases by 3 and 9 percentage points, respectively.
The pharmacy index is positively related to non-adherence rate, which means, increasing
the pharmacy index by 0.1‰, non-adherence rate increases 0.9 percentage points. However,
this relationship is less significant when compared to other socio-economic determinants.
Performing the analysis by pharmacological subclass, namely, AHS and antidepressants,
the effect of almost all socio-economic determinants is higher when comparing to all psy-
chotropic drugs. Only for pct rsi and nr phys the effect is almost the same.
It should be highlighted that, for AHS, pharm index and avg wage lose their statisti-
cal significance. Additionally, unemployment rate has a negative impact on non-adherence
rate. That is, if unemployment rate increases by 1 percentage point, we estimate that non-
adherence decreases by 0.4 percentage points.
4.7 Discussion
Our results reveal, approximately, one in four adults living in the Center region of Portugal
was prescribed with psychotropic medication per year. Figures from 2013, show one in six
American adults reported taking a psychiatric drug (Moore and Mattison, 2017) and for
French population, this percentage is higher and amounts to approximately 33% (France24,
2014).
Mental health care in primary care is defined as the provision of preventive and curative
care by a GP, or nurse, who can refer complex cases to secondary care (WHO, 2007a; WHO
and WONCA, 2008). According to Wittchen, Mu¨hlig and Beesdo (2003), depression and
anxiety are the most common mental health disorders treated in primary care facilities.
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In Portugal, it is estimated that about 23.7% of individuals who have any mental health
disorder are treated in primary care (Almeida et al., 2013). More specifically, individuals
who were diagnosed with anxiety (22%) and mood disorders (37.4%) were treated by GPs
(Almeida et al., 2013), which might explain the fact that, among all psychotropic drugs,
AHS and antidepressants were the most prescribed drugs in primary care representing about
44.4% and 27.8%, respectively.
The prescription pattern did not change except for AHS and antidepressants from 2012
onwards. Particularly, since 2012, GPs have been prescribing more antidepressants and less
AHS. There are two possible reasons. First, it was published in last quarter of 2011, a
clinical guideline addressing the symptomatic treatment of anxiety and insomnia with ben-
zodiazepines and similar drugs (DGS, 2011). This guideline provides a detail description on
the use of antidepressants and AHS in which it is clearly stated that AHS should be used
only as a temporary measure. This guideline might have increased awareness of the negative
effects of long-term treatment with AHS. Second, society and health care providers have
been progressively aware of the burden of mental health disorders, namely mood disorders,
which has been supported by international literature (WHO, 2003a) and also by the imple-
mentation of the Portuguese Mental Health Plan in 2008 (Almeida, 2009). This fact might
have promoted, prevented, and helped manage mental health disorders.
More than half of prescriptions were prescribed to female patients. According to Almeida
et al. (2013), Portuguese women have a higher risk of suffering from depression and anxiety
disorders compared to men. Also, Portuguese women have a much higher rate of lifetime
health services utilisation due to mental health disorders than do men (Almeida et al.,
2013). This result is line with other international studies that report higher prevalence of
prescribing in women compared to men. In the US, Medco (2011) analysed prescription
claims data from 2.5 million insured Americans from 2001 and 2010 and found that one
in four women is dispensed with psychotropic medication compared to 15% of men. An
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analysis performed for five European countries (Spain, Germany, the UK, the Netherlands,
and Denmark) on the prevalence of antidepressant prescribing shows it is in women than in
men (Abbing-Karahagopian et al., 2014).
The average non-adherence rate among patients prescribed with psychotropic drugs in
primary care amounts to 21.3% between 2009 and 2015. During this time period, non-
adherence rate presents three distinct patterns: for all municipalities, 2013 is the year
in which non-adherence rate is higher (mean 41.6%), 2015 is characterized by lower non-
adherence rate (mean 8.4%), and for the remaining years non-adherence rate did not change
much (mean between 16.1% and 22.6%). ARS Centro did not provide any justification for
these differences. However, we put forward the hypothesis these differences might be related
to some failures of the software used to record all prescriptions and dispensing. More specif-
ically, since electronic prescription became mandatory after 2011, we believe the system has
been adapting to meet demand over the years. According to an official report issued by the
Ministry of Health, there have been failures of the system namely in primary health care
facilities located in urban and rural areas (MS, 2012). Recently, announcements on tem-
porarily software shut-downs were issued by the Ministry of Health (SPMS, 2016a,b), which
we conjecture that some problems have not been solved yet.
Regarding the average non-adherence rate for AHS and antidepressants it amounts to
19.9% and 22.5%, respectively. Comparing our values with results from the study of Freccero
et al. (2016) in which primary non-adherence amounts to 14.9%, this difference calls for
urgent strategies to enhance mental health and promote adherence.
Regarding the drivers of non-adherence rate, we find a negative relationship between
this rate and average age. That is, municipalities with oldest population have lower non-
adherence rates. This finding is similar to the results found by Valenstein et al. (2004);
Bulloch and Patten (2010), and Freccero et al. (2016) but it contradicts Miasso et al. (2016)
in which elderly patients are less adherent than their younger counterparts. Forgetfulness
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has been pointed out as a risk factor for poor adherence regardless of age group (Bulloch and
Patten, 2010; Miasso et al., 2016). The negative relationship between non-adherence and age
can be explained by the careless nature of young individuals (Gadkari and McHorney, 2012).
On the other hand, cognitive impairment and complex medication regime (frequency of
dosing) are found to be related to poor adherence among elderly people (Jin, Kim and Rhie,
2016). In our case, we believe our result not only translates forgetfulness and carelessness
but also self-stigma around mental health that persists among younger adults (Kamaradova
et al., 2016; YMCA, 2016). In Portugal, Silveira et al. (2011) relates stigma to poor adherence
among undergraduate students. Also, the Portuguese NHS provides additional benefits to
afford medication for individuals above 65 whose annual income is less than e5,175.82 per
year (“complemento solida´rio para idosos”). These benefits translate into an additional 50%
co-payment of the value that was not covered by the NHS (decree-law 232/2005). This
additional benefit might increase primary adherence among the elderly. Overall, combining
our results with the fact that mental disorders have an earlier age of onset (Jones, 2013),
strategies to enhance adherence among young adults should not be disregarded.
Our results provide additional evidence on a strong relationship between non-adherence
rate and socio-economic factors such as unemployment rate, percentage of beneficiaries of
social benefits, and number of physicians per 10,000 inhabitants.
Considering all psychotropic drugs, we find that increasing unemployment rate by 1 per-
centage point, non-adherence increases by 1.1 percentage points. This result is in line with
previous literature. As Hibdye et al. (2015) and Ma˚rdby et al. (2016) find, individuals with
low socio-economic status are more likely to develop a non-adherent pattern. This positive
relationship can indicate the poor financial capacity to afford medication by unemployed indi-
viduals (Chandra et al., 2014). Moreover, and given the negative relationship that has been
established in the literature between unemployment and mental health (Paul and Moser,
2009; Berchick et al., 2012; OECD, 2012b; Matias et al., 2016), this finding gains additional
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importance. Individuals who have lost their jobs are at greater risk of developing mental
health disorders, namely anxiety and depression (Goldsmith and Diette, 2012).6 However,
and based on our results, we expect that this vulnerable group might not improve its health
status due to poor financial capacity to afford the prescribed medication. As jobless individ-
uals with mental disorders might return to work if adequate treatment is prescribed (OECD,
2012b), we believe those individuals might not return to the labour market within a short
period of time, deteriorating their mental health status and maintaining their employment
status. Given that long-term unemployment has large negative effects on mental health
(Goldsmith and Diette, 2012), we suppose that additional costs are being imposed to society
(e.g: treatment costs, loss of income).
Performing the analysis by pharmacological subclass, and for antidepressants, unemploy-
ment rate has a larger positive effect on non-adherence rate. We think this result might
reflect the fact that unemployment individuals are more likely to develop anxiety and de-
pression disorders (Goldsmith and Diette, 2012), and following the international and national
guidelines, these disorders should be treated using antidepressants rather than AHS (DGS,
2011).
Regarding AHS, we find a negative relationship between unemployment rate and non-
adherence but this effect is almost zero. We put forward the hypothesis that given the lower
average cost of AHS (Furtado, 2013) and being more additive compared to antidepressants
(AddictionCenter, 2018), jobless individuals have additional incentives to be adherent.
This result is exacerbated if we consider the following facts. First, Portugal has been
continuously among the worst performers in the European Union in terms of youth un-
employment. According to ILO (2015) this rate exceeds 30% in some countries, including
6It is worth mentioning that it is difficult to establish a causal relationship between mental health and
unemployment. That is, causality may run in both directions: on the one hand, it may be that unemployment
acts as a stressor thus affecting the mental health of the individuals; on the other hand, those individuals
might be unemployed precisely due to their poorer mental health status. Given the scope of this chapter,
we just focus on the relationship between unemployment and poor mental health.
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Portugal (34.8%), which is very high comparing to the usual 23% in the euro zone (Banerji
et al., 2014).7 Second, there is a positive association between youth unemployment and
mental diagnosis requiring inpatient care (Eliason and Storrie, 2010) and a negative link
between youth unemployment and self-reported mental health (Matias et al., 2016). Com-
bining both facts with our finding that municipalities with youngest population have higher
non-adherence rates, we believe young unemployed individuals are worsening their mental
health condition, which prevent them from entering in the labour market, consequently,
depleting their skills (OECD, 2012b).
The non-adherence rate increases by 1.5 percentage points when the percentage of ben-
eficiaries of social benefits increases by 1 percentage point. In Portugal, these benefits are
granted to individuals who are in social and financial need and at risk of social exclusion
(EC, 2018). As mentioned before for jobless individuals, this result translates the low fi-
nancial capacity of this group to afford medication. Additionally, the prevalence of mental
health disorders, namely depression and anxiety, is higher among welfare benefit recipients
than their counterparts (Butterworth, 2003). Therefore, these individuals are worsening
their mental health status by not adhering, which might impose additional costs to soci-
ety. According to Cree, Kay and Steward (2012), illiterate individuals are more likely to
be on welfare benefits than their counterparts. Illiteracy is associated with poor insight of
one’s chronic condition(s) (Parker, 2000), and therefore, a major factor of poor adherence
(Parker, 2000; Clayton et al., 2012). Hence, we consider along with low financial capacity,
non-adherence might be driven by low health literacy of these individuals, thus, perpetuating
their poor mental health status (Lucca et al., 2015).
The similar result between antidepressants and all psychotropic drugs is explained by
high prevalence of depression and anxiety among individuals receiving social benefits (But-
7The youth unemployment rate is defined as the number of unemployed youth (typically between 15 and
24 years old) divided by the youth labour force.
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terworth, 2003). The difference might rely on the fact that the analysis on all psychotropic
drugs includes medications with a higher average cost compared to antidepressants such
as antipsychotics (Furtado, 2013). Regarding AHS, and as mentioned before, we believe
non-adherence rate is less affected (0.8 percentage points compared to 1.5) given the low
average cost of these medicines (Furtado, 2013) and their addictive nature when compared
to antidepressants (AddictionCenter, 2018).
It is worth highlighting that despite unemployed individuals and beneficiaries of social
benefits are intrinsically tied in (Reid, 2009), in our data the correlation between unemploy-
ment rate and percentage of beneficiaries of social benefits is low (0.3).
To what concerns average wage and number of physicians, both variables bear the ex-
pected sign. In other words, if average wage increases e100 and number of physicians
increases by 1 per 10,000 inhabitants, non-adherence rate decreases by 3 and 0.6 percent-
age points, respectively. Our result on average wage is in line with previous literature in
which income is a key factor for non-adherence (Mishra et al., 2011; Lucca et al., 2015).
For patients with multiple comorbid chronic diseases, income reveals to be a major factor of
non-adherence. More specifically, low-income patients reported to have to choose what med-
ication was the most important given their limited budget (Mishra et al., 2011). Considering
patients with mental illness are less likely to perceive benefits of medication combined with
the stigma around mental health (Shrivastava, Johnston and Bureau, 2012), we acknowledge
patients do not consider psychotropic drugs as one of the most important medication. Re-
garding the number of physicians, we conjecture this result may reflect the lack of time GPs
have to treat mental health patients. According to Farooq and Naeem (2014), monitoring
and encourage patients to take medication can tackle non-adherence. However, to do so,
GPs need time and motivation since different patients might need different approaches.
Pharmacy index is positively associated with non-adherence, except for AHS which is
not statistically significant. For diabetes mellitus and skin diseases, Syed et al. (2016) and
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Moo-Young, Suarez and Adamson (2018), respectively, find no significant differences be-
tween adherent and non-adherent patients in distance to pharmacy. Authors claim there
are a number of personal barriers to non-adherence, which makes distance to pharmacy
less relevant as a risk factor for non-adherence. In Portugal, new community pharmacies
or relocation of existing ones must fulfil certain distance and population criteria defined by
decree-law.8 There are some exemptions to these rules. A new community pharmacy can be
established if a health care service is present but there is not a pharmacy in the vicinity, that
is, less than 3km. We hypothesise that in municipalities with lack of community pharmacies,
there is a pharmacy located near to primary health care units driving patients to buy the
medication after leaving the primary care facility. In municipalities with more community
pharmacies, patients may postpone their buying decision, which may influence their primary
adherence. We must refer the relationship between pharmacy index and non-adherence rate
is less significant compared to the other socio-economic determinants we have considered.
Given the period covered in our analysis, results may be reflecting the consequences of
the economic crisis. Indeed, variables such as unemployment, beneficiaries of social benefits,
and income, three of the main determinants of poor mental health, were largely affected by
the economic downturn (OECD, 2012b).
Despite unable to draw conclusions on Portugal’s pattern on primary adherence, our data
is very heterogeneous as it comprises municipalities with distinct socio-economic character-
istics. Therefore, we believe our conclusions will be similar when considering the remaining
regions of Portugal.
Given our definition of non-adherence, which is, the percentage of individuals who were
prescribed with psychotropic medication in primary care but did not fill the prescription (pri-
mary non-adherence), we are aware that our results might be underestimated since patients
can fill the prescription but not take the medication or they can discontinue the treatment
8Decree-law 936-A/99 established general rules for the location of community pharmacies.
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(non-persistence). Despite most of the literature focuses on secondary adherence, it is im-
portant not only to present values for primary non-adherence but also to identify its main
drivers since this is the first step towards implementation of effective strategies to improve
adherence.
It is worth highlighting that our work differs from the study of Freccero et al. (2016).
First, we are using more recent data and our definition of non-adherence respects the Por-
tuguese prescription rules (section 4.3). Second, there are important differences between
both Portuguese and Swedish mental health systems that may influence non-adherence rates.
More specifically, cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) is available at Swedish primary care
whereas Portugal does not provide such therapy in primary care and the current financing
system does not incentivise continuous care (Almeida, 2009; OECD, 2014; Perelman et al.,
2017a). According to Chapman and Horne (2013) and Haddad, Brain and Scott (2014),
CBT can improve adherence, and therefore its availability may influence adherence rates.
Third, our analysis comprises all psychotropic medication while the Swedish study only focus
on antidepressants. Finally, our analysis is performed at municipality level while Freccero
et al. (2016) analysis primary adherence at individual level.
Combining our results with data from treatment gap in mental health care, that is,
individuals with psychiatric disorders that remain untreated although effective treatment
exist (Kohn et al., 2004), we may explain the high prevalence of mental health disorders in
Portugal. According to Almeida et al. (2013), about 81.8% and 33.6% of patients with mild
and severe mental health disorders, respectively, are left untreated. Therefore, additional
challenges are imposed to society as patients who do not adhere to the treatment and those
who do not seek for help are deteriorating their mental health status which might increase
health care utilisation and costs.
Given our results, adherence should be promoted. Several strategies such as psychosocial
and cognitive interventions, electronic reminders (e.g.: text messages, phone calls), and
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family intervention (Haddad, Brain and Scott, 2014) are suggested in the literature as a
way to enhance medication adherence. On the pharmacological side, the literature suggests
that drug treatment should be carefully design to suit the individual patient (Farooq and
Naeem, 2014). More specifically, Farooq and Naeem (2014) suggest that GPs can simplify
the treatment regime, switch when treatment is not effective, adjust doses, and treat side
effects. However, authors claim the success of these strategies will depend on the degree
of involvement of GPs in the treatment process. In particular, policies aiming to create
incentives to treat mental health patients and provide continuous care by GPs could engage
physicians in the treatment process. Fleury et al. (2012) identify inappropriate GP payment
model as a barrier to enhance GPs in managing mental health disorders. GPs spend little
time assessing and addressing the adherence problem. According to Farooq and Naeem
(2014), clinicians need time and patience to keep patients engaged in treatment. Currently,
Portugal has two types of primary health care centers: Personalised Health Care Units
(PHCU) and Family Health Units (FHU). The main difference between both units is the
number of patients enrolled in a FHU, the payment mechanism of GPs working in FHU,
and the voluntary creation of multidisciplinary teams in FHU (Simo˜es et al., 2017; Barros,
Machado and Simo˜es, 2011). GPs are paid a salary in PHCUs but in FHUs, there are
incentive mechanisms based on performance (Simo˜es et al., 2017; Barros, Machado and
Simo˜es, 2011). However, there is only one mandatory indicator related to mental health,
“Percentage of patients aged 65 or older without being prescribed with AHS”. Therefore,
additional indicators that could promote adherence should be implemented. Also, and as
suggested by Fleury et al. (2012), the role of mental health care providers should be extended
in order to enhance the ability of GPs to treat their patients with mental disorders and
promote integrated care.
Finally, policies aiming at enhancing mental health and improving the key main drivers of
non-adherence should be coordinated. In particular, promote employment, and support wel-
137
fare recipients should be a priority combined with integration of mental health. These policies
ought to account for the fact that there are two particular groups within the population which
are more vulnerable. These groups consist of unemployed and welfare recipients. Within
those groups, the young adults are the most vulnerable. As reported by McKee et al. (2005),
individuals living in countries with generous unemployment benefits experience higher well-
being during unemployment than those living in less generous countries. Therefore, policies
focusing on unemployment benefits should not be discarded since they can improve mental
health status and may allow individuals to afford medication. Integrating mental health in
the benefit system is also of great importance. Particularly, benefit system needs to be de-
signed to respond to people’s need (JA MH-WB, 2016). Financial incentives for medication
adherence are controversial. However, Highton-Williamson et al. (2015) implemented a “de-
scriptive and thematic analyses of semi-structured interviews with the clinicians of patients
assigned to receive incentives within a randomized controlled trial”(p.120) in which adher-
ence was improved. Also, positive results on symptoms, insights, and social functioning were
reported. Therefore, the implementation of an additional co-payments for welfare recipients
and unemployed, namely for young adults, can be a possible strategy to promote adherence.
Nonetheless, and as mentioned before, these measures should be coordinated with strate-
gies to enhance mental health. Effective policies should combine the three key-areas: health,
labour market, and social security. This approach was already put forward by the WHO and
CGF (2014), which suggested several combined strategies, such as the protection of mental
health of the unemployed through social and re-employment programs. In practice, Portugal
has been implementing several measures targeting youth unemployment. Most of these were
recommended by the European Union to all member-states. To the best of our knowledge,
there are no strategies to enhance adherence.
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4.8 Robustness Check
Our data does not comprise the full year of 2015. Therefore, we check if prescription rate has
any seasonal pattern. To do so, we analysed the prescription rate per month and quarters
using a trend model and a periodogram. We conclude prescription rate does not have any
seasonality.
In addition, and given the higher rate of non-adherence in 2013, we performed the analysis
without considering this year. The results did not change. Furthermore, the direction of
the relationship between non-adherence rate and socio-economic variables is the same. All
variables still remain statistically significant. The magnitude of the APEs has changed
slightly but the difference in the coefficients is not statistically significant.
In our model, and because of possible options for the WCM (independent, autoregressive,
stationary, non-stationary, and unstructured), only the independent WCM is suitable.9 As
the goal of choosing the WCM is to estimate the coefficients more efficiently, misspecification
of the correlation structure can affect the efficiency of the estimates. Generally, GEE method
is robust to incorrect specification of the WCM (Liang and Zeger, 1986). However, if the
WCM does not “incorporate all of the information on the correlation of measurements within
the cluster, we can expect that inefficient estimators will result” (Ballinger, 2004, p.133).
Therefore, a selection criteria for the WCM is useful.
The literature suggests the use of Quasi Likelihood under Independence Model Criterion
(QIC) to properly select the WCM (Ballinger, 2004). However, we did not use such method
because, according to Wooldridge (2014), the way QIC was designed, estimates under inde-
pendence structure will always be preferrable than the ones using an exchangeable WCM. As
Wooldridge (2014) pointed out, large differences between estimates under exchangeable and
9As mentioned before, and given the nature of our data, only the exchangeable or independent WCM
might be selected.
139
independent working structures might indicate a misspecification of the probability model or
explanatory variables might not satisfy the strict exogeneity assumption. Therefore, and as a
sensitivity analysis, we estimate equation (4.3) assuming an independent WCM (Table D.3).
The results using both exchangeable or independent WCM are almost the same. In terms of
the APEs, the results are the same. Having said that, we can assure our probability model
is not misspecified and the explanatory variables satisfy the strict exogeneity assumption.
The literature recommends the use of year dummies when dealing with panel data
(Wooldridge, 2010). Also, Papke and Wooldridge (2008) state the desirability of includ-
ing such dummies in the fractional response models for panel data. In Table D.4 we present
the estimation results of equation (4.3) when introducing year dummies. Almost all socio-
economic determinants lose their statistical significance. Only both pct rsi and nr phys re-
main significant but the former is now negatively related to non-adherence rate. The impact
of these socio-economic variables is smaller when compared to our original model (without
year dummies). It should be mentioned that for AHS, average age remain significant but
the magnitude of the APE is small.
These results show the potential problem that can arise when including year dummies.
Since we are controlling for municipalities specific characteristics (time averages of the ex-
planatory variables) and now for year dummies, which can capture the economic environ-
ment, there is not much left to explain. We conjecture that explanatory variables in regression
model with year dummies might only be capturing disturbance. More specifically, as our
socio-economic variables might incorporate not only municipalities specific characteristics
but also the economic environment over the years, including both time averages and year
dummies will expurgate most of variability of these variables.
Given the fact that in our panel data there is a higher variability between years rather
than between municipalities, we believe our initial specification, that is, the model that does
not consider year dummies, is more appropriate.
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It is worth mentioning that Wooldridge (2010) points out several approaches to estimate
fractional responses but none of them seem to apply to our data.
One possibility is to use the log-odds transformation. Nevertheless, it may not produce
accurate results, even if the dependent variable is strictly within the unit interval (as in our
case). This means, “we cannot recover the expected value of the fractional response from a
linear model for the log-odds ratio unless we make strong independence assumptions”(Papke
and Wooldridge, 2008, p.122).
Another approach is the two-limit Tobit model as it is possible to determine the expected
value. However, this model can only be applied if the response variable has a mass point at
zero and one. We cannot apply this because our case does not meet the criteria.
The beta regression model might also be a possibility but the main drawback is the in-
consistency of all parameters if the distribution is misspecified. In our case, and despite non-
adherence rate being continuous on (0,1), it does not follow a beta distribution (Wooldridge,
2010).
Additionally, and suggested by Hardin, Hilbe and Hilbe (2007), one can introduce ex-
plicitly municipalities-specific intercepts in the fractional model when the entire population
is observed. In our case we have information on the entire population but just a small num-
ber of time periods (seven years) compared to the number of cross sectional observations
(77 municipalities). Therefore, by applying this methodology, we can incur in the so-called
incidental parameters problem which leads to inconsistent estimates of the common slope
coefficients (Wooldridge, 2010).
Finally, both pooled Bernoulli quasi-maximum likelihood estimation and pooled non-
linear least squares are alternatives but “fully robust inference should be used because the
variance associated with the Bernoulli distribution is likely to be wrong, and the variance is
unlikely to be constant. More important, there is neglected serial correlation” (Wooldridge,
2010, p.768). Thus, we opt to use the GEE approach.
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4.9 Further Research
As further research, we will extend this analysis for the remaining regions of Portugal. This
analysis will allow to draw conclusions for Portugal and also to make comparisons between
regions. It is important to highlight we have submitted the same research proposal for all
the remaining Administrac¸o˜es Regionais de Sau´de and they were accepted. So far, we did
not receive any data.
We will also extend the analysis for depression disorders. According to international
clinical guidelines, patients diagnosed with depression should be treated with antidepressants
for at least 6 months (NICE, 2009; DGS, 2012). Hence, we will perform a specific analysis for
this pharmacological subgroup considering non-adherence as not only buying the prescribed
medicines but also discontinuing the treatment during the first 6 months. To determine the
continuity of treatment we will compute the defined daily dose (DDD) (WHO, 2017).
This analysis will consider patients who were diagnosed with depression (ICPC P76
and P74) and were prescribed with antidepressants since 2010 and do not appear in the
prescription dataset in 2009. By doing so, even if a patient was treated with antidepressants
before 2010, we assume that he discontinued the treatment, and therefore, he started the
treatment when we first observe him in our dataset. We are aware this analysis will suffer
from the so-called “gap in data availability” (Braunstein et al., 2017). In other words, our
data will suffer from time bias because our data does nor provide information on prescribed
medication during inpatient stays. It will not be possible to estimate the impact of this
effect but we will be able to know if this bias will under- or over-estimate non-adherence rate
by assuming long periods of interruption might correspond to unobservable inpatient stays
(Braunstein et al., 2017).
Finally, and if policy-makers decide to implement strategies to tackle non-adherence,
particularly in the more vulnerable groups, we could test their effectiveness. Specifically, we
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can check the pattern of non-adherence before and after the strategies have been implemented
to verify for differences not only on primary non-adherence but also on patients that are more
likely to discontinue treatment. Also, and by performing a qualitative study, we may be able
to assess the main reasons for primary and secondary non-adherence, which will allow policy-
makers to implement more patient-oriented adherence interventions.
4.10 Conclusion
This chapter provides additional evidence on the socio-economic drivers of non-adherence to
psychotropic medication in primary care using information on prescription and dispensing
of these drugs for the Center region of Portugal between 2009 and 2015. Non-adherence rate
is defined as patients who do not fill the prescribed medication according to the Portuguese
prescription rules (primary non-adherence). As our dataset does not provide socio-economic
characteristics of individuals, we perform this analysis at municipality-level. We use a frac-
tional probit model to assess the impact of socio-economic variables on non-adherence rate.
Our results provide evidence of positive relationships between non-adherence rate and
unemployment, and percentage of beneficiaries of social benefits. More specifically, if unem-
ployment rate and the percentage of individuals receiving social benefits increase by 1 per-
centage point, non-adherence rate increases by 1.1 and 1.5 percentage points, respectively.
On the other hand, increasing average wage and number of physicians improves adherence.
In line with previous literature, municipalities with a low average age have smaller adherence
rates than their counterparts.
These results call for coordinated strategies to enhance adherence, promote employment,
and support low-income families who receive social benefits. Such policies should give special
attention to young adults.
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Chapter 5
How to improve a mental health
patient status when treatment
non-adherence is a problem? A
payment mechanism approach.1
5.1 Introduction
In Chapter 4 we illustrate the importance of adherence, particularly in Psychiatry. As
mentioned before, increasing adherence in mental health patients implies, among others, an
effective community services (Herbeck et al., 2005), provision of intensive case management
to SMI patients (Dieterich et al., 2017) and frequently consultations and psycho-education
(Nelson, Maruish and Axler, 2000). The degree of involvement of physicians in the treatment
process is crucial for its success (Farooq and Naeem, 2014). Physicians need to have frequent
contact with patients in order to induce adherence and improve their mental health status.
1The co-authors of this paper are Pedro Chaves and Pedro Pita Barros.
145
Several factors influence physicians decisions such as ethical concerns, social incentives,
and payment mechanisms (Hurst et al., 2005; Biller-Andorno and Lee, 2013; Kazungu et al.,
2018). There is a vast literature on physician responses to various payment mechanisms.
Empirical work focus on the impact of payment mechanisms on physicians’ activities mea-
sured by length of stay, volume of services or readmissions (E´chevin and Fortin, 2014; Innes
et al., 2018). According to Herbeck et al. (2005) the way physicians are paid has an impact
on patients’ adherence problems. Specifically on mental health, Douven, Remmerswaal and
Mosca (2015) conclude that mental health providers react to financial incentives.
Theoretical models focus on the payment model and the physician response. Ellis and
McGuire (1986) developed a model of provider response to prospective payment (based on
the quality of services provided). They conclude that the weight that a physician places on
a patient’s benefits (altruism) influences the provision of services. Chalkley and Malcomson
(1998) work is an extended version of Ellis and McGuire (1986) where they assume that
costs depend not only on the provision of quality care but also on the effort level exerted
by the physician. This paper can be seen as the examination of the second best of the Ellis
and McGuire (1986) model. Jack (2005) derives the conditions for the optimal payment
mechanism in the presence of asymmetric information about altruism. There are extensions
of this work which considered that quality has two dimensions (Eggleston (2005) and Kaar-
boe and Siciliani (2011)). Chone´ and Ma (2011) introduce asymmetric information not only
about altruism but also about patient’s valuation for health care. Recently, Fichera et al.
(2018) analyse the patient’s response to physician’s effort. Specifically, they model a joint
production of health in which the patient’s and the physician’s effort can be either comple-
ments or substitutes. The goal is to find how P4P responds to the degree of complementarity
and substitution of physician and patient efforts. They show that when the physician’s and
patient’s efforts are complements, the power of P4P scheme is higher.
In this paper we analyse the physician’s payment if treatment non-adherence is a possibil-
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ity. We design a model in which treatment non-adherence is a possibility and the physician’s
payment depends on the patient’s health status. Specifically, the patient attends to one con-
sultation and decides whether to adhere or not to the prescribed treatment. If he decides to
adhere, he comes back to a second consultation. The semi-altruistic physician has to choose
the effort level she will exert in both consultations. On the other hand, the Government
decides on the payment mechanism. That is, the physician receives an adherence bonus if
the patient adheres to the treatment. Besides that, if the patient’s health status improves,
the physician receives an additional improvement bonus.
Our results show that when the patient adheres to the treatment for any effort level
exerted by the physician, the Government may find optimal to induce the physician to
exert a high effort level. In this case the optimal adherence bonus is zero and the optimal
improvement bonus increases with the level of altruism and with the benefit the patient gets
if his health status improves. On the other hand, the optimal improvement bonus decreases
as the tax distortion increases. This result also applies when the patient may not adhere but
the physician may always prefer adherence.
In the situation in which not only does the patient need to be convinced to turn to the
adherence side, but so does the physician, the Government needs to assure adherence (if it
is socially optimal) and guarantee the optimal effort level. The Government’s decision is
based on the level of tax distortion. Specifically, when the tax distortion is low the optimal
adherence bonus is zero and the improvement bonus decreases with the level of altruism and
with the benefit the patient gets if his health status improves. On the other hand, if the
tax distortion is moderate, we may have multiple equilibria, in which the distribution of the
bonuses is irrelevant, as long as the expected payment of the physician does not change.
When the tax distortion is high, the optimal adherence and improvement bonuses are zero
and there is no adherence. In all the above situations the first-best is only attained when
there is no tax distortion.
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We conclude that using payment mechanisms can induce adherence. However, and during
periods of tight budgets where adherence is not guaranteed, it does not matter the way the
physician receives her bonuses as long as the expected payment does not change. That is,
multiple equilibria are attained combining both adherence and improvement bonuses or just
using one of them. That is, if the adherence bonus can be seen as a proxy of FFS while
the improvement bonus can be assumed as a P4P mechanism, the choice between these two
payment schemes relies on other reasons like administrative simplicity. It will come as no
surprise if we find the payment structure irrelevant in empirical terms.
The remainder of the chapter is as follows. Section (5.2) presents the basic structure of the
model and study the decision of each agent separately. Section (5.3) studies the equilibria.
We first study what would be socially optimal if the Government could decide the actions
of all agents (first-best), and then turn to the situations where patient may adhere or not to
the treatment. Section (5.4) discusses the results and section (5.5) provides ideas for further
research. Section (5.6) concludes and appendix E collects proofs.
5.2 Model
In this section, we present the basic structure of our model and study the decision of each
agent separately.
5.2.1 Setup
There is one patient diagnosed with a mental health problem, who is being followed by one
physician. The Government has to decide how to pay the physician so that she provides the
proper treatment to the patient, knowing that its resources come from tax payers. In society,
there are multiple patients and physicians, but we focus on only one of each, because the
Government can apply this individual framework to all of them. We want to focus on the
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patient-physician relationship and not at system-level equilibrium.
The patient attends a first consultation and decides whether or not to adhere to the
prescribed treatment. Let us define d ∈ {n, a} as the patient’s adherence decision, where n
represents non-adherence and a stands for adherence. In this consultation, the physician has
to choose an effort level x1 ≥ 0. If the patient decides to adhere to the prescribed treatment,
and only in this case, he comes back for a second consultation, where the physician exerts an
effort level x2 ≥ 0. In this case, at the end of the treatment, his health status is assessed. We
assume that, throughout the model, only the sum of the two effort levels x1 and x2 matters
for the functions which depend on the effort level. So, we define x = x1 + x2. Furthermore,
we assume that, when, at the first consultation the patient sees x1 he can anticipate what
x2 will be in the second consultation, if he returns. So the patient reacts to x when deciding
to adhere or not. The patient’s final health status may remain the same or improve, and is
defined by h ∈ {0, 1}, where 0 stands for remaining the same and 1 for improving. He knows
that the probability of improving depends on his adherence decision and on the effort level
chosen by the physician, x. This probability, p, is defined in the following way:
p (d, x) =
 pn (x) , d = npa (x) , d = a
We assume that ∀d ∈ {n, a}, pd is a C3 function and, for all x,
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0 ≤ pd (x) ≤ 1 (5.1)
pa (x) ≥ pn (x) (5.2)
p′a (x) ≥ p′n (x) > 0 (5.3)
p′′d (x) < 0 (5.4)
p′′′d (x) < 0 (5.5)
Assumption (5.1) is related to the definition of probabilities. Assumptions (5.2) and (5.3)
state that the patient’s health status will improve with a higher probability if he adheres to
the treatment, for any effort level of the physician and, moreover, that the marginal contri-
bution of the effort level for the probability of improving is higher when there is adherence.
Assumptions (5.4) and (5.5) are technical.
Regarding his health status, the patient gets a benefit of b ≥ 0 if it improves and 0
otherwise. The patient’s adherence cost is k ≥ 0. The patient has to choose whether to
adhere or not and his utility function, u, is given by:
u (d, x) =
 un (x) = pn (x) b , d = nua (x) = pa (x) b− k , d = a
As mentioned before, the physician chooses to exert a certain effort level. She does so for
two reasons. First, the payments she receives from the Government depend on the patient’s
adherence decision and health status.2 In case the patient adheres to the treatment, the
physician receives an adherence bonus, w1 ≥ 0. If, besides that, the patient’s health status
improves, the physician receives an additional improvement bonus, w2 ≥ 0. The wage vector
2Remember that the patient’s health status is only assessed if he attends the check-up session, which
only happens if he adheres to the treatment.
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is w = (w1, w2). We can define the total payment received by the physician in the following
way:
m (d, h) =

0 , d = n
w1 , d = a ∧ h = 0
w1 + w2 , d = a ∧ h = 1
When choosing her effort level x, the physician anticipates whether, or not, the patient
will adhere, but has no way of knowing if his health status will improve. Therefore, she
focuses on the expected value of her total payment, which is:
E[m (d, h) |x] =
 0 , d = nw1 + pa (x)w2 , d = a
Second, she is semi-altruistic, in the sense that the patient’s health status enters directly
into her utility function (Chalkley and Malcomson, 1998; Jack, 2005; Chone´ and Ma, 2011;
Liu and Ma, 2013). She benefits from the improvement of the patient’s health status in the
same way the patient does. The physician’s total benefit is modelled as a weighted average of
the payment she receives and the expected benefit she gets from the patient’s health status,
with θ ∈ ]0, 1] and 1− θ being the weights:3
θ (E[m (d, h) |x]) + (1− θ) p (d, x) b
For an easier reading, we normalize the weights, dividing the total benefit by θ and
defining α = 1−θ
θ
. By doing this, we can say that α ≥ 0 is the level of altruism of the
physician. To exert a total certain effort level x, the physician incurs in a cost c (x). We
assume that c is a C3 function and, for all x,
3Throughout the model, we assume that benefits and costs are measured in monetary terms.
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c (x) ≥ 0 (5.6)
c′ (x) ≥ 0 (5.7)
c′′ (x) > 0 (5.8)
c′′′ (x) > 0 (5.9)
Assumptions (5.6) and (5.7) imply that the cost is non-negative and increases with the
effort level. Assumption (5.8) implies an increasing marginal cost. Assumption (5.9) is
technical.
The physician knows how the patient makes his decision and only has to choose the effort
level. Therefore, her utility function, v, is defined in the following way:
v (x,w) = E[m (d, h) |x] + αp (d, x) b− c (x) (5.10)
The Government is a benevolent social planner, that is, it aims to maximize social welfare.
We consider the Government to be utilitarian, in the sense that it views social welfare as the
sum of individual utilities. Besides the patient and the physician, taxpayers, who finance
the physician’s payment, are also a part of society (Chalkley and Malcomson, 1998). For
each monetary unit of taxes collected, there is a cost of λ ≥ 0, which may be interpreted
as the cost associated with generating a distortion in the markets where the tax is collected
from. Taxpayers also have to face a cost of l ≥ 0, in case the patient does not adhere. If
this happens, society has to bear the cost of readmissions, new consultations and the use of
emergency rooms, for instance. However, these treatments only target the patient’s stability
and do not increase the probability of improvement of his health status. The problem of
the Government is to choose the values of w1 and w2 that maximize the following expected
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social utility function, where 1{n} (d) is 1 in case of adherence, and 0 otherwise:
s (w1, w2) = u (d, x) + v (x,w)− (1 + λ)E[m (d, h) |x]− 1{n} (d) l (5.11)
Government
(w1, w2)
Physician - Consultation 1
x1
Patient
n
Nature
1− pn (x1)
0
pn (x1)
1
a
Physician - Consultation 2
x2
Nature
1− pa (x1 + x2)
0
pa (x1 + x2)
1
Player
Decision
Probability
Figure 5.1: Timeline
Figure 5.1 provides the timeline of moves. First, the Government chooses the adherence
and improvement bonuses, respectively w1 and w2. Then, the physician chooses the effort
level for the first consultation x1, knowing w1 and w2. When she does so, she knows the
patient will observe this effort and make a rational decision. Such decision will take into
account the impact the adherence decision will have on the effort the physician will make
in the second consultation, if it takes place. That is, when the physician chooses x1, she
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and the patient can infer the value of x2 which means that, even though this effort level
is only seen in the second consultation, it is decided in the first one. That is why it is
possible, throughout the paper, to only focus on x = x1 + x2 as the physician decision to
which the patient reacts. After the first consultation, the patient adheres or not. In the
first case, the second consultation takes place and the physician puts the anticipated x2
into practice. The optimal x2 if the physician can revisit it is the one decided in the first
consultation, so that no inter-temporal inconsistency is present. In the second case, there
is no second consultation. Nature dictates if the patient’s health status improves, and this
happens with a higher probability if the patient adheres to the treatment. This model is
solved by backward induction: the patient decides to adhere or not, given the effort level
exerted by the physician; the latter knows this and incorporates it in his decision, which is
affected by w1 and w2; the Government knows both the patient’s and physician’s decisions
and, based on those, selects the optimal bonuses.
5.2.2 Patient
The patient has to compare, given the effort level exerted by the physician, the utility he
gets if he adheres or not. Although, at the time he decides to adhere or not, he has only
seen x1, he can infer what x2 will be chosen, given his adherence decision. Therefore, he
only focuses on x. He adheres if and only if u (a, x) ≥ u (n, x).4 That is,5
d∗ (x) =
 n , (pa − pn) (x) b < ka , (pa − pn) (x) b ≥ k (5.12)
By looking at (5.12), we know that the patient adheres to the treatment when the increase
in benefit from changing from not adhering to adhering (the increase in the probability of
4In case of indifference, we assume that the patient adheres.
5We represent the optimal value of each choice variable with an ∗.
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improving) outweighs the increase in cost (which arises because the adherence cost is added).
It is important to note that this decision depends on the effort level chosen by the physician,
as can be seen in (pa − pn) (x). As pa − pn is an increasing function of x, we can say that
d∗ (x) = a⇔ x ≥ x = (pa − pn)−1
(
k
b
)
.6 Specifically, as k and b are exogenous to the patient
or physician decisions, the choice of x will lead to adherence if it exceeds the threshold x.
5.2.3 Physician
The physician knows the impact her decision has on the patient’s. That is, she knows
the patient follows (5.12) and therefore which effort levels make the patient adhere or not.
Besides, she is aware of the payment scheme the Government designs. Hence, (5.10) may be
rewritten as,
v (x) =
 vn (x) = pn (x)αb− c (x) , 0 ≤ x < xva (x) = w1 + pa (x) (w2 + αb)− c (x) , x ≥ x (5.13)
We can look at the physician’s problem dividing it in two. She needs to find the optimal
effort level in vn and va and then choose one of them. That is, in her perspective, it may be
optimal that the patient adheres or not. A stationary point of vn, xˆn, respects the following
condition:
p′n (xˆn)αb = c
′ (xˆn) (5.14)
Equation (5.14) shows that, in an interior solution, the marginal benefit of the effort level
equals its marginal cost. Furthermore, as vn is strictly concave, xˆn, if it exists, is unique, and
the optimal effort level in vn, x
∗
n, is xˆn. However, it is possible that (5.14) has no solution in
[0, x[. Using the strict concavity of vn and assuming that (5.14) has a solution, we can say
6To assure that there is a x, we assume that limx→+∞ ((pa − pn) (x)) > kb .
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that:
x∗n = max {0,min {xˆn, x}} (5.15)
Note that, in (5.15), x can never actually be chosen because it does not belong to the
domain of vn. However, this is not a problem since, in the case in which vn (x) is the
hypothetical maximum of vn, it is lower than va (x), which means the physician prefers
undoubtedly the patient to adhere.
A stationary point of va, xˆa, respects the following condition:
p′a (xˆa) (w2 + αb) = c
′ (xˆa) (5.16)
Observing equation (5.16), we can see that, in an interior solution, the logic which was
present in (5.14) still applies, with the difference that w2 also contributes to the marginal
benefit. This means that, in opposition to what happens in vn, there is the possibility that
the Government has the ability to influence x∗a. Assuming that (5.16) has a solution, and
applying the same arguments as before, and the fact that, because of the bound on pa and
the absence of bound on c, va must eventually decrease, we can conclude that:
7
x∗a = max {x, xˆa} (5.17)
Having solved these two sub-problems, the physician should compare the two obtained
maxima. Let us define vm (x) = w1 +pa (x)w2 and vu (x) = pa (x)αb−c (x), respectively, the
monetary and non-monetary parts of the physician’s utility, that is, va (x) = vm (x) + vu (x).
It is useful to define ∆v (xn, xa) = vn (xn) − vu (xa), the difference in non-monetary utility
the physician gets when the patient does not adhere and adheres, and the effort levels chosen
are xn and xa, respectively. The physician’s optimal effort level, x
∗, is x∗a whenever:
7As c is increasing and convex, limx→∞ c (x) = +∞.
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vm (x
∗
a(w)) ≥ ∆v (x∗n, x∗a (w)) (5.18)
Equation (5.18) says that, if the Government wants to induce adherence, it has to pay
enough to the physician, so that she prefers to exert effort level x∗a. More specifically, the
expected wage the physician receives must be at least as high as the difference between the
optimal physician’s utility when the patient does not adhere and the optimal physician’s
non-monetary utility when the patient adheres. This comparison leads us to analyse some
different cases separately, which we do in Section 5.3.
5.2.4 Government
The Government is aware of the way it can influence what happens in society. In the end,
as it knows both the patient’s and the physician’s decisions, it can decide, when possible,
what is the effort level chosen and the adherence decision, by selecting the appropriate w1
and w2. As, for some w’s, the Government induces adherence and, for others, it does not,
(5.11) may be rewritten as:
s (w) =
 sn = un (x
∗
n) + vn (x
∗
n)− l , vm (x∗a (w)) < ∆v (x∗n, x∗a (w))
sa (w) = ua (x
∗
a (w)) + vu (x
∗
a(w))− λ (w1 + pa (x∗a (w))w2) , vm (x∗a (w)) ≥ ∆v (x∗n, x∗a (w))
(5.19)
Notice that the Government is incapable of indirectly influencing the value of the social
utility when there is no adherence, which means it should focus on sa (w) when it is choosing
w1 and w2.
If, with no Government intervention, society is better off without adherence, then w∗1 =
w∗2 = 0. This is because forcing adherence would lower the non-monetary social utility and
still generate a monetary cost. Otherwise, depending on the level of tax distortion, it may
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be optimal for the Government to induce adherence with positive wages. In the latter case,
the Government should find the maximum of sa (w) and compare it to sn.
If there was no cost of collecting taxes, then the Government would simply pay the
physician the amount needed for her to exert the socially optimal effort level. However, the
presence of λ in the model forces the Government to compare the optimal utilities of the
patient and physician in case of adherence and non-adherence. Let us define ∆u+v (xn, xa) =
(ua (xa) + vu (xa)) − (un (xn) + vn (xn)). Then, it is socially optimal that the Government
induces adherence whenever λ ≤ λ¯, with:
λ¯ =
∆u+v (x
∗
n, x
∗
a (w
∗)) + l
w∗1 + pa (x∗a (w∗))w
∗
2
(5.20)
Equation (5.20) tells us that the higher the difference between non-monetary social util-
ities when there is adherence and not, the higher the maximum tax distortion that makes
adherence socially optimal. On the other hand, the higher the payment the physician needs
to induce adherence, the lower this threshold is. The social cost of non-adherence increases
it.
5.3 Equilibria
In this section, we study the possible equilibria, for each combination of parameters that
produce situations which require different types of analysis.
5.3.1 First Best
To have a reference point, it is useful to study what would be socially optimal if the Gov-
ernment could decide the actions of all agents. In such situation, both wFB1 and w
FB
2 would
be zero, because payments to the physician have a social burden and generate no net benefit
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to society.8
We have to compare two possible situations, adherence and non-adherence. Let us define
sFB (d, x) as the first best social utility function when the patient makes decision d and the
physician exerts effort level x. We then have:
sFB (d, x) =
 s
FB
n (x) = (1 + α) bpn (x)− c (x)− l , d = n
sFBa (x) = (1 + α) bpa (x)− c (x)− k , d = a
(5.21)
If, after fixing l, k is left unbounded, there are situations in which we have non-adherence
in the first best. However, the goal of our paper is to study the payment mechanisms that
induce adherence. Hence, we assume k ≤ l, which assures that, in the first best, the patient
always adheres. In fact, notice that, if this is the case, sFBa is not lower than s
FB
n for all
effort levels. The first best effort level, xFB, if positive, is then defined by the following first
order condition:
(1 + α) bp′a (x) = c
′ (x) (5.22)
As we want to focus on the impact of the effort exerted by the physician in the patient’s
adherence decision and health status, we assume the following, which is enough to guarantee
that xFB > 0:
(1 + α) bp′a (0) > c
′ (0) (5.23)
Assumption (5.23) states that, at a zero effort level, the social marginal benefit of in-
creasing it is higher than its social marginal cost. The concavity of sFBa and the fact that
the marginal effort cost eventually becomes higher than the marginal benefit imply that the
first best effort is positive and unique. In order to make clear the meaning of (5.22), let us
8FB stands for first best.
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state a result about xˆa, as defined in (5.16):
Proposition 1. The optimal effort level chosen by the physician is increasing in the im-
provement bonus (w2).
Proof. See Appendix E.
Proposition 1 says that, as w2 goes up, so does x
∗
a. When w2 = b, the optimal effort level
coincides with the first best one. This is because, when the physician makes her decision, she
ignores the positive externality she creates on the patient. A payment in case of adherence
equal to the benefit the patient gets in case of improvement aligns the physician’s incentives
with the ones society has when there is no tax distortion. In addition, notice that w∗2 ≤ b,
because paying an improvement bonus higher than the one that leads to the first best implies
a lower social non-monetary utility and a higher expected payment than the ones verified
when w2 = b. Combining all of these, we can see that the increase of w2 has two effects:
both the non-monetary social utility and the expected payment increase.9 When the tax
distortion is low, the first effect dominates, which leads to a high improvement bonus and
an effort level close to the first best one. Otherwise, it is the second effect that dominates,
implying a low improvement bonus, and, therefore, an effort level distant from what would
be chosen in the first best. As we shall see in the next sections, the first best optimal effort
level is only attained when λ = 0, meaning that, unless there is no cost in redistributing
money, the non-monetary social utility is always lower than it could be.
5.3.2 The patient always adheres
The first situation we are going to study is the one in which (pa − pn) (0) b ≥ k. In this
case, as pa − pn is an increasing function, the patient prefers to adhere for any effort level
9Notice that sFBa is concave.
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exerted by the physician, that is, d∗ = a.10 This could happen for three reasons: either the
adherence cost, k, is very low; or the patient highly benefits from seeing his health status
improve; or, even when the physician exerts no effort, the probability of the patient’s health
status improving is significantly higher when he adheres. Figure 5.2 illustrates the patient’s
decision in this case: adhering is so beneficial to him that, even if the physician exerts no
effort, he prefers to incur in the adherence cost and adhere.
x
un
ua
x
u
Figure 5.2: Patient’s utility functions when x = 0
The physician does not need to exert any effort to make the patient adhere but, as she
is altruistic, her optimal effort level may be positive. Her decision is given by (5.17), with
x = 0. The Government does not need to induce adherence, but it may decide to pay positive
wages if the socially optimal effort level is higher than the one the physician would choose
by herself. That is, its utility function is reduced to the second branch of (5.19).
In this situation, no positive adherence bonus is paid in equilibrium, that is, w∗1 = 0. This
happens because w1 is a constant in (5.13) and, therefore, does not have the power to change
x∗a, only to increase va (x
∗
a). That is, in the perspective of the Government, the only role w1
plays is making adherence more attractive to the physician. As adherence is guaranteed, w1
serves no purpose and, as its collection is costly, its optimal level is 0. Therefore, we only
10From (5.3), (pa − pn)′ (x) ≥ 0,∀x ≥ 0.
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need to focus on one of the Government’s decision variables, w2.
Let us define the physician’s optimal effort level when she receives no bonuses, among
the ones which induce adherence, as xIa. If x
I
a = 0, the physician is reluctant, without a
monetary compensation, to make any effort, which may happen because she is not very
altruistic, the effort cost is high, or the impact of effort on the probability of the patient’s
health status improving or the benefit of this happening is low. In this case, small values
of w2 do not change the physician’s decision, which means they are never optimal for the
Government.11 Hence, in this case, there is a minimum value of w2, w2, which is a possible
optimal improvement bonus. If xIa > 0, w2 = 0, because, even with no bonuses, the physician
is choosing an interior solution, which is affected by any positive w2. Figure 5.3 illustrates
the effect w2 has on the optimal effort level chosen by the physician. In Figure 5.3a, the
Government only considers improvement bonuses in {0} ∪ [w2, b], whereas in Figure 5.3b,
the set of possible equilibrium values for w2 is [0, b]. In the former case, the physician is
not naturally inclined to make a big effort, in opposition to what happens in the latter. In
general, w2 depends negatively on the benefit generated by the improvement of the patient’s
health status and on the altruism level of the physician. In fact, if b or α are low, the
physician does not care too much about the patient’s improvement, thus needing a high
monetary incentive to make an effort.
The Government has to choose the optimal w2, knowing it has an implication on the
money it needs to collect and on the effort level chosen by the physician and, consequently,
on the physician’s and patient’s utilities. Figure 5.4 shows what may happen, depending on
λ. When λ = 0, there is no cost in collecting the funds to pay for the physician’s bonuses,
which may, therefore, be as high as needed.12 Thus, in this situation, the Government simply
11There is one case in which xIa = 0 and any positive w2 increases the optimal effort level: when x
I
a = 0
is the unconstrained maximizer of va and not just the maximizer of va subject to x ≥ 0.
12Notice that, if λ = 0, the sum of the physician’s and taxpayers’ utilities, net of the tax collection cost,
is the same for any (w1, w2).
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Figure 5.3: Physician’s utility function when x = 0
chooses w∗2 = b which leads the physician to choose x
FB and the sum of the patient’s and
physician’s utilities attains its maximum. However, when λ > 0, there is a trade-off in the
choice of w2, as high values of w2 lead to a high effort level, but also to a high tax collection
cost. In these cases, w2 is never in
]
0, w2
[
, as they imply the same effort level as w2 = 0
and a higher tax collection cost. When λ is low enough, there are values of w2 higher than
w2 which generate a higher social utility than the one that results from paying no treatment
bonus. However, if λ is higher or equal to a cut-off value, λ, the collection of taxes needed
to foster high effort levels is so high, that it is better to simply not pay anything to the
physician and let her choose xIa.
If λ ≥ λ, the Government’s decision is w∗2 = 0. But, otherwise, its characterisation is
more complex. In this case, the physician is choosing an effort level different from xIa, which
means (5.16) is respected. Also, the Government chooses a positive w2 and the first-order
condition for the second branch of (5.19) is fulfilled (for an easier reading, we omit the
arguments):
p
′
ax
∗
a
′
w2
b+ x∗a
′
w2
(
p
′
aαb− c
′
)
= λ
(
p
′
ax
∗
a
′
w2
w2 + pa
)
(5.24)
The left hand side of equation (5.24) is the marginal benefit of increasing w2: when
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Figure 5.4: Government’s utility function when x = 0 or x > 0, va
(
xIa
) ≥ vn (x∗n) and
(1 + α) bp′a (x) ≥ c′ (x)
w2 increases, so do the patient’s and physician’s non-monetary utilities, because the effort
level becomes higher. The right hand side is the marginal cost of increasing w2: when w2
increases, the probability of the payment occurring goes up and so does the value paid in
case of improvement of the patient’s health status, and both these effects are weighted by
the tax distortion. Introducing (5.16) into (5.24), we obtain the following:
w∗2 =
b
1 + λ
− λ
1 + λ
pa (x
∗
a (w
∗))
p′a (x
∗
a (w
∗))x∗a′ (w∗)
(5.25)
Although (5.25) does not give us a closed solution to w∗2, it helps us understand the
impact the parameters of the model have on it. We already knew that w∗2 is not greater than
b, but now we can add that it never exceeds b
1+λ
. As b or α increase, so does w∗2, because
the higher the benefit associated with the improvement of the patient’s health status, the
more valuable it is for society that the patient gets better and, therefore, the higher the
value of w2 the Government is willing to pay to induce the physician to exert a high effort
level. On the other hand, if λ increases, then it is more costly to transfer money between
taxpayers and the physician, which implies a lower value of w∗2. Proposition 2 summarises
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the Government’s decision in the conditions of this subsection.
Proposition 2. When the patient adheres to the treatment for any effort level chosen by
the physician, the following statements are true:
1. The optimal adherence bonus, w∗1, is 0.
2. The optimal improvement bonus, w∗2, is in {0} ∪
[
w2, b
]
, where w2 ∈ [0, b] decreases
with b and α.
3. When there is no tax distortion, that is, when λ = 0, w∗2 = b and the optimal effort
level, x∗, is xFB.
4. x∗ and w∗2 increase with b and α and decreases with λ.
Proof. See Appendix E.
In this particular situation, the single objective is the optimal effort to generate better
outcome (but not adherence, since it is already guaranteed) and w2 is the instrument to
guide decisions.
5.3.3 The patient may adhere or not
We now focus on the situation in which (pa − pn) (0)b < k, that is, when a zero effort level will
induce non-adherence. In this case, the physician needs to exert at least a certain positive
effort level in order to lead the patient to adhere. This means that w∗1 may be positive and,
therefore, in equilibrium, v may depend on both bonuses.
5.3.3.1 The physician always prefers adherence
It is possible that, even if the patient considers non-adherence, the physician does not.
That is, even receiving no bonuses, the optimal effort level of the physician is such that
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the patient adheres. If we define x∗a (w1, w2) as the physician’s optimal effort level when
the adherence and improvement bonuses are, respectively, w1 and w2, this is the case when
va
(
xIa
) ≥ vn (x∗n), or ∆v (x∗n, xIa) ≤ 0. Once again, the Government does not need to induce
adherence and w∗1 = 0. As for w
∗
2, it is characterised much in the same way as in the previous
section. Specifically, we have a single objective (x) and one instrument (w2).
In opposition to what happens in the previous section, the patient does need to be
convinced to adhere. If the physician exerts no effort at all, the adherence cost is high
enough so that the patient prefers not to adhere. However, from a certain effort level on, the
increase in the probability of improvement of the patient’s health status caused by adherence
makes the patient want to adhere. This is depicted in Figure 5.5.
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Figure 5.5: Patient’s utility functions when x > 0
As for the physician, although knowing that effort levels below x induce non-adherence,
she never chooses them, because she is better off when there is adherence. This happens
because she highly benefits from the improvement of the patient’s health status, or because
the difference in the probability of this improvement occurring when the patient adheres and
does not is very high. In this case, even if, with w2 = 0, adherence is guaranteed, w2 may
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still be positive. As in the previous section, when the physician is very eager to contribute
to the improvement of the patient’s health status, she decides for an effort level higher than
x even when she receives no bonus. Otherwise, when w2 = 0, she chooses x, the minimum
effort level that leads to adherence, and w2 > 0. The situation is similar to the one in the
previous section, but now x > 0. Figure 5.6 illustrates the physician’s decision.
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w2>w2
vn
vw2=0
vw2=w2
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∗
w2=w2
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(b) w2 = 0
Figure 5.6: Physician’s utility function when x > 0 and ∆v
(
x∗n, x
I
a
) ≤ 0
In the perspective of the Government, almost everything is the same as in the previous
section. When w2 ∈
[
0, w2
]
, the physician’s decision may not be changed and, in the
presence of λ > 0, the only possible optimal value for w2 in this interval is 0. For w2 > w2,
the physician chooses an interior optimal effort level, which, in the previous section, meant
that, if λ is low enough, social utility is increasing at w2. However, when x > 0, it may
happen that (1 + α) bp′a (x) < c
′ (x). If this is the case, the social marginal benefit of x
is lower than the correspondent social marginal cost and, as the difference between this
marginal benefit and marginal cost is decreasing in the effort level, x is socially better than
any effort level higher than it. In this situation, the Government decision is straightforward:
whatever the value of λ, the best decision is to pay no bonuses whatsoever. In the more
interesting case, which happens when (1 + α) bp′a (x) ≥ c′ (x), the Government prefers to
pay a positive improvement bonus when the tax collection cost is low enough, but, when
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collecting taxes becomes too costly, w∗2 = 0. Figure 5.4 applies to this case. In the cases
in which w∗2 > 0, as the social utility function suffers no changes relatively to the previous
section, w∗2 is still characterised by (5.25). Finally, in the most interesting case, all the
conclusions in Proposition 2 are still valid.
Proposition 3. When the physician always prefers adherence to non-adherence, and the
social marginal benefit of x is not lower than its social marginal cost, all statements in
Proposition 2 are true.
Proof. See Appendix E.
5.3.3.2 The physician may prefer non-adherence
Finally, we are left with the case in which not only does the patient need to be convinced
to turn to the adherence side, but so does the physician. This happens when va
(
xIa
)
<
vn (x
∗
n), or ∆v (x
∗
n, x
∗
aI) > 0, that is, when paying no bonuses to the physician leads her to
exert an effort which induces non-adherence. This is the most interesting case because the
Government now has two objectives to balance: assure adherence (if that is socially optimal)
and guarantee that the optimal effort level is chosen by the physician. And this, as we will
see, makes room for a positive w∗1.
When the Government chooses the bonuses to induce adherence, he may leave the physi-
cian indifferent between adherence and non-adherence (and, in this case, we assume that
adherence is attained) or strictly preferring adherence. Before continuing, let us state an
important result:
Proposition 4. If (pa (x)− pn (x)) b < k, va
(
xIa
)
< vn (x
∗
n) and x
∗ > x, then va (x∗) >
vn (x
∗
n).
Proof. See Appendix E.
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Proposition 4 has more implications than it may seem. It tells us not only that, if the
physician is optimally exerting an effort higher than x, she must be strictly better off with
adherence, but also that, when she is indifferent between adherence and non-adherence, she
exerts x. It is still possible that the physician is exerting x and strictly preferring adherence,
but this is never socially optimal. This is because, in this case, it is possible to pay less to the
physician, still assuring that she exerts x, which does not change the non-monetary utilities
of the patient and the physician and reduces the cost of collecting taxes. Hence, we get that,
in equilibrium, either the physician is exerting x and is indifferent between non-adherence
and adherence, or is exerting a higher effort level and strictly prefers adherence.
Let us focus on the former situation. The utility of the physician, if she gets no bonuses
and chooses to induce non-adherence is vn (x
∗
n). But, if she is paid enough to be indifferent
between adherence and non-adherence, her non-monetary utility is vu (x). This means that
her expected total bonus, w∗1 + pa (x)w
∗
2, has to make up for the difference between these
two utility levels. Formally, in this type of equilibrium, (w∗1, w
∗
2) belongs to the following set:
A =
{
(w1, w2) ∈
(
R+0
)2
: w1 + pa (x)w2 = ∆v (x
∗
n, x)
}
(5.26)
Analysing (5.26), we can see that, in this type of equilibrium, w1 and w2 are substitutes,
that is, if the Government decides to increase one of them, it has to decrease the other, so
that the total expected bonus is still in A. So, if it is socially optimal that the Government
simply induces adherence, assuring that the physician exerts the minimum effort that leads
to it, the way it designs the payment scheme, defining the adherence and improvement
bonus, does not make much difference, as long as adherence is guaranteed. In this case, both
bonuses have the same role: convince the physician to go that extra mile which assures that
the patient adheres. In what refers to the adherence bonus, this is expected, because that
is the main reason for its existence. But the improvement bonus, in this case, works like a
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Figure 5.7: Physician’s utility function when x > 0 and ∆v
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I
a
) ≤ 0
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decoy: it is meant to attract the physician to x, because she knows that the probability of
improvement is higher with x than with x∗n. Figure 5.7a illustrates this type of equilibrium.
When (w1, w2) = (0, 0) and, more generally, when w1 + pa (x)w2 < ∆v (x
∗
n, x), the best the
physician can do is to exert x∗n and the patient does not adhere. To make sure that adherence
occurs, expecting to pay as little as possible, the Government has several options. Three of
them are depicted in the figure: one in which only an adherence bonus exists, one in which
only an improvement bonus exist, and one in which there is a combination of both bonuses.
Although they influence the physician’s utility function in different ways, their impact is the
same: in equilibrium, x∗ = x. We may still add that there are maximum levels of w1 and w2
the Government may choose when trying to induce this type of equilibrium, respectively:
w˜1 = ∆v
(
x∗n, x
I
a
)
(5.27)
w˜2 =
∆v
(
x∗n, x
I
a
)
pa (x)
(5.28)
Both of them depend positively on ∆v
(
x∗n, x
I
a
)
because the more comfortable the physi-
cian is with non-adherence, the more the Government has to spend to convince her to make
an effort which assures adherence. The maximum improvement bonus, w˜2, depends neg-
atively on pa (x) because, in opposition to what happens with the adherence bonus, its
payment is probabilistic and, the more probable it is, the lower it needs to be. Notice that
w˜1 ≤ w˜2 because they both correspond to situations in which the one of the bonus is given
and, while w1 is paid with certainty, w2 may be or not.
In the other type of equilibrium that may arise, the Government pays the physician not
only to induce adherence, but also to assure the effort level is higher than the minimum
that guarantees it. And, in this case, the role for w1 is lost and its optimal level is 0. This
happens because it does not change the effort level chosen by the physician, just her utility.
Therefore, if there was an equilibrium of this type, in which the physician strictly prefers
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adherence, and w∗1 is positive, w1 could be reduced in a way that would not change the
physician’s decision and the cost of collecting taxes would decrease, hence benefiting society.
We are thus left with the study of w∗2.
Let us define w2 in this context as the highest value w
∗
2 may be so that the physician still
chooses x. Note that w2 ≥ w˜2. No improvement bonus in
]
w˜2, w2
]
is ever socially optimal
because it leads to the same effort level as w˜2 and to a higher cost of collecting taxes. Hence,
the optimal w2 chosen by the Government is higher than w2 (the highest one which leads to
an effort of x) and lower or equal to b (the one that leads to the first best effort level). The
set of optimal bonus packs the Government may choose in this type of equilibrium is then:
B =
{
(w1, w2) ∈
(
R+0
)2
: w1 = 0 ∧ w2 < w2 ≤ b
}
(5.29)
Figure 5.7b illustrates this type of equilibrium. Gathering both types of equilibrium, we
can define the optimal adherence bonus, given the improvement bonus chosen. If w2 ≤ w˜2,
only the first type of equilibrium is possible, and w∗1 is such that (w
∗
1, w2) ∈ A. Otherwise,
only the second type of equilibrium is possible and w∗1 = 0. In sum, we have:
w∗1 (w2) =
 ∆v (x
∗
n, x)− pa (x)w2 , w2 ≤ w˜2
0 , w2 > w˜2
(5.30)
Figure 5.8 shows what may be the optimal choices of the Government when it is trying
to induce adherence. In A, we have w1 = w
∗
1 (w2), the physician is indifferent between
choosing x∗n and x and the Government is indifferent between all points in the line segment
(because all imply the same effort level and expected payment). In B, w1 = 0 and the
physician is choosing an effort level higher than x. If there were no cost of collecting taxes,
the Government would simply select point (0, b) which would induce the first best effort level
and adherence. However, taxes are (in general) costly which means the Government has to
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settle with a social utility lower than the first best one, paying an improvement bonus lower
than b. As we shall see, the higher the cost of collecting taxes, the more attractive A is,
relative to B.
w˜1
w˜2
w2
b
O
A
B
w1
w2
Figure 5.8: Possible optimal bonus packs which induce adherence when x > 0 and
∆v
(
x∗n, x
I
a
) ≤ 0
In Figure 5.9, the horizontal axis is relative only to w2, even though w1 may also affect the
Government’s utility. This is because w1 is assumed to be w
∗
1 (w2). That is, for each w2 the
Government may possible choose, only the optimal w1 that corresponds to it is considered.
In this figure, we may see, in the case in which (1 + α) bp′a (x) ≥ c′ (x) (that is, when the
socially optimal effort level is higher than x), the impact λ has on the equilibria attained.
For any λ, if w2 ≤ w˜2, it is combined with w∗1 (w2), the expected payment to the physician is
always the same and she always chooses x, which means the Government’s utility is constant.
If w2 ∈
]
w˜2, w2
]
, w∗1 = 0 and the physician is still choosing x. Hence, the higher the w2 in this
interval, the lower the Government’s utility. Finally, if w2 > w2, w
∗
1 = 0 and the physician is
choosing an effort level higher than x. If collecting money is costless, the Government simply
pays the physician what she needs (b) to choose the first best effort level. However, as λ
increases, it becomes more and more difficult for the Government to induce high effort levels.
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Eventually, at high levels of λ, paying the physician only to induce adherence or not paying
anything at all and let non-adherence be a reality is preferrable to paying her to make an
effort higher than x. In Figure 5.9, we depict a situation in which there is a transition from
effort levels higher than x to x to x∗n. When λ reaches a first cut-off level, λ, inducing high
effort levels is worse than inducing x, but the latter is still preferrable to not paying anything
to the physician. However, when λ reaches a second cut-off level, λ, collecting taxes is so
costly that the Government should just abstain from intervening and give up from inducing
adherence.
w˜2 w2 w
∗
2
0<λ<λ
b
sn
sλ=0a
s0<λ<λa
sλ=λa
sλ<λ<λas
λ=λ
a
w∗2
λ≤λ≤λ
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s
Figure 5.9: Government’s utility function when x > 0, va
(
xIa
)
< vn (x
∗
n) and
(1 + α) bp′a (x) ≥ c′ (x)
As for the characterisation of w∗2 when λ < λ, the same reasoning used in Subsection
5.3.2 applies: both the physician and the Government are choosing interior solutions, and
we may insert (5.16) in (5.24) to get (5.25). In Proposition 5, we have a description of the
Government’s decision in the conditions of this subsection.
Proposition 5. When the physician does not induce adherence in the absence of bonuses
and the social marginal benefit of x is not lower than its social marginal cost, the following
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statements are true:
1. When the tax distortion is low, the optimal adherence bonus, w∗1, is 0, and the optimal
improvement bonus, w∗2, is in
]
w2, b
]
, where w2 ∈ [0, b[ decreases with α and b and
increases with k.
2. When the tax distortion is high, the optimal adherence and improvement bonuses are
0 and there is no adherence.
3. When the tax distortion is moderate, we may have multiple equilibria, in which the
distribution of bonuses is the same, as long as the expected payment to the physician
does not change.
Proof. See Appendix E.
5.4 Discussion
Payment mechanisms play an important role in aligning the physician’s incentives with the
ones society has. The most common mechanisms of physician payments are salary, FFS,
capitation, and P4P (Grignon et al., 2002). The remuneration of a physician can mix one or
more type of payments as in the case of the UK, the US (Kazungu et al., 2018), and Portugal
(Simo˜es et al., 2017). Briefly, under salary the physicians are paid an annual amount to work
a set number of hours per week per year (Gosden et al., 2000). On the other hand, capitation
reimburses practices on the basis of a list of potential users and FFS reimburses each item of
service provided and occurs after care has been provided (Gosden et al., 2000). As for P4P,
it rewards or penalise health care providers according to their performance on measures of
quality.
These payment mechanisms have been used by Governments to improve the delivery of
evidence-based care and health outcomes (Ettner, Schoenbaum and Williams, 2012; WHO,
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2014). In mental health, evidence suggests that continuous care should be provided in order
to enhance and monitor adherence (Balon, 2002). However, it is not clear how policy-makers
can improve adherence using payment mechanisms.
In our model it is possible to improve a mental health patient status through a payment
mechanism. That is, we introduce two types of payment mechanisms: an adherence bonus
(w1) which is received by the physician if the patient adheres to the treatment; and an
improvement bonus (w2) which is paid if the patient’s health status improves. Our results
show that what is relevant is not the type of incentives that are in place but how hard is
to collect money from taxpayers. Specifically, and analysing the situation in which patient
may not adhere and the physician may prefer non-adherence, the Government cannot induce
adherence if collecting taxes is too costly. On the other hand, if the cost of collecting taxes is
moderate then it is not relevant the type of payment mechanisms that are in place because
it is possible to induce adherence only by using the adherence bonus, or the improvement
bonus, or a combination of both. When the cost of collecting taxes is low, the Government
finds optimal a positive improvement bonus and a zero adherence bonus. This last result
applies when the patient always adheres or when he may adhere or not but the physician
always prefers adherence.
The adherence bonus can be seen as a proxy of FFS while the improvement bonus can
be assumed as a P4P mechanism. Despite the implementation of financial incentives to the
physicians being country specific, most studies report a combination of FFS and P4P since
it is a way of overcoming some of the weaknesses of those payment mechanisms (Conrad,
2015). It is discussed that FFS per se induces high volume namely in practices that provide
a high net income per unit of service. However, if FFS is complemented with P4P incentives
it may improve quality of care (Conrad, 2015).
Specifically on mental health, in Part I, Chapter 1, we have described several reim-
bursement models tested in mental health but with limited success, and therefore, making
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evidence poorly conclusive about which system functions best for mental health. Recently,
Perelman et al. (2017a) propose an innovative payment model for mental health providers
by incentivising best practices. Based on theoretical considerations, the authors argue that
FFS should be opted when there is evidence that a specific service is a good practice. On
the other hand, capitation and bundle payments are favoured as they promote efficiency,
continuity care, and prevention but the authors complemented these schemes with P4P.
Particularly, and for the Portuguese mental health system, authors suggest the inclusion of
a P4P indicator and an additional fee for each follow-up consultation to be paid to general
practitioners (Perelman et al., 2018). However, based on our results and given the tight
budgets Portugal has been facing, we believe that what matters is to keep the expected pay-
ment of physicians constant and not how the incentives are provided to them. The choice
between which payment mechanism prevails will rely on other reasons such as administrative
simplicity.
Additionally, the literature has been arguing that a successful P4P scheme depends on
the ability to measure performance (Ettner, Schoenbaum and Williams, 2012). In cases
in which assessing performance is hard, and Governments face tight budgets, our model
suggests that policy-makers can rely on the FFS payment instead of the P4P. It is worth
mentioning that innovative measures to evaluate and improve quality of mental health care
are being implemented in several countries (Kilbourne et al., 2018).
Our results can be tested empirically. Particularly, the physician’s effort level can be
proxied by indicators that assess the degree of involvement of the physician in patient’s
treatment such as the number of medical procedures. Regarding patient’s adherence cost, we
can use as proxy the number of prescriptions not filled. To assess the patient’s improvement
health status several patient health questionnaires are available namely the PHQ-9 or the
Health of the Nation Outcome Scales (HoNOS). Finally, and regarding to the degree of
altruism, Jack (2005) suggests that physicians with higher values of α can be the ones that
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admit more patients for secondary care since they perceive a great benefit of admission.
Overall, when adherence is not attractive to patients and physicians, what matters is not
the payment mechanism itself but how costly it is to collect money from taxpayers. Hence,
when Governments face tight budgets, policy-makers can choose the payment mechanism
that best suits mental health needs knowing that if assessing performance is hard, FFS can
be the optimal option.
It is worth highlighting that the optimal adherence and improvement bonuses decrease
with the level of altruism and with the benefit that the patient gets from improving. This
result emphasises the work of Godager and Wiesen (2013), where authors found evidence of
different levels of altruism towards patient’s health benefit using behavioural data.
Finally, in our model, the first-best is never attained unless there is no tax distortion.
The first-best is characterised by a P4P scheme in which an optimal adherence bonus of zero
and an improvement bonus equal to the benefit that the patient gets if his health status
improves.
5.5 Further Research
In our model we consider that adherence, when not attractive, can be induced through a
payment mechanism provided to the physician. However, the patient also bears an adherence
cost (k) which will determine the threshold level x. Therefore, we can extend our model to
allow a scheme which includes payments to both the patient and physician.13 This extension
would allow us to compare the impact of each type of payment and find out if just one of
them or a combination of both should be put in practice.
Moreover, and follow the work performed by Fichera et al. (2018), we can extend our
model to consider the probability of improving depends not only on the physician’s effort
13One possible way is to reduce the value of co-payments.
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but also on the patient’s effort.
5.6 Conclusion
In this paper we design a model to answer to the question: “Is it possible to improve a
mental health patient status when treatment non-adherence is a possibility through payment
mechanisms?”. Our model considers a mental health patient, a semi-altruistic physician and
an utilitarian Government. The patient may not adhere to the treatment and the physician’s
payment depends not only on the patient’s adherence but also on the patient’s health status.
That is, we introduce two types of payments: an adherence bonus, w1, if the patient adheres
to the treatment; and an improvement bonus, w2, if the patient’s health status improves.
The adherence bonus can be seen as a proxy of FFS while the improvement bonus can be
assumed as P4P mechanism.
We conclude that, if adherence is not guarantee since the patient may not adhere and
the physician may prefer non-adherence, the optimal bonuses depend on how costly it is to
collect money from taxpayers. Specifically, for a high level of tax distortion, the Government
has no saying on the final outcome and should refrain from collecting taxes. If the level of
tax distortion is moderate, then what matters is not the payment mechanism per se as long
as the expected payment to the physician does not change. That is, it is possible to achieve
the same result combining both bonuses or only using one of them. When tax distortion is
low, the optimal adherence bonus is zero and the improvement bonus depends negatively on
the level of altruism and with the benefit that patient gets from improving.
In our model the first-best is characterised by an optimal adherence bonus of zero and an
improvement bonus equal to the benefit that the patient gets if his health status improves.
However, the first-best is never attained unless there is no tax distortion.
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Part III
Socio-economic determinants of
mental health
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Chapter 6
Young, well-educated and
unemployed: A risky combination for
perceived mental health?1
6.1 Introduction
The mental health status of an individual is a result of a sequence of events that occur in
various domains throughout his live. Risk factors are characteristics which not only increase
the likelihood of developing a mental health problem, but can also worsen the burden of
existing conditions. These may comprise individual characteristics, family characteristics
and functioning, school context, community and cultural factors and stressful life events,
such as unemployment (OECD, 2012b). Indeed, unemployment is associated with lower
income, earnings instability, lower life-satisfaction, social stigma, loss of self-esteem and
social contacts, lower physical and mental activity and under-use of one’s skills (Artazcoz
et al., 2004; OECD, 2012b). All these factors have a negative impact on mental health
1The co-authors of this paper are Ana Moura, Adriana Loureiro, Paula Santana and Pedro Pita Barros.
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status since they contribute to depression and anxiety. In addition, the young unemployed
people have a higher risk in developing a mental health disorder when compared to the young
people who remain employed (WHO, 2011a). Therefore the unemployed, namely the young
unemployed, are a specially vulnerable group and have lower levels of mental health than
the general population (Artazcoz et al., 2004).
Due to the recent global economic and financial crisis, unemployment rates, namely
the youth unemployment ones, have increased significantly.2 These economic developments
raised additional interest on the impact of youth unemployment on mental health status.
The recent report on youth unemployment issued by the ILO (ILO, 2015), states that the
global youth unemployment rate increased from 11.7% in 2007 to 13% in 2010. Despite this
fast increase the rate settled at 13% between 2012 and 2014 but it is expected to slightly raise
to 13.1% in 2015 (ILO, 2015). In the euro area, the unemployment rate among individuals
under 25 amounted to 23% in 2014 (Banerji et al., 2014).
Despite the improvements at the aggregate level between 2012 and 2014, youth unemploy-
ment rate still exceeded 30% in several European countries such as in Greece (52,4%), Italy
(42,7%), Portugal (34,8%), and Spain (53,2%) (ILO, 2015). Due to the crisis, some of these
countries are still undergoing austerity adjustments. According to ILO, these adjustments
prove to have harmful consequences for youth (ILO, 2015).
It is worth highlighting that the European Commission considers youth unemployment
a priority and has taken action by adopting a set of measures aimed at fighting its trend
(Banerji et al., 2014; EC, 2019).
Portugal provides the ideal framework to assess the link between youth unemployment
and mental health status as it has been continuously among the worst performers in the
European Union in terms of youth unemployment.
2The youth unemployment rate is defined as the number of unemployed youth (typically between 15 and
24 years old) divided by the youth labour force.
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Using data from a survey carried out in 2014 and 2015 among individuals living in the
Lisbon area, we unveil a strong negative relationship between unemployment and mental
health for individuals under 35. The magnitude of this relationship increases with the level
of education of the individual. This may reflect the unmet expectations of young individuals
who completed more years of schooling, as far as labour market outcomes are concerned, a
conjecture deserving future exploration.
This study is integrated in the research project SMAILE (Study on Mental health -
Assessment of the Impact of Local and Economic conditioners) which aims to assess the
effect of environmental and territorial health determinants on the mental health and on the
use of mental health services in times of social and economic crises.
The remainder of this chapter is as follows. The next section briefly reviews the literature.
Section 6.3 presents the dataset used throughout our analysis, while the methodological
approach is described in Section 6.4. Section 6.5 presents the main results of our analysis,
which are then discussed in Section 6.6. Section 6.7 provides the limitations of our study.
Finally, Section 6.8 concludes.
6.2 Literature Review
The body of literature on the impact of unemployment on mental health is vast and a special
interest on the topic has recently been growing. A negative relationship between mental
health status and unemployment has long been established (Paul and Moser, 2009; Berchick
et al., 2012; OECD, 2012b; Farre´, Fasani and Mueller, 2018). Specifically, Huegaerts, Puig-
Barrachina and Vanroelen (2017) find that unemployed youth face a worse mental health
situation when compared to employed youth. More recent literature has focused on the
evolution of this relationship in light on the current economic and financial crisis, as well
as on the identification of protective socio-economic factors that can ease the impact of
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unemployment on mental health (Berchick et al., 2012; Huegaerts, Puig-Barrachina and
Vanroelen, 2017).
As far as the relationship between unemployment and mental health is concerned, evi-
dence has shown that it was exacerbated by the economic crisis.
Two main theories have been put forward in the literature aimed at assessing for which
population groups is the impact produced by unemployment on mental health more negative.
On the one hand, we have the theory of role loss posing that those most affected from job
loss are the ones who are more privileged as far as job content and salary are concerned
(Ashforth, 2001). On the other hand, there are theories of general/differential susceptibility,
which state that people with few social and economic resources are those who suffer the most
from job loss (Syme, 1996). The rationale behind this theory relates to the idea that being
in a disadvantaged socio-economic position will exacerbate the negative effect produced by
unemployment on mental health (Backhans and Hemmingsson, 2011).
Other determinants of mental health include age, gender and socio-economic variables
such as education and income (Esteban et al., 2012; OECD, 2012b). In contrast with other
conditions, mental health diseases have an early onset at a median age of 14. By the age
of 24, 75% of all mental illnesses have already been developed (OECD, 2012b). According
to the last Portuguese epidemiological study, the 18-34 age group is more likely to develop
a mental health disease than the other age groups. The younger have a higher prevalence
(50.1%) of having at least one psychiatric disease (Almeida et al., 2013).
Men and women have different roles in society so that gender determines the susceptibility
and the exposure to certain mental health risk factors (WHO, 2002). According to the gender
roles hypothesis, gender differences should narrow as the roles of women and men converge
(Seedat et al., 2009). Epidemiological studies state that women are more likely to have
anxiety and humour diseases than men. However men are more prone to have both alcohol
and substance abuse diseases (Almeida et al., 2013).
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Finally, there is evidence that individuals with poorer mental health status have both
lower education and financial resources (OECD, 2012b). However, a recent study found that
population with higher education, along with unemployment, is a high context risk factor
for hospitalisation due to mental illness (Loureiro et al., 2015a).
Despite the fact that age, education, and unemployment per se have been associated with
mental health, to our best knowledge, no study as yet focused on the effect of the interac-
tion between these three variables. We propose to fill in this gap, by allowing the impact
of unemployment on perceived mental health to differ by age group and, within each age
group, to vary according to the education level of the individual. This allows to differentiate
the impact of unemployment on mental health according to certain characteristics of the
individuals, thus increasing the understanding of the dynamics of this relationship.
6.3 Data
A survey was carried out between August 2014 and February 2015, targeting the population
ageing 18 and older living in the municipalities of Amadora, Lisbon, Mafra and Oeiras. These
four municipalities were selected from the Great Lisbon Area and represent consolidated
urban areas areas (Lisbon), recent urban growth areas (Amadora and Oeiras) and rural areas
(Mafra), according to their distinct geographical and socioeconomic characteristics present
in Table F.1 in appendix F.1. This allows having a diversity of territorial backgrounds while
having a sufficient number of observations from each these territorial backgrounds. The
statistical population consists of 808,110 inhabitants (INE, 2012) among which was collected
data from 1,609 residents through simple random sample (estimated with a margin of error
of 3.21% and a confidence level of 99%).
This survey collected individual information on demographic characteristics (age and
gender); socioeconomic characteristics (education, professional status, marital status, house-
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hold financial situation and expenditure concerns); health information (diabetes, hyperten-
sion, BMI); behavioural characteristics (smoking, physical activity), and self-assessed mental
health status.
For the specific case of self-assessed mental health, it was measured by the mental health
and vitality scale (MHVS) on the version validated to Portuguese population of the Short
Form 36-item Health (SF-36v2) (Ferreira, Ferreira and Pereira, 2012). The SF-36 is a generic
health survey, which measures functional health and well-being from the individual’s view-
point. It consists of 36 questions and is widely used to assess health-related quality of life
(Ware and Sherbourne, 1992). More precisely, the MHVS ranges from 0 to 100, correspond-
ing to the situations in which the individual experiences total and no disability, respectively.
The MHVS was computed following the methodology proposed by Ware et al. (1993).
Additional information was gathered by the survey but it was not relevant for the purpose
of our analysis. A more detail analysis on the data of this survey can be found on the study
carried by Loureiro et al. (2015b) who used a multilevel approach.
A description of all the variables included in the model, their respective designations
and summary statistics is presented in Table F.2 in appendix F.1. Note that, though 1,609
individuals were surveyed, there were some missing values in the data and we ended up with
1,464 complete observations.
6.4 Methodology
Our dependent variable is the MHVS described in the previous section. Given that it can
be considered a continuous variable, we opted to use a multiple OLS regression model as a
means to assess the impact of being unemployed on the mental health of the individuals. The
OLS technique produces coefficients which are not only easy to interpret but also relatively
robust when compared to those of other techniques (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005).
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As far as the independent variables are concerned, our variable of interest is a binary
one, which takes value 1 in case the individual was unemployed when the survey was carried
out and value 0 otherwise (UNEMP).
We control for several other factors, which are likely to play a role in explaining indi-
vidual mental health. These include age, gender, education, household financial situation,
variables capturing physical health, among others. In addition, a variable indicating whether
the individual is retired or not (NRET ) was also included. While retired individuals are not
unemployed by definition, their mental health score is still affected by their individual char-
acteristics. Hence, by introducing NRET in the model we are able to use all the available
data, instead of excluding this group from the analysis.
Our approach consists in estimating the impact of unemployment on MHVS by intro-
ducing interaction terms between some of the key regressors, as a means to differentiate the
impact of unemployment on mental health according to certain individual characteristics,
namely gender, age and the level of education.
In our first model specification, we allow the effect produced by unemployment on mental
health to differ by education level. Hence, interaction terms between UNEMP, the variables
capturing the education level of individuals and NRET are introduced in the model as
regressors. Furthermore, we allow for unemployment to exert a distinct effect on the mental
health of men and women. In order to do this, an interaction between UNEMP, NRET
and the binary variable capturing the individuals’ gender is introduced in the model. The
corresponding equation is presented below.
MHV Si = α0 + α1 ∗ UNEMPi + α2 ∗NRETi + α3 ∗ Ωi + α4 ∗Υi + i (6.1)
, where Ω is a vector of the interaction terms and Υ is a vector of individual characteristics.
Table F.3 in appendix F.2 presents the variables comprised within this vector.
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As previously mentioned, literature suggests the association between unemployment and
mental health differs across age groups. In order to capture this effect, we divide our ob-
servations into age groups instead of considering only the two broad groups of retired and
non-retired individuals. We introduce interaction terms between UNEMP, the variables
capturing the education level of individuals and the age groups. Such approach allows us
to assess whether the impact of unemployment on mental health differs by age group and,
within each age group, whether it varies depending on the education level of the individual.
Similarly to what was done in model specification (6.1), we allow for the impact of unem-
ployment on mental health to vary according to gender and hence introduce an interaction
term between UNEMP, gender and the age groups. The corresponding model specification
is as follows.
MHV Si = α0+α1∗UNEMPi+α2∗Y OUNGi+α3∗ADULT1i+α4∗ADULT2i+α5∗Γi+α6∗Υi+i
(6.2)
, where Y OUNG, ADULT1 and ADULT2 are the variables corresponding to the age
groups, as defined in Table F.2. Individuals above 65 are set as reference group. Γ is a vector
containing the above-mentioned interaction terms. Table F.3 in appendix F.2 presents the
variables comprised within this vector.
It should be highlighted that we also regress both model specifications without considering
the interaction terms, which we call the restricted versions of equations (6.1) and (6.2). In
section 6.5 we present those results.
6.5 Results
The results from the estimation of equations (6.1) and (6.2) are presented in Table F.4 in
appendix F.3. The results of the restricted versions of both equations (6.1) and (6.2) are
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presented as models 1 and 3, respectively. The first column presents the results for the full
model, whereas the second column presents the results of a restricted model, in which the
variables that were found not to be statistically significant were recursively eliminated.
Before presenting the results from the model specifications, it is worth recalling that
our dependent variable, MHV S, ranges from 0 to 100. A higher score on the MHV S is
associated with a lower level of disability, meaning that a positive coefficient sign of a given
regressor is associated with a better mental health status. Conversely, a negative coefficient
is associated with a poorer mental health status.
According to model 1, the restricted version of equation (6.1), being unemployed does not
produce statistically significant impact on perceived mental health. Similarly result is found
for age and NRET. The level of education, in turn, was found to be positively associated
with mental health. The remaining control variables bear the expected signs.
In model specification (6.1) we allowed the impact of unemployment on mental health
to differ according to gender and the level of education, for non-retired individuals. None
of the newly introduced interaction terms is statistically significant. As for the remaining
variables, the results are similar to the ones obtained in the previous model specification, in
terms of both statistical significance and magnitude.
Regarding model 3, where we did not introduce the interaction terms of the model speci-
fication (6.2), the coefficients associated with each age group are not statistically significant,
similarly to what happened with the variable AGE in previous model specification. There-
fore, we can state that this model converges to the first restricted model.
The output of the last model specification is presented in Table F.4 in the last two
columns. For the newly introduced interaction terms between the level of education, age
group and UNEMP, we have that the only statistically significant ones are those referring to
individuals under 35 years old. In terms of marginal effects, the impact of being unemployed
on perceived mental health is estimated at 2.1, -3.1 and -10.1 points, for young individuals
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with basic, secondary and college education, respectively.3 The interactions corresponding
to the remaining age groups are dropped in the restricted model, similarly to what occurs
with the interactions including the variable gender.
Table F.5 summarises the results of the restricted versions of the four model specifi-
cations. Overall, being unemployed per se does not have an impact on perceived mental
health as the associated coefficient is statistically undistinguishable from 0, regardless of
model specification. Regarding the control variables, the associated effects operate in the
expected direction and their sign and magnitude are very similar across all estimated models.
We have that women score about 7 points less than men on the MHVS. Additionally, being
concerned about daily expenses and facing difficulties in paying current household expendi-
tures are associated with poorer mental health status (the effects amount to -5.4 and -6.4
points, respectively). In contrast, being able to accumulate savings after paying all expenses
is positively associated with mental health (5.5 points). Suffering from hypertension is asso-
ciated with a poorer mental health (around -5.4), whereas being physically active produces a
positive impact on MHVS amounting to 4.7 points. None of the remaining control variables
is statistically significant.
6.6 Discussion
Our results show that the mental health impact of being unemployed under the age of 35
varies according to education level of the individual. Though this impact is slightly positive
for individuals who only completed basic education, it becomes increasingly negative for
individuals with secondary and college education.
The magnitude of this effect is sizeable and amounts to -10.1 for individuals holding a
college degree. We conjecture that people with more years of schooling may have higher
3These figures correspond to the derivative of the estimated equation in order to UNEMP.
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expectations regarding job market opportunities, which are not met by the labour market.
The extent to which the magnitude of these unmet expectations is being affected by the
current economic and financial situation in Portugal one cannot know. As a matter of fact,
since we only have information referring to 2014/2015, we are not able to understand whether
the unmet expectations were caused by the crisis or if they were already present and the
crisis only contributed to their exacerbation.
As for the slightly positive effect of being unemployed on the MHVS that was found
for young individuals with basic schooling, we put forward the hypothesis that the utility
originating from the increase in leisure time more than compensates for the income decrease
faced by these individuals when moving to unemployment.
Both these results provide evidence in favour of the role loss theory in the sense that
more privileged individuals (in terms of educational level) are the ones being more affected
by unemployment, as far as mental health is concerned (Ashforth, 2001).
Regarding the control variables introduced in our model specifications, their associated
coefficients are in line with previous literature. We find evidence of gender differences in the
sense that women have poorer mental health than men (WHO, 2002).
As for the variables capturing the financial situation and expenditure concerns of the
household, evidence from WHO also shows that financial difficulties are positively associated
with mental health problems (WHO, 2011a; WHO and CGF, 2014).
In addition, we found the relationship between unemployment and perceived mental
health to be similar for men and women as the coefficient associated with the interaction
term between UNEMP and gender is statistically insignificant in the two model specifica-
tions where it is introduced. Previous evidence points to the fact that, when facing an
unemployment situation, men tend to react more negatively than women (Paul and Moser,
2009; Backhans and Hemmingsson, 2011; Breslin and Breslin, 2013; Clemens, Popham and
Boyle, 2014). This result may be related to the traditional breadwinning role of men within
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the household, so that men experience feelings of personal failure when they find them-
selves unable to maintain that role (Backhans and Hemmingsson, 2011). Alternatively, the
fact that women can more easily replace the rewards formerly provided by their job with
the nurturant family role, as put forward by the role enhancement hypothesis, may also be
contributing to this result (Artazcoz et al., 2004). The reason why we do not find any statis-
tically significant gender difference may be related to the increase in female labour market
participation rates in the last decade (OECD, 2012b).
Overall, our results may be reflecting the consequences of the recent economic crisis,
which is still present. Indeed, variables such as unemployment and income, two of the main
determinants of poor mental health, were largely affected by the economic downturn (OECD,
2012b).
Finally, our results allow us to draw some policy implications. Policies aiming at enhanc-
ing mental health and promoting employment should be coordinated rather than dissociated.
These policies should account for the fact that there is a particularly group within the pop-
ulation which is more vulnerable. This group consists in individuals under 35 years old, un-
employed and holding a college degree. Evidence shows that individuals living in countries
with generous unemployment benefits experience higher well-being during unemployment
than those living in less generous countries (McKee et al., 2005). Despite the fact that na-
tional social security systems have been facing additional pressure due to the economic crisis
(ISSA, 2012),4 policies focusing on unemployment benefits should not be discarded. Hence,
effective policies should combine the three key-areas: health, labour market and social se-
curity. This approach was already put forward by WHO (2005b), which suggested several
combined strategies, such as the protection of mental health of the unemployed through so-
cial and re-employment programs. Additionally, policies aimed at strengthening the strong
4Such pressure is originated both by increased expenditures with unemployment benefits and lower
revenue from contributions.
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social ties and networks are also of relevance as they help avoiding social isolation (Kawachi
and Berkman, 2001; Berchick et al., 2012).
In practice, Portugal has been implementing several measures targeting youth unemploy-
ment. Most of these were recommended by the EU to all member-states. To the best of our
knowledge, no assessment of the effects of these measures on the youth unemployment rate
was done so far.
All in all, our results point to the need for a coordinated and system-wide approach
towards mental health and unemployment. Though the policies implemented in Portugal
are not coordinated across these areas, the fact that they tackle unemployment may exert a
positive impact on the mental health of young individuals.
6.7 Limitations
It is worth highlighting some limitations of our analysis. The first one relates to the difficulty
in establishing a causal relationship between unemployment and poor mental health. Such
difficulty has been widely documented in the literature and termed as reverse causality
(Diette et al., 2012). More specifically, this effect relates to the fact that causality may run
in both directions: on the one hand, it may be that unemployment acts as a stressor thus
affecting the mental health of the individuals; on the other hand, those individuals might be
unemployed precisely due to their poorer mental health status. More recent studies using a
longitudinal, individual or panel approaches have manage to overcome this issue either by
controlling for the mental health status of individuals before their unemployment experience
or by focusing on changes in employment status (OECD, 2012b). Such studies were therefore
able to find a causal impact of unemployment on mental health (Paul and Moser, 2009; Farre´,
Fasani and Mueller, 2018). Since our data refers to a survey which was only carried out once,
we are not able to control for previous mental health status. Moreover, we lack information
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on the previous employment status of individuals, meaning that we cannot know whether
individuals faced a change from employment to unemployment. Hence, reverse causality
may be present in our results. As a guideline for further research, and in order to eliminate
this possible bias, one would need to conduct this survey at a different point in time and
use propensity score matching techniques to match the individuals in the two samples (note
that the individuals surveyed will not be the same in the two samples since it is not possible
to track their identities).
Additionally, we have only been concerned about whether an individual is employed or
unemployed. However, as previously put forward in the literature, the type of job and the
characteristics of the working environment also play an important role as far as mental health
status is concerned. In fact, it has been shown moving from unemployment to low quality job
can be detrimental to mental health (OECD, 2012b). Job insecurity, exposure to stress, no
career prospects and lack of work task control are some of the characteristics of low quality
jobs (OECD, 2012b).
There is also evidence in the literature that people experiencing mental health issues
remain unemployed for a longer period, which may further exacerbate their mental health
status and deplete their skills (OECD, 2012b). Previous literature has also highlighted the
importance of distinguish unemployed individuals in two groups, depending in whether they
are receiving unemployment benefits or not (Artazcoz et al., 2004). Due to the design of the
survey, we did not account for unemployment duration nor unemployment benefits in our
analysis.
6.8 Conclusion
This study provides additional evidence on the unemployment-mental health relationship,
using a sample of Portuguese population living in 4 different municipalities in the Lisbon
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area, covering distinct territorial backgrounds. We allow the impact of unemployment on
mental health to differ by age group and, within each age group, to vary according to the
individual educational level.
Our results provide evidence of a negative relationship between unemployment and men-
tal health for individuals under 35, while no such effect is found for other age groups. The
magnitude of this relationship increases with the level of education of the individual, cor-
responding to -10.1 points on the MHVS for those with a college degree. We conjecture
that our results may be reflecting the unmet expectations of young individuals who com-
pleted more years of schooling, as far as labour market outcomes are concerned. That is,
well-educated young unemployed appear as a particular vulnerable group of mental health
exposed to unemployment in times of economic crises. These results point to the need of
coordinating policies targeting both mental health and unemployment at this age group.
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Appendix A
Chapter1
A.1 Literature Review
A.1.1 Why a new mental health financing plan for Portugal?
Portugal was one of the first European countries to adopt a national law (“Lei de Sau´de
Mental”, 1963) in accordance to the principles of sectorisation,1 which enabled the creation
of mental health centers in every district and the appearance of various important actions,
such as integration of mental health in primary care and social psychiatry — moving medical
teams from psychiatric hospitals to community. These changes had a positive impact on the
improvement of accessibility and quality of care, enabling responses closer to the population
and a greater interaction with health centers and other community agencies (Almeida, 2009).
According to Kovess et al. (2005), Portugal does not have a consistent support to improve
mental health services, namely in terms of accessibility, equity and quality of care, which
explains why it is lagging behind in relation to other European countries. In fact, and
based on a study carried by the Portuguese Mental Health Plan,2 it was found psychiatric
1Establishment of small geographical catchment areas with dedicated mental health staff providing ser-
vices to all patients living in the area.
2Questionnaire performed in 5 psychiatric emergency services in the first quarter of 2007. The aim was
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patients have been struggling in schedule consultations and consequently their first option
is to use the emergency services. This finding can be related to problems with accessibility
to specialised care. Regarding quality of care, particularly continuity care, this study also
revealed patients who have been discharged can wait more than one month for a subsequent
consultation (Almeida, 2009).
Another important issue raised by this plan concerns the low level of resources, namely
human and financial, available for mental health in Portugal when compared to the real
contribution of mental illness to the global burden of disease. Both financial and human
resources are distributed in an unbalanced way between the various regions of the country,
where we have a clearly dichotomy between inland and rural areas (ACSS, 2015). Also, and
since most patients are being treated in general hospitals, it was found a discrepancy in the
distribution of psychiatrists between psychiatric hospitals and psychiatric departments in
general hospitals.3 This plan claims all these factors have been constrained the development
and improvement of services in the mental health sector.
Management and financing models of services have also been mentioned as another fun-
damental restraint on the development of mental health services.4 The argument is that
placing management and financing of local services in general hospitals and limiting the fi-
nancial autonomy of mental health departments, avoids any effort to develop comprehensive
services in the community (Almeida, 2009). Availability of community services is essential
since these services along with outpatient care can avoid relapses and, therefore, reduce
rehospitalisations (CIHI, 2008).
to evaluate the obstacles in the access to specialised psychiatric care in the past 12 months. Limitations of
the study: non-randomised study and selection bias.
3Data from 2005 revealed that we had 2.6 and 1.1 psychiatrists per 25,000 inhabitants in psychiatric
hospitals and general hospitals, respectively.
4Financing is the “mechanism by which mental health plans and policies are translated into action
through the allocation of resources”(WHO, 2003b, p.2).
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A.2 Data
A.2.1 DRG description codes
Table A.1: DRG description codes
DRG Description
424 Operating room procedure with principal diagnosis of mental illness
425 Acute adjustment reaction & psychosocial dysfunction
426 Depressive neuroses
427 Neuroses except depressive
428 Disorders of personality & impulse control
429 Organic disturbances and mental retardation
430 Psychosis
431 Childhood mental disorders
432 Other mental disorder diagnosis
A.2.2 Sources of Information — Hospital characteristics
The following hospital reports were used to gather information on hospital characteristics:
• EPE hospitals: Relato´rios e Contas from 2003 to 2012 — variables: cmi, beds, dp,
lstay, cost.
• from Unidade Operacional de Financiamento e Contratualizac¸a˜o: Relato´rios Nacionais
de Retorno 2007, 2008, and 2009 (EPE and SPA hospitals) — variables: cmi, dp, lstay.
• from Unidade Operacional de Gesta˜o Financeira: Relato´rio e Contas 2006 and 2007
(SPA hospitals), 2008 (EPE and SPA hospitals) — variables: cmi, beds, dp, lstay, cost.
• from Instituto de Gesta˜o Informa´tica e Financeira da Sau´de:
– Departamento de Consolidac¸a˜o e Controlo da Gesta˜o do SNS: Contas Globais
2001, 2002, and 2003 (SPA hospitals) — variables: cmi, beds, dp, lstay, cost
(except for 2003).
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– Relato´rio e Contas 2004 and 2005 (SPA hospitals) — variables: cmi, beds, dp,
lstay, cost.
• from ACSS: Tabela Hospitalar 2010, 2011, 2012 — variables: cmi, dp, lstay.
• from the report “Avaliac¸a˜o da experieˆncia de gesta˜o privada do Hospital Fernando
Fonseca (1995-2008)” issued by Universidade Nova de Lisboa we collect information
about Fernando Fonseca Hospital (Hospital Amadora-Sintra) from 2001 to 2007.
A.2.3 Hospital Mergers
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Table A.2: Hospital Mergers
ID before merge ID after merge Merge year
COND
PVVC 2001
VARZ
FUND
CHCB 2001
COVI
REAL
CHVR 2002
PESO
ABRA
CHMT 2003NOVA
TOMA
VIAN
CHAM 2003
LIMA
PMAO
CHBV 2004
LAGO
SERP
CHBA 2005
BEJA
EGAS
CHLO 2006XAVI
CRUZ
SETU
CHSE 2006
OUTA
BRAC
CHNT 2006MACE
MIRA
JOSE
CHLC 2007
ESTE
MART
CAPU
CHVR
CHTA 2007CHAV
LAME
GAIA
CHGE 2007
ESPI
FAMA
CHMA 2007
TIRS
PLEG
ULNA 2007
ELVA
GUIM
CHAA 2007
FAFE
ID before merge ID after merge Merge year
AMAR
CHVS 2008
VALE
MARI
CHLN 2008
PULI
ANTO
CHPO 2008MPIA
DINI
ALCB
CHON 2009PENI
CALD
FEIR
CHDV 2009MADE
OLIV
GUAR
ULSG 2009
SEIA
CHAM ULAM 2009
CHBA ULBA 2009
MONT
CHBM 2010
BARR
CAST ULCB 2010
JOAQ CHPO 2011
HUCO
CHUC 2011
CHCO
AVEI
CBVG 2011AGUE
ESTA
POMB
CHLP 2011LEIR
ALCB
JOAO
CHSJ 2011
VALO
VISE
CHTV 2011
TOND
CURR
CHLC 2012
MACO
CHON
CHO 2012
VEDR
CHBV
CHAL 2012
FARO
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A.2.4 Histogram – DRG
Figure A.1: Histogram – DRG
A.2.5 “Costs” and Hospital Capacity
Figure A.2: Average “Cost” per case by Small and Medium Capacity Hospitals
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A.2.7 Histogram – LOS
Figure A.3: Histogram – LOS less than 90 days
A.2.8 Average Length of Stay
Figure A.4: ALOS per year
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A.2.9 “Cost” per patient
Figure A.5: “Cost” per patient per year
265
A
.3
R
e
su
lt
s
A
.3
.1
T
re
a
tm
e
n
t
O
u
tc
o
m
e
s
266
T
ab
le
A
.4
:
F
ra
ct
io
n
al
R
es
p
on
se
G
en
er
al
iz
ed
L
in
ea
r
M
o
d
el
—
A
ve
ra
ge
M
ar
gi
n
al
E
ff
ec
ts
on
R
ea
d
m
is
si
on
R
at
e
D
R
G
42
5
D
R
G
42
6
D
R
G
42
7
D
R
G
42
8
D
R
G
42
9
D
R
G
43
0
D
R
G
43
1
D
R
G
43
2
vo
lu
m
e
0.
00
01
60
∗
0.
00
01
71
∗∗
∗
0.
00
02
91
∗∗
∗
0.
00
05
92
∗∗
∗
0.
00
02
65
∗∗
∗
0.
00
01
85
∗∗
∗
0.
00
13
7∗
∗∗
0.
00
00
43
0
(2
.1
4)
(5
.9
2)
(6
.7
1)
(4
.1
8)
(4
.5
5)
(8
.3
1)
(4
.7
4)
(1
.4
4)
cm
i
-0
.0
00
14
6
-0
.0
28
6∗
0.
00
02
37
-0
.0
12
7
-0
.0
24
4∗
∗∗
-0
.0
20
6
0.
04
24
∗
-0
.0
27
6
(-
0.
02
)
(-
2.
39
)
(0
.0
3)
(-
0.
56
)
(-
3.
36
)
(-
1.
74
)
(2
.3
8)
(-
1.
62
)
b
ed
s
0.
00
00
12
7
-0
.0
00
04
13
∗
0.
00
00
06
02
0.
00
00
67
2
-0
.0
00
02
57
0.
00
00
19
3
0.
00
00
40
7
-0
.0
00
01
59
(0
.5
3)
(-
2.
10
)
(0
.3
4)
(1
.1
9)
(-
1.
36
)
(0
.8
4)
(1
.5
5)
(-
0.
82
)
d
p
-0
.0
00
35
6
0.
00
02
77
-0
.0
00
20
8
-0
.0
01
93
-0
.0
00
01
18
-0
.0
02
92
∗∗
0.
00
03
47
0.
00
02
02
(-
0.
58
)
(0
.6
0)
(-
0.
34
)
(-
1.
27
)
(-
0.
02
)
(-
2.
97
)
(0
.6
0)
(0
.6
9)
ls
ta
y
0.
00
10
6
0.
00
10
2
0.
00
11
3
0.
00
05
48
0.
00
20
3
-0
.0
03
48
-0
.0
02
35
0.
00
01
70
(0
.8
3)
(0
.7
7)
(1
.0
4)
(0
.1
4)
(1
.7
9)
(-
1.
71
)
(-
1.
44
)
(0
.2
3)
to
ta
lc
os
t
-0
.0
00
03
40
0.
00
01
21
∗∗
-0
.0
00
08
90
∗
-0
.0
00
12
5
0.
00
00
72
4
0.
00
01
69
-0
.0
00
42
5∗
∗
0.
00
00
53
4
(-
0.
63
)
(2
.7
1)
(-
1.
97
)
(-
1.
24
)
(1
.8
4)
(1
.3
5)
(-
2.
84
)
(1
.0
5)
d
u
m
cm
i
-0
.0
05
51
-0
.0
08
69
-0
.0
09
77
-0
.0
03
53
-0
.0
80
5
-0
.0
09
32
0.
02
84
∗∗
-0
.0
46
8
(-
0.
91
)
(-
1.
59
)
(-
1.
24
)
(-
0.
22
)
(-
0.
31
)
(-
1.
74
)
(3
.2
5)
(-
1.
92
)
d
u
m
to
tc
os
t
-0
.0
07
74
-0
.0
04
49
-0
.0
07
03
-0
.0
05
30
-0
.0
05
01
-0
.0
04
98
0.
02
21
∗∗
∗
0.
00
41
0
(-
1.
37
)
(-
1.
04
)
(-
1.
33
)
(-
0.
34
)
(-
0.
90
)
(-
0.
49
)
(3
.3
1)
(1
.2
9)
d
u
m
ls
ta
y
-0
.0
00
17
8
-0
.0
30
8∗
∗∗
0.
00
83
5
-0
.0
33
2
-0
.0
25
9∗
-0
.0
30
8
-0
.0
25
4
-0
.0
09
86
(-
0.
01
)
(-
4.
00
)
(1
.3
3)
(-
0.
77
)
(-
2.
56
)
(-
1.
62
)
(-
1.
41
)
(-
1.
04
)
d
u
m
d
p
-0
.0
15
4
0.
02
90
∗∗
-0
.0
00
79
4
0.
01
11
-0
.0
48
5
0.
03
51
-0
.0
26
7
0.
02
86
(-
1.
15
)
(3
.0
5)
(-
0.
10
)
(0
.3
7)
(-
0.
11
)
(1
.7
2)
(-
1.
42
)
(1
.8
9)
d
u
m
b
ed
s
0.
00
97
5
0.
01
49
∗∗
-0
.0
07
42
-0
.0
02
14
0.
00
51
4
-0
.0
06
37
-0
.0
10
4
-0
.0
17
9∗
(1
.5
0)
(2
.9
9)
(-
1.
16
)
(-
0.
20
)
(0
.9
2)
(-
0.
47
)
(-
1.
53
)
(-
2.
04
)
N
68
7
66
6
44
3
42
1
77
1
64
5
35
4
38
6
t
st
at
is
ti
cs
in
p
ar
en
th
es
es
∗
p
<
0
.0
5,
∗∗
p
<
0.
01
,
∗∗
∗
p
<
0.
00
1
267
A.3.2 Rehospitalisations – Financing determinants
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Table A.5: Probit Model — Marginal effects
(1) (2)
dum rehosp dum rehosp
volume 0.0000664∗∗∗ 0.0000639∗∗∗
(14.72) (14.80)
age -0.00094∗∗∗ -0.00094∗∗∗
(-27.17) (-27.26)
gender 0.00428∗∗∗ 0.00421∗∗∗
(3.43) (3.37)
cmi -0.0365∗∗∗ -0.0361∗∗∗
(-6.17) (-6.12)
beds -0.000057∗∗∗ -0.000064∗∗∗
(-6.52) (-12.84)
dp -0.00034
(-1.37)
lstay 0.00475∗∗∗ 0.00548∗∗∗
(5.96) (8.09)
totalcost 0.00000897∗∗∗ 0.00000768∗∗∗
(4.76) (4.30)
dum cmi -0.00135
(-0.63)
dum totcost -0.00316
(-1.27)
dum lstay 0.01029
(1.36)
dum dp -0.0164∗ -0.00898∗∗∗
(-2.06) (-3.30)
dum beds -0.00341 -0.00494∗
(-1.21) (-2.15)
weight 0.0569∗∗∗ 0.0569∗∗∗
(30.67) (30.66)
N 135,367 135,367
PseudoR2 0.0390 0.0388
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table A.6: Probit Model — Marginal effects
(1) (2)
dum rehosp dum rehosp
volume 0.0000669∗∗∗ 0.0000659∗∗∗
(14.90) (15.29)
age -0.000976∗∗∗ -0.00098∗∗∗
(-29.09) (-29.18)
gender 0.00800∗∗∗ 0.00793∗∗∗
(6.42) (6.37)
cmi -0.03848∗∗∗ -0.0385∗∗∗
(-6.64) (-6.63)
beds -0.0000657∗∗∗ -0.0000655∗∗∗
(-7.17) (-13.17)
dp -0.00012
(-0.47)
lstay 0.00528∗∗∗ 0.005592∗∗∗
(6.64) (8.27)
totalcost 0.00001∗∗∗ 0.00000877∗∗∗
(4.99) (4.86)
dum cmi -0.0023
(-1.07)
dum totcost -0.0038 -0.00449∗
(-1.54) (-2.23)
dum lstay 0.01003
(1.35)
dum dp -0.01545 -0.00895∗∗∗
(-1.94) (-3.52)
dum beds -0.0023
(-0.83)
price rehosp -0.000045
(-0.88)
N 135,361 135,361
PseudoR2 0.0252 0.0251
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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A.3.3 Cost of emergency readmissions
Table A.7: Negative Binomial Regression
(1) (2)
readmission readmission
age 0.00300∗∗∗ 0.00301∗∗∗
(5.58) (5.63)
gender -0.0554∗∗∗ -0.0577∗∗∗
(-3.37) (-3.51)
cmi -0.344∗∗∗ -0.213∗∗
(-3.62) (-2.81)
beds -0.000248∗ -0.000230∗
(-2.46) (-2.38)
dp 0.00440 0.00683∗∗
(1.71) (2.87)
lstay 0.0714∗∗∗ 0.0725∗∗∗
(6.44) (6.56)
totalcost 0.0006∗
(2.43)
dumread3 -1.343∗∗∗ -1.342∗∗∗
(-30.66) (-30.68)
dumread6 -0.726∗∗∗ -0.738∗∗∗
(-22.55) (-23.34)
dumread13 0.0310
(1.03)
dumread21 0.508∗∗∗ 0.505∗∗∗
(10.65) (10.61)
cons 2.183∗∗∗ 2.059∗∗∗
(21.07) (22.99)
lnalpha
cons -0.928∗∗∗ -0.927∗∗∗
(-44.60) (-44.54)
N 7538 7538
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
We omit the results for the dummy variables due to space restrictions.
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Figure A.6: Observed versus Predicted Probabilities
Figure A.7: Estimation results vs Real emergency readmissions
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A.3.4 Services Organisation
A.3.4.1 Volume: Median and Percentile 75
Table A.8: Volume: Median and Percentile 75
Median Pctl 75
DRG 425 30 45
DRG 426 81 117
DRG 427 26 70
DRG 428 32 49
DRG 429 42 65
DRG 430 278 350
DRG 431 10 21
DRG 432 9 53
A.3.4.2 Duration Model
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Appendix B
Chapter 2
B.1 Methodology
Table B.1: Characterisation of experts
Number Profession Sex Experience (years) Region
1 Biologist, hospital manager M 11 North
2 Psychiatrist M 37 South
3 Economist, hospital manager M 18 South
4 Psychiatrist, hospital manager M 36 North
5 Psychiatrist M 39 North
6 Nurse F 39 South
7 Psychiatrist F 3 South
8 Psychologist F 29 South
9 Public health physician F 4 South
10 Psychiatrist M 3 South
11 Economist, hospital manager F 30 South
12 Psychiatrist M 24 South
13 Psychiatrist M 40 South
14 Psychiatrist F 3 South
15 Nurse M 14 South
16 Psychiatrist M 35 South
17 Social assistant F 25 South
18 Economist, hospital manager F 10 North
19 Psychologist M 19 South
20 Economist M 11 South
21 Psychiatrist F 10 North
22 GP M 42 South
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Appendix C
Chapter 3
C.1 Data
Table C.1: 3-digit codes from ICD-9-CM considered in the analysis
ICD-9-CM Description
291 Alcohol-induced mental disorders
292 Drug-induced mental disorders
295 Schizophrenic psychosis
296 Affective disorders
297 Delusional disorders
298 Non-organic psychosis
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C.1.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table C.2: Absolute and relative frequencies of the number of patients per ICD-9-CM
ICD-9-CM Number of patients Percentage
291 12 0.41%
292 65 2.22%
295 1,167 39.83%
296 989 33.75%
297 195 6.66%
298 500 17.06%
Figure C.1: Type of treatment services provided
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C.2 Results
C.2.1 Direct treatment costs
Table C.3: Average cost per ICD-9-CM per year
ICD-9-CM Average cost (e) Standard deviation
292 1,138 1,372
295 1,577 2,213
296 1,104 1,466
297 1,493 1,981
298 933 1,313
Table C.4: Average cost per type of care and its % of the total per diagnostic
Type of care Average cost (e) ICD 292 ICD 295 ICD 296 ICD 297 ICD 298
Outpatient 1,770 11.5% 13.1% 10.7% 8.7% 11.2%
Day care 3,759 17.9% 22.8% 6.5% 26.3% 9.6%
Inpatient care 3,752 61% 60.9% 75.9% 59.6% 64.6%
Emergency room 2,160 9.6% 3.2% 6.9% 5.4% 14.6%
Figure C.2: Kernel Density Estimate
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C.2.2 Cost determinants
Table C.5: GLM – Estimation results
ICD 292 ICD 295 ICD 296 ICD 297 ICD 298
age 0.022∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.002∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗
(7.86) (-26.30) (-2.22) (-4.07) (-22.44)
gender -0.807∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.399∗∗∗ -0.206∗∗∗ -0.120∗∗∗
(-11.92) (4.62) (15.28) (-4.12) (-4.70)
treat phase -0.124∗ 0.034 0.123∗∗∗ 0.087 0.308∗∗∗
(-2.21) (1.55) (4.57) (1.77) (11.56)
cons 7.575∗∗∗ 8.648∗∗∗ 7.401∗∗∗ 8.379∗∗∗ 8.045∗∗∗
(65.28) (243.91) (141.03) (83.05) (163.11)
N 633 13,447 8,585 1,792 5,861
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Appendix D
Chapter 4
D.1 Data
D.1.1 Sources of Information
The socio-economic variables were collected for each municipality belonging to ARS Centro.
• Unemployment rate (unemp rate) – It was computed considering the number of unem-
ployed individuals registered in the Institute for Employment and Vocational Training
(IEFP) divided by the total number of residents in each municipality aged between 15
and 64 years. This information was collected from the Pordata database (available at
www.pordata.pt) and is available from 2009 to 2015.
• Average wage (avg wage) – Average monthly wage of employed workers, expressed
in euros. This information was gathered from Pordata database and it is available
between 2009 and 2013.
• Percentage of beneficiaries of social benefits (Rendimento Social de Inserc¸a˜o, RSI)
(pct rsi) – Quoting verbatim from www.pordata.pt, the social benefit is “included in
291
the welfare sub-system and social integration programme, in order to provide support
for beneficiaries and their households, which is adapted to their specific context, meets
their essential needs and fosters progressive social, community and labour force inte-
gration”. The information was collected from PORDATA database and we have data
from 2009 to 2015.
• Number of physicians per 10,000 inhabitants (nr phys) – This data was collected from
Marktest Consulting database. It is available for all years under analysis.
• Pharmacy index (pharm index ) – It is a relative measure created by Marktest Con-
sulting in order to compare municipalities with one another. It is expressed in ‰ and
its computation uses the following formula:
marktest indexj =
∑n
i=1 Pji
n
where, Pji is the relative weight of municipality j in relation to a variable i. In our
case, we only have one variable, which is the number of pharmacies. This information
is available from 2009 to 2015.
292
D.1.2 Descriptive Statistics
Figure D.1: Number of patients per year
Figure D.2: Prescription volume per year
293
Figure D.3: Prescription rate by ATC codes
Figure D.4: Yearly evolution of prescription rates by main ATC codes
Figure D.5: Non-adherence rate — Kernel density
294
Figure D.6: Average non-adherence rate per year
Figure D.7: Non-adherence rate by ATC codes
Figure D.8: Non-adherence rate per municipality — Top and bottom 10%
295
Figure D.9: Prescription rate per municipality — Top and bottom 10%
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D.2 Results
Table D.2: Estimates of equation (4.3) using GEE method — fractional probit
All psychotropics AHS Antidepressants
Coefficient APE Coefficient APE Coefficient APE
pct rsi 0.053∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
avg wage -0.001∗∗ -0.0003∗∗ -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.002∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
unemp rate 0.038∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ -0.015∗ -0.004∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
pharm index 0.033∗ 0.009∗ 0.002 0.001 0.062∗∗ 0.017∗∗
nr phys -0.020∗∗ -0.006∗∗ -0.012∗∗ -0.003∗∗ -0.020∗∗ -0.006∗∗
avg age -0.031∗∗ -0.009∗∗ -0.040∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.057∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗
cons -0.068 - 0.203 - -0.397 -
Working correlation 0.029 0.412 -0.082
Number of municipalities 539 539 539
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Estimations include time averages of the six explanatory variables.
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D.3 Robustness Checks
Table D.3: Estimates of equation (4.3) using GEE method — fractional probit using inde-
pendent WCM
All psychotropics AHS Antidepressants
Coefficient APE Coefficient APE Coefficient APE
pct rsi 0.053∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗ 0.012∗∗
avg wage -0.001∗∗ -0.0003∗∗ -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.002∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
unemp rate 0.038∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ -0.015∗ -0.004∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
pharm index 0.034∗ 0.009∗ 0.002 0.001 0.062∗∗ 0.017∗∗
nr phys -0.020∗∗ -0.006∗∗ -0.012∗∗ -0.003∗∗ -0.020∗∗ -0.006∗∗
avg age -0.031∗∗ -0.009∗∗ -0.040∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.057∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗
cons -0.076 - 0.187 - -0.377 -
Number of municipalities 539 539 539
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Estimations include time averages of the six explanatory variables.
Table D.4: Estimates of equation (4.3) using GEE method — fractional probit with year
dummies
All psychotropics AHS Antidepressants
Coefficient APE Coefficient APE Coefficient APE
pct rsi -0.024∗∗ -0.007∗∗ -0.021∗ -0.006∗ -0.023∗∗ -0.006∗∗
avg wage 0.0001 0.000 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.000
unemp rate -0.009 -0.002 -0.004 -0.001 -0.013 -0.003
pharm index 0.005 0.001 0.008 0.002 0.002 0.001
nr phys -0.006∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗ -0.001∗∗
avg age -0.006 -0.002 -0.022∗∗ -0.006∗∗ -0.004 -0.001
cons -0.434 - 0.026 - -1.137∗ -
Working correlation 0.449 0.504 0.271
Number of municipalities 539 539 539
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Estimations include time averages of the six explanatory variables and year dummies.
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Appendix E
Chapter 5
Proof of Proposition 1
The equation which generates xˆa (w2) is F (w2, xa) = 0, with F (w2, xa) = p
′
a (xa) (w2 + αb)−
c′ (xa). As F is C3, F ′xa (w2, xˆa (w2)) = p
′′
a (xˆa (w2)) (w2 + αb)−c′′ (xˆa (w2)) < 0 and F ′w2 (w2, xˆa (w2)) =
p′a (xˆa (w2)) > 0, we get, using the implicit function theorem, that xˆ
′
a (w2) > 0. As w2 does
not influence x, according to (5.17), x∗a is increasing with w2.
Proof of Proposition 2
Let f be the function defined by f (x) = (pa (x)− pn (x)) b − k. We know that f is
differentiable and, in the conditions of this proposition, f (0) ≥ 0. On the other hand,
because of (5.3), f ′ (x) = (p′a (x)− p′n (x)) b ≥ 0, which means ∀x ≥ 0, f (x) ≥ 0 and,
∀x ≥ 0, d∗ (x) = a. Therefore, x = 0.
As for the patient’s and physician’s utilities, they become defined by, respectively:
u (x) = pa (x) b− k (E.1)
v (x) = w1 + pa (x) (w2 + αb)− c (x) (E.2)
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As w1 is a constant in (E.2), it does not influence x
∗. Hence, the Government’s utility is
defined by:
s (w1, w2) = u (x
∗ (w2)) + vu (x∗ (w2))− λ (w1 + pa (x∗ (w2))w2) (E.3)
As w1 only has a negative effect in (E.3), w
∗
1 = 0, which proves 1.
We know that ∀x ≥ 0, v′′ (x) = p′′a (x) (w2 + αb)− c′′ (x) < 0, because of (5.4) and (5.8).
Besides, (5.1), (5.7) and (5.8) imply that ∃x ≥ 0 : v′ (x) < 0. Let g be the function defined
by g (w2) = p
′
a (0) (w2 + αb) − c′ (0). This function gives, for each value of w2, v′ (0). As
g′ (w2) = p′a (0) ≥ 0, it is increasing, and it has a zero at:
c′ (0)
p′a (0)
− αb (E.4)
If (E.4) is non - negative, then, ∀w2 ≥ 0, g (w2) ≥ 0, which means that there is exactly
one xˆ ≥ 0 such that v′ (xˆ) = 0. As v is C2 and strictly concave, xˆ is the unique global
maximizer of v. In this case, x∗a = xˆa (w2) which, according to the Proof of Proposition 1,
means that x∗a is strictly increasing with w2. Hence, no value of w2 is ruled out as a possible
equilibrium and w2 = 0. But, if (E.4) is negative, no w2 lower than (E.4) is ever chosen by
the Government. This is because, if w2 were in that interval, ∀x ≥ 0, v′ (x) ≤ 0. As the
domain of v is R+0 , we would have x∗ (w2) = 0. Observing (E.3), the Government’s utility
would be lower in this case than when w2 = 0, which means w2 is not optimal. Gathering
both cases, we get that w2 = max {0, (E.4)}. As (E.4) is decreasing in b and in α, so is w2.
On the other hand, if w2 = b, (5.16) and (5.22) become equivalent, which means the
physician chooses xFB. In this case, the expression u (x∗ (w2)) + vu (x∗ (w2)) in (E.3) attains
its maximum. A higher w2 than b does not increase this expression and, as x
∗ is increasing
in w2, reduces −λ (w1 + pa (x∗ (w2))w2), which means any w2 > b is never chosen by the
Government, and w2 ≤ b, thus concluding the proof of 2.
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If λ = 0, (E.3) becomes (5.21) when d = a, and the Government’s utility is not affected
by its choice of w1 and w2. Therefore, the Government chooses w2 = b in order to induce
x∗ = xFB and maximize (5.21). This proves 3.
If λ ≥ λ, w∗2 = 0 and x∗ = xIa, both constant and, therefore, non - strictly increasing in α
and b and non - strictly decreasing in λ. Otherwise, w∗2 is positive and characterized by (5.24).
On the other hand, x∗ > 0, because, otherwise, w∗2 would not be positive. This means that
the physician is choosing the effort level according to (5.24). The implicit function theorem,
as used in the Proof of Proposition 1, allows us to conclude the following (omitting the
arguments, for an easier reading):
x∗′ (w2) = − p
′
a
(w2 + αb) p′′a − c′′
(E.5)
x∗′′ (w2) = −x∗′p
′′
a ((w2 + αb) p
′′
a − c′′)− p′a (p′′a + (w2 + αb) p′′′a − c′′′)
((w2 + αb) p′′a − c′′)2
(E.6)
Using (5.3), (5.4), (5.5), (5.8) and (5.9), we conclude that (E.5) is positive and (E.6) is
negative. Gathering (5.16) and (5.24), we get that w∗2 (α, b, λ) is defined by F (α, b, λ, w2) = 0,
with F (α, b, λ, w2) = (b− (1 + λ)w2) p′a (x∗ (w2))x∗′ (w2) − λp. As F is C3, omitting the
arguments, we get that F ′w2 = −λp′ax∗′ + (b− (1 + λ)w2)
(
p′′ax
∗′2 + pax∗′′
)
. According to
(5.25), (b− (1 + λ)w2) > 0, which implies that F ′w2 < 0, and the implicit function theorem
may be applied to get w∗2
′
α, w
∗
2
′
b and w
∗
2
′
λ. As (omitting the arguments), F
′
α = 0, F
′
b = p
′
ax
∗′ >
0 and F ′λ = −w∗2p′ax∗′ − p < 0, we conclude that w∗2 ′α = 0, w∗2 ′b > 0 and w∗2 ′λ < 0. Because
(E.5) is positive, we also get that x∗ is increasing with α and b and decreasing with λ. This
proves 4.
Proof of Proposition 3
The f function in the Proof of Proposition 2 is still differentiable and such that ∀x ≥
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0, f ′ (x) ≥ 0. However, as (pa − pn) (0) b < k, f (0) < 0 and x > 0. But, as va
(
xIa
) ≥ vn (x∗n),
in any possible equilibrium, the patient’s, physician’s and Government’s utilities are still
defined by, respectively, (E.1), (E.2) and (E.3), which means 1 is still valid. As for the proof
of 2 and 4, the reasoning in the Proof of Proposition 2 may be adjusted, replacing x = 0
with x = x. The proof of 3 suffers no changes.
Proof of Proposition 4
In this situation, we have x > 0, and, if (w∗1, w
∗
2) = (0, 0), x
∗ = x∗n. If x
∗ > x, x∗ must be
the unique global maximizer of va. This is because, if x ≥ x is a non - binding constraint in
the problem maxxa va (xa) subject to xa ≥ x, then it must be true that v′a (x∗) = 0. As va is
differentiable and v′′a < 0, v is strictly concave and x
∗ is the unique global maximizer of va.
Because vn ≤ va and x∗n 6= x∗, we get that va (x∗) > vn (x∗n).
Proof of Proposition 5
There are three types of equilibrium in this setting. In the first, the physician chooses
x∗n and the Government’s utility is given by un (x
∗
n) + vn (x
∗
n)− l, which is not affected by λ.
In the second, the physician is indifferent between inducing adherence or not, and, ac-
cording to Proposition 4, is choosing x. In this type of equilibrium, it must be true that
vn (x
∗
n) = vu (x)+w
∗
1 +pa (x)w
∗
2. Hence, the Government’s utility is given by ua (x)+vu (x)−
λ (w∗1 + pa (x)w
∗
2) = ua (x) + vu (x)− λ (vn (x∗n)− vu (x)), which is decreasing in λ.
In the third, the physician strictly prefers to induce adherence, and we have x∗ > x,
w∗1 = 0 and w
∗
2 > 0. To see why, notice that, if w
∗
1 were positive, it would be possible to
increase sa by reducing w1 to 0 which would change nothing in the physician’s decision and
would decrease the term w∗1 + pa (x)w
∗
2 in sa. If w
∗
1 = 0, and because va
(
xIa
)
< vn (x
∗
n),
w∗2 must be positive so that the decision of the physician is not x
∗
n. If we had x
∗ = x, the
Government could reduce w2 until the physician was indifferent between inducing adherence
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or not, which would change nothing but the expected payment of the Government, thus
increasing the Government’s utility.
In this type of equilibrium, as we know from the Proof of Proposition 2, w∗2 ≤ b. In
general, if (w1, w2) = (0, 0), x
∗ = x. This is because, if xIa were higher than x, we would
get, by the same reason applied in the Proof of Proposition 4, that xIa would be the global
maximizer of va, implying that va
(
xIa
) ≥ vn (x∗n), a contradiction. Hence, and given that, in
this type of equilibrium, w∗1 = 0, w
∗
2 must be high enough such that x
∗ > x. The highest
value of w2 which assures that this is not true is the one which makes x > x a non - binding
constraint. That is, w2 is such that v
′
a (x) = 0, or
(
w2 + αb
)
p′a (x)− c′ (x) = 0.
Notice that x = (pa − pn)−1
(
k
b
)
, which is increasing in k and decreasing with b, so we
can write x′b (b, k) ≤ 0 and x′k (b, k) ≥ 0. Defining F
(
α, b, k, w2
)
=
(
w2 + αb
)
p′a (x (b, k)) −
c′ (x (b, k)), a C3 function, and noticing that F ′w2
(
α, b, k, w2
)
= p′a (x (b, k)) > 0, F
′
α
(
α, b, k, w2
)
=
bp′a (x (b, k)) > 0, F
′
b
(
α, b, k, w2
)
= αp′a (x (b, k)) + (αbp
′′
a (x (b, k))− c′′ (x (b, k)))x′b (b, k) > 0
and F ′k
(
α, b, k, w2
)
=
((
w2 + αb
)
p′′a (x (b, k))− c′′ (x (b, k))
)
x′k (b, k) ≤ 0, we conclude that
w2
′
α
(α, b, k) < 0, w2
′
b
(α, b, k) < 0 and w2
′
k
(α, b, k) ≥ 0.
Applying the envelope theorem to maxw2 sa (0, w2), we find that:
s∗a
′
λ (λ) = −pa (x∗ (0, w∗2 (λ)))w∗2 (λ) < 0
, which mean the optimal Government’s utility in this type of equilibrium is decreasing in
λ. When λ = 0, we know, from the Proof of Proposition 2, that, in this type of equilibrium,
x∗ = xFB and the Government’s utility is as high as it may be, higher than what it is in
the other two types of equilibrium. As the Government’s utility changes continuously with
λ in all three types of equilibrium, this type of equilibrium is the one which occurs when
λ is low. In the second and third type of equilibrium, the Government’s utility approaches
−∞ when λ approaches +∞, whereas, in the first type of equilibrium, it is not affected by
λ. Therefore, when λ is high, the first type of equilibrium is occurring. The second type
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of equilibrium may occur for moderate values of λ if, when λ grows from 0 to +∞, there
are some values of λ such that the Government’s utility in this type of equilibrium is higher
than in the others.
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F.2 Methodology
Table F.3: Variables within the vectors
Υ Ω Γ
AGE
GENDER GENDER UNEMP NRET
GENDER UNEMP YOUNGER
GENDER UNEMP ADULT1
GENDER UNEMP ADULT2
SINGLE
DIVORCED
WIDOWED
BMI
DIABETES
HYPERTENSION
SMOKE
PHYSICAL
PRIMARY EDUC PRIM UNEMP NRET
PRIM UNEMP ADULT1
PRIM UNEMP ADULT2
BASIC EDUC BASIC UNEMP NRET
BASIC UNEMP YOUNGER
BASIC UNEMP ADULT1
BASIC UNEMP ADULT2
SECOND EDUC SECOND UNEMP NRET
SECOND UNEMP YOUNGER
SECOND UNEMP ADULT1
SECOND UNEMP ADULT2
COLLEGE EDUC COLLEGE UNEMP NRET
COLLEGE UNEMP YOUNGER
COLLEGE UNEMP ADULT1
COLLEGE UNEMP ADULT2
HIGHER INCOME
LOWER INCOME
SAVING CAPACITY
FINANCIAL RESTRAINT
HIGH FINANCIAL CONCERN
LOW FINANCIAL CONCERN
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Table F.4: Estimation results Model 1 to Model 4
(Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4)
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
MHVS MHVS MHVS MHVS MHVS MHVS MHVS MHVS
unemployed 0.521 10.85 0.633 7.827
nretired -0.067 -0.555
age -0.045 -0.039
gender -7.099∗∗∗ -6.766∗∗∗ -7.286∗∗∗ -7.143∗∗∗ -6.992∗∗∗ -6.766∗∗∗ -7.152∗∗∗ -7.254∗∗∗
single -2.521∗ -2.435 -1.981 -1.982
divorced -2.219 -2.264 -2.425 -2.543
widowed -3.399 -3.361∗ -3.148 -4.084∗ -3.361∗ -3.781∗
BMI 0.005 -0.018 -0.004 -0.018
diabetes -1.435 -1.210 -1.554 -1.365
hypertension -5.043∗∗∗ -5.208∗∗∗ -5.079∗∗∗ -5.395∗∗∗ -5.441∗∗∗ -5.208∗∗∗ -5.520∗∗∗ -5.371∗∗∗
smoke -1.760 -1.561 -1.617 -1.302
physical 4.702∗∗∗ 4.779∗∗∗ 4.719∗∗∗ 4.592∗∗∗ 4.724∗∗∗ 4.779∗∗∗ 4.800∗∗∗ 4.685∗∗∗
primary educ 1.202 1.893 1.243 1.943
basic educ 5.669∗∗ 4.999∗∗∗ 6.975∗∗ 5.936∗∗∗ 6.259∗∗ 4.999∗∗∗ 7.595∗∗∗ 5.966∗∗∗
second educ 6.281∗∗ 5.500∗∗∗ 7.772∗∗∗ 6.471∗∗∗ 6.963∗∗ 5.500∗∗∗ 8.481∗∗∗ 6.805∗∗∗
college educ 4.552∗ 3.801∗∗ 6.370∗∗ 4.875∗∗∗ 5.252∗ 3.801∗∗ 7.109∗∗ 5.450∗∗∗
higher income -2.021 -2.110 -1.922 -2.242
lower income -1.412 -1.557 -1.543 -1.629
saving capacity 5.229∗∗∗ 5.458∗∗∗ 5.166∗∗∗ 5.442∗∗∗ 5.242∗∗∗ 5.458∗∗∗ 5.196∗∗∗ 5.469∗∗∗
financial restraint -6.579∗∗∗ -6.643∗∗∗ -6.639∗∗∗ -6.587∗∗∗ -6.601∗∗∗ -6.643∗∗∗ -6.648∗∗∗ -6.447∗∗∗
high financial concern -5.167∗∗∗ -5.604∗∗∗ -5.044∗∗∗ -5.467∗∗∗ -5.125∗∗∗ -5.604∗∗∗ -4.999∗∗∗ -5.397∗∗∗
low financial concern 5.252 4.873 5.262 4.692
prim unemp nret -5.803
basic unemp nret -11.41
second unemp nret -12.67∗
college unemp nret -16.32∗
gender unemp nret 2.614
younger -0.114 -0.631
adult1 -0.112 -1.098
adult2 0.073 -0.433
younger unemp 17.54 25.20∗
adult2 unemp -1.075
basic unemp younger -24.41∗ -23.14∗
second unemp younger -27.73∗ -28.25∗
college unemp younger -35.54∗∗ -35.28∗∗
prim unemp adult1 -1.234
basic unemp adult1 -5.672
second unemp adult1 -10.16
college unemp adult1 -8.268
prim unemp adult2 -0.845
basic unemp adult2 -11.70
second unemp adult2 -5.658
college unemp adult2 -6.777
gender unemp younger 1.224
gender unemp adult1 2.128
gender unemp adult2 0.963
cons 63.96∗∗∗ 60.33∗∗∗ 63.35∗∗∗ 59.49∗∗∗ 61.42∗∗∗ 60.33∗∗∗ 60.96∗∗∗ 59.22∗∗∗
N 1464 1464 1464 1464 1464 1464 1464 1464
R2 0.210 0.203 0.215 0.200 0.209 0.203 0.218 0.207
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table F.5: Summary of the results obtained in restricted Models 1 to 4
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(MHVS) (MHVS) (MHVS) (MHVS)
financial restraint -6.643∗∗∗ -6.587∗∗∗ -6.643∗∗∗ -6.447∗∗∗
second educ 5.500∗∗∗ 6.471∗∗∗ 5.500∗∗∗ 6.805∗∗∗
basic educ 4.999∗∗∗ 5.936∗∗∗ 4.999∗∗∗ 5.966∗∗∗
gender -6.766∗∗∗ -7.143∗∗∗ -6.766∗∗∗ -7.254∗∗∗
saving capacity 5.458∗∗∗ 5.442∗∗∗ 5.458∗∗∗ 5.469∗∗∗
physical 4.779∗∗∗ 4.592∗∗∗ 4.779∗∗∗ 4.685∗∗∗
widowed -3.361∗ -3.361∗
high financial concern -5.604∗∗∗ -5.467∗∗∗ -5.604∗∗∗ -5.397∗∗∗
college educ 3.801∗∗ 4.875∗∗∗ 3.801∗∗ 5.450∗∗∗
hypertension -5.208∗∗∗ -5.395∗∗∗ -5.208∗∗∗ -5.371∗∗∗
second unemp younger -28.25∗
college unemp younger -35.28∗∗
younger unemp 25.20∗
basic unemp younger -23.14∗
cons 60.33∗∗∗ 59.49∗∗∗ 60.33∗∗∗ 59.22∗∗∗
N 1464 1464 1464 1464
R2 0.203 0.200 0.203 0.207
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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